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Preface
The vastness of the ocean and its various processes that support life and earth 
remain a big challenge for humanity. Despite so much achievement in human 
civilization, logistic, to information technology to multimedia and sensor 
technology, the knowledge of water and ocean has left man with much more work 
to do on innovation front and new discovery. Modern day challenges are cluster 
of alternative energy, protection of the environment, ocean space exploration, 
sensing technology and material science. The book presents recent studies that 
have been carried out in maritime research and innovation front. Potential users 
of the books are library, societies, universities, research centers, professional 
bodies, government and NGO.
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Introduction
The book will represent a master piece that provides information and guidance 
on future direction of marine technology and sustainability requirement. The 
book focuses on various contemporary issues that make its contents richer, more 
informative and beneficial to the wide number of readers in industry and academic 
sphere. This book provides the most recent information about proactive approach to 
sustainable development technology for readers about requirements of sustainable 
marine system. The book will be useful as followed:
• Reference material for academician, students, researcher, universities 
library, research institution as well as classroom subject.
• Networking, literature citation
• Useful information for maritime industry and organization Industry and 
regulatory institution. 
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Abstract
Marine vessel collisions cover the largest part of accidents scenario in waterways. 
Waterways accidents expose vessel owners and operators as well as the public to risk. They 
attract possibility of losses such as vessel cargo damage, injuries, loss of life, environmental 
damage and obstruction of water ways. Collision risk is a product of the probability of the 
physical event its occurrence as well as losses of various nature including economic losses. 
Environmental problem and need for system reliability call for innovative methods and tools 
to assess and analyze extreme operational, accidental and catastrophic scenarios as well 
as accounting for the human element and integrate these into a design environments part 
of design objectives. This paper discusses modeling of waterways collision risk frequency 
in waterways. The analysis consider mainly the waterways dimensions and other related 
variables of risk factors like operator skill, vessel characteristics, traffic characteristics, 
topographic, environmental difficulty of the transit and quality of operator’s information in 
transit which are required for decision support related to efficient, reliable and sustainable 
waterways developments. The probability per year predicted is considered acceptable in 
maritime and offshore industry but for a channel using less number of expected traffic, 
it could be considered high. Providing safety facilities like traffic separation, vessel traffic 
management could restore maximize sustainable use of the channel.
Keywords: Collision; Environmental Prevention; Frequency; Inland Waterways; Risk; 
Reliability; 
Introduction
Collision in waterways falls under high consequence incidents, collision data may be 
imperfect or inconstant, making it difficult to account for dynamic issues associated with 
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2vessels and waterways requirement. Accounting for these lapses necessitated need to 
base collision analysis on hybrid use of deterministic, probabilistic or simulation methods 
depending on the availability of a data.Developing sustainable Inland Water Transportation 
(IWT) requires transit risk analyses of waterways components and relationship between 
factors such as environmental conditions, vessel characteristics, operator’s information 
about the waterway as well as the incidence of groundings and collisions using available 
data. Whatever information is available is useful for risk and reliability based decision work 
of accidents rate of occurrence, consequence and mitigation [1,2]. Risk and reliability based 
design entails the systematic integration of risk analysis in the design process targeting 
system risk prevention, reduction that meet high level goal and leave allowance for integrated 
components of the system including environment that will facilitate and support a holistic 
approach for reliable and sustainable waterways appropriate and require trade-offs and 
advance decision making leading to optimal design solutions. 
Frequency estimation work on channel lead to fundamental sustainable model of transit 
risk that include factors such as traffic type and density, navigational aid configuration, 
channel design and waterway configuration and classification. For cases where there 
are insufficient historical record to support their inclusion, more comprehensive models 
of transit risk will have to rely on integral use of hybrid of deterministic, probabilistic, 
stochastic method whose result could further be simulated or employ expert judgment to 
optimize deduced result [3]. Risk based collision model are derivative for improvement of 
maritime accident data collection, preservation and limit acceptability using information 
relating to the following:
• Ports for entering incidents 
• Wind speed and direction, visibility, water level, current speed and direction, etc.
• Eliminate/correct erroneous and duplicate entries (e.g. location information)
• Record data on actual draft and trim, presence and use of tugs, presence of pilots
• Types of cargo and vessel movements
• Report barge train movements as well as individual barges
• Improve temporal resolution (transits by day or hour)
This paper describes frequency analysis of risk based model, where accident frequency 
are determined and matched with waterway variables and parameter. The result hopes to 
contribute to decision support for development and regulation of inland water transportation. 
Background
The study area is Langat River, 220 m long navigable inland water that has been under 
utilized. Personal communication and river cruise survey revealed that collision remain the 
main threat of the waterways despite less traffic in the waterways. This make the case to 
establish risk and reliability based model for collision aversion for sustainable development 
of the waterways a necessity. Data related to historical accidents, transits and environmental 
conditions were collected. Accident data are quite few, this is inherits to most water ways 
and that make probabilistic methods the best preliminary method to analyze the risk which 
can be optimized through expert rating and simulation methods as required Figure 1.
Barge and tug of capacity 5000T and 2000T are currently plying this waterway at draft 
of 9 and 15 m respectively. Collisions (including contact between two vessels and between 
a vessel and a fixed structure) causes of collision linked to navigation system failure, 
mechanical failure and vessel motion failure are considered in this work towards design of 
safe and reliable the river for transportation. Safety associated with small craft is not taken 
into account. Below is relevant information relating to channel, vessel and environment 
3employed in the risk process. Lack of information about the distribution of transits during 
the year, the joint distribution of ship size, flag particular, environmental conditions become 
main derivative from probabilistic estimation.
 
Figure 1: Langat map.
In total risk management system of various methods is used according to result 
expectation and performance contribution. The study use Langat River to a case study to 
test the model, because it is a big River with big potential that is underutilized. The testing 
of the model on Langat could help decision support for its development and regulation in 
future. Table 1 shows some of advantage associated with use of the risk methods [2,4]. 
The model described is suitable for preventive safety reliability decision for new water way 
development. When it is safe the environment is preserved and protected.
Approach Main Advantages Main Disadvantages
Statistical method Long been regarded as the only reliable sources.
Limitation with incident reports, difficulty in application to 
the future.
Comprehensive risk analysis Rational, includes consequences. Relies on accident data for benchmarking.
Stochastic method Predict unfavourable conditions, inexpensive.
Targets known scenarios, limits choice of software/
programs, restricted to occurrence probability.
Computer simulation method Target extreme condition. Could left out certain information in real life.
Expert opinions Long been used when limited by data. Subjective.
Table 1: Methods for risk work.
Baseline Data’s: Vessel movement, port call consists of two transits.
IN Langat River: one into and one out of the port. Safe transit data consider the 
same barge type and size for risk analysis are considered Table 2 and 3, Figure 2.
Channel Parameters
Width Depth
Maneuvering lane
Vessel Clearance
Bank suction
Wind effect
Current effect
Channel with bends
Navigationaids
Pilot
Tugs
Draught
Trim
Squat
Exposureallowance
Fresh water adjutment
Maneuvering allowance
Overdepth allowance
depth transition
Tidal alllowance
Table 2: River Langat tributary.
4Approach channel
Design parameter
Straight Bend
98 m 120 m
3-6 m 3-6 m
Side slope 10H:1V 10H:1V
Estuarine 135.7km North (44.2km) South (9.9km)
Table 3: River width and depth parameters.
                              
Channel width: One way traffic 
     Straight channel: 98 m,  
     Bend: 120 m, Depth: 6 m 
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Figure 2: Channel width parameter.
Required radius of curvature at bends for 5000 DWT, Towed barge Length=Barge 
Length+Tug Length+Tow Line, R> (4-6) length of barge train (to meet the navigation 
requirement): PIANC, 2007. The main risk contributing factors can fall under the following:
Operator skill: There is no direct measure of this risk, inherently, highly skilled or 
seasoned operators and those with better local knowledge, may be expected to produce 
a lower risk of accidents. Flag ship or expert rating, port policy for entrance procedure 
could be used, this case frequency analysis relating to collision by barge flag or operator is 
considered
Vessel characteristics: Maneuverability capability of vessel could determine probability 
of accident, maneuverability data is difficult to acquire in waterways that has no Automatic 
Identification System (AIS) system in place. Therefore, analysis rely on derivative from vessel 
type and size, barge trains are, in general, likely to be less maneuverable than ships [5].
Traffic characteristics: Most wind and visibility information are hourly tracked through 
installed higher wind speed range which are likely from sensor located at the airport. There 
is potential visibility fluctuation resulting from this [3].
Topographic difficulty of the transit: The number of bent in the channel also adds to 
channel complexity which needs further consideration.
Environmental condition: This involves analysis of the effect of wind speed, visibility, and 
water level on accident risk. A transit characterized by unfavorable environmental conditions, 
such as high wind, poor visibility, or strong currents, may be expected to involve a greater risk 
of accidents than a transit through the same area under more favorable conditions.
5Water Level: Accident due to tide are much linked to grounding, we assume that there 
is significant correlation between collision and grounding, Figure 3 shows the distribution 
of predicted and observed water level, if the distribution during groundings had a larger 
peak in the low water level, this could be due to increased risk of groundings or large 
(negative) errors in the tide forecasts used by vessel operators, this could be reduced through 
maximization of underkeel clearance against deep draft vessel [6].
Tide Forecast Error: Large forecast errors resulting in lower than forecast actual water 
levels. River complexity Figure 3 shows some of the model that is used to address various 
river complexities to manage safety and protect environment along Langat and it tributary. 
This model can be translated into benefit for reduction option.
 
Figure 3: Channel straightening and alignment.
Barge parameter 2000 tons 5000 tons
Length (m) 67.3 76.2
Beam (m) 18.3 21.3
Depth (m) 3.7 4.9
Draft (m) 2.9 4.0
Table 4: Vessel requirement: barge parameter.
Tugs parameter 2000 tons 5000 tons
Length (m) 23.8 23.8
Beam (m) 7.8 7.8
Depth (m) 3.5 3.5
Draft (m) 2.8 2.8
Horse Power (hp) 1200 1200
Table 5: Vessel requirement: tug parameter.
Table 4 and 5 shows the environmental parameters considered in the risk process.
Quality of operator’s information: quality of operator information about environmental 
conditions, information about currents, tide levels and winds can help in the risk process. 
Uncertainty in Surveys/Charts: it is better to use hydrostat for interpolation of the 
locations of the accidents as plotted on a chart. Thus that comes with bargage of point error 
distribution for depth survey. 
Real-time Environmental Information: for this it is important to use caution when 
comparing accident rates across ports and over time because of differences in reporting 
criteria. However the annual accident data collected is good for preliminary analysis using 
probabilistic method can give information about possible temporal factor changes [7] Figure 
4, 5 and 6.
Frequency of accident and geographical distribution of transit through open and water 
approach survey could also help in analysis of uncertainty Table 6.
6Model Tool
Rainfall-Runoff model NAM Contribution of catchments runoff to Langat river
One-Dimensional River model MIKE11 Establish baseline condition of tide, salinity, and flood level of the Langat river. Assess the impacts of navigational improvement plan
Two-Dimensional Curvilinear 
Grid Model MIKE21 C
assess the impacts of navigational, improvement plan on erosion/
deposition,  pattern of the Langat river
Two-Dimensional Rectangular 
Grid Nested Model MIKE21
Establish baseline condition of tide, wave, erosion/deposition pattern for 
Langat river
mouth assess the impacts of proposed
navigation improvement plan
Table 6: River Models.
 
Figure 4: Tide movement and current EB, Green to red: low to high speed.
 
Figure 5: Water level Mean, water level = 40cm seasonal variation, Existing coastal environmental current.
 
Figure 6: Coastal current, Avg. Speed in Spring tide 0.4-1.2 m/s, avg. Speed in Neap 0.2 - 1.0 m/s.
7Data collection limitation: Limitations in data collection poised hybrid combinatory 
use of historical, first principle or deterministic and stochastic analysis, future data 
collection effort can open opportunity for improvement in validation analysis as well 
as understanding of accident risk. In this case the data is good enough data to model 
a predictive and state space analysis model of frequency of occurrence in the channel. 
Major data problems are as follows:
Vessel casualty data: Inherent problem with causality data have missing entries, 
duplicate entries, and inaccuracies. Lack of recording of location of accidents in theory 
expected to be to the tenths of minute’s latitude/longitude for accuracy. In reality rarely 
latitude/longitude information is rarely given, leading to erroneous location information. 
Data limitation are lack draft or trim data of vessels at the time the accident happen, 
actual water depth at the time of the accident from the environmental data, lack of 
quantification in the use of tugs and present of pilot [8].
Environmental data: Limitations are associated with potential change in real-time 
oceanographic data systems. Wind and visibility are general to each port area, and 
measured at an airport location that does not necessarily reflect conditions on the water. 
No historical information on currents, lack of consistency on wind and visibility, and 
water level and current conditions. 
Port-Specific data: information about safe transits counts categorization by flag, 
vessel type, vessel size, with tug escort and piloting information, taken at hourly by 
authority.
Surveys and chart data: it is important to compare conventional cartographic 
uncertainty and with new technology to cover additional uncertainties.
Safety and enviromental risk for IWT: Risk and reliability based model aim to 
develop innovative methods and tools to assess operational, accidental and catastrophic 
scenarios. It requires accounting for the human element and integrates them as required 
into the design environment. Risk based design entails the systematic integration of risk 
analysis in the design process. It target safety and environment risk prevention and 
reduction as a design objective. To pursue this activity effectively, an integrated design 
environment to facilitate and support a holistic risk approach to ship and channel design 
is needed. Total risk approaches enable appropriate trade off for advanced sustainable 
decision making. Water ways accident falls under scenario of collision, fire and explosion, 
flooding, grounding. 
• Loss of propulsion
• Loss of navigation system
• Loss of mooring function and 
• Loss of other accident from the ship or water ways
Risk based design entails the systematic risk analysis in the design process targeting 
risk preventive reduction. It facilitates support for total risk approach to ship and waterways 
design. Integrated risk based system design requires the availability of tools to predict the 
safety, performance and system components as well as integration and hybridisation of 
safety element and system lifecycle phases. Therefore, it becomes imperative to develop, 
refine, verify, validate reliable model through effective methods and tools. The risk process 
begins with definition of risk which stands for the measure of the frequency and severity of 
consequence of an unwanted event (damage, energy, oil spill). Frequency at which potential 
undesirable event occurs is expressed as events per unit time, often per year. The frequency 
can be determined from historical data. However, it is quite inherent that event that don’t 
8happen often attract severe consequence and such event are better analyzed through risk 
based and reliability model. Figure 3 shows main components of risk based design for IWT. 
Risk is defined as product of probability of event occurrence and its consequence.
Risk (R) = Probability (P) X Consequence (C)                (1)
Incidents are unwanted events that may or may not result to accidents. Necessary 
measures should be taken according to magnitude of event and required speed of response 
should be given. Accidents are unwanted events that have either immediate or delayed 
consequences. Immediate consequences variables include injuries, loss of life, property 
damage, and persons in peril. Point form consequences variables could result to further loss 
of life, environmental damage and financial costs. The earlier stage of the process involves 
finding the cause of risk, level of impact, destination and putting a barrier by all mean in 
the pathway. Risk work process targets the following:
Cause of risk and risk assessment, this involve system description, identifying the risk 
associated with the system, assessing them and organising them in degree or matrix. IWT 
risk can be as a result of the following:
• Root cause. 
• Immediate cause
• Situation causal factor.
• Organization causal factor 
Risk analysis and reduction process, this involve analytic work through deterministic 
and probabilistic method that strengthen can reliability in system. Reduction process 
that targets initial risk reduction at design stage, risk reduction after design in operation 
and separate analysis for residual risk for uncertainty as well as human reliability factor. 
Uncertainty risk in complex systems can have its roots in a number of factors ranging 
from performance, new technology usage, human error as well as organizational cultures. 
They may support risk taking, or fail to sufficiently encourage risk aversion. To deal 
with difficulties of uncertainty risk migration in marine system dynamic, risk analysis 
models can be used to capture the system complex issues, as well as the patterns of 
risk migration. Historical analyses of system performance are important to establish 
system performance bench marks that can identify patterns of triggering events, this 
may require long periods of time to develop and detect. Assessments of the role of human 
and organizational error and its impact on levels of risk in the system are critical in 
distributed, large scale dynamic systems like IWT couple with associated limited physical 
oversight. Effective risk assessments and analysis required three elements highlighted in 
the relation below. 
Risk modeling = Framework + Models + Process              (2)
Reliability based verification and validation of system in risk analysis should be followed 
with creation of database and identification of novel technologies required for implementation 
of sustainable system.
Risk framework: Risk framework provides system description, risk identification, 
criticality, ranking, impact, possible mitigation and high level objective to provide system 
with what will make it reliable. The framework development involves risk identification which 
requires developing understanding the manner in which accidents, their initiating events 
and their consequences occur. This includes assessment of representation of system and 
all linkage associated risk related to system functionality and regulatory impact (Figure 7)
9 
Figure 7: IMO Risk framework.
Risk framework should be developed to provide effective and sound risk assessment and 
analysis. The process requires accuracy, balance and information that meet high scientific 
standards of measurement. The information should meet requirement to get the science 
right and getting the right science. The process requires targeting interest of stake holder 
including members of the port and water way community, public officials, regulators and 
scientists. Transparency and community participation helps ask the right questions of the 
science and remain important input to the risk process, it help checks the plausibility of 
assumptions and ensures that synthesis is both balanced and informative. Employment of 
quantitative analysis with required insertion of scientific and natural requirements provide 
analytical process to estimate risk levels, and evaluating whether various measures for risk 
are reduction are effective.
Safety and Environmental Risk and Reliability Model (SERM)
There is various risk and reliability tools available for risk based methods that fall under 
quantitative and qualitative analysis. Choice of best methods for reliability objective depends 
on data availability, system type and purpose. However employment of hybrid of methods 
of selected tool can always give the best of what is expect of system reliability and reduced 
risk. Figure 8 shows generic risk model flow chart. 
 
Figure 8: Risk and Reliability model flow charts
SERM process: SERM intend to address risks over the entire life of the complex system 
like IWT system where the risks are high or the potential for risk reduction is greatest. 
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SERM address quantitatively, accident frequency and consequence of IWT. Other risk and 
reliability components include human reliability assessment which is recommended to 
be carried out separately as part of integrated risk process. Other water ways and vessel 
requirement factors that are considered in SERM model are:
• Construction 
• Towing operations and abandonment of ship 
• Installation, hook-up and commissioning
• Development and major modifications 
Integrated risk based method combined various technique as required in a process. Table 
7 shows available risk based design for techniques. This can be applied for each level of risk. 
Each level can be complimented by applying causal analysis (system linkage), expert analysis 
(expert rating), and organizational analysis (Community participation) in the risk process. 
Figure 7 shows stakes holder that should be considered in risk process. From Figure 8, the 
method use is risk analysis that involves frequency analysis where the system is modelled with 
hybrid of deterministic, probabilistic and stochastic process. Technically, the process of risk 
and reliability study involves the following four areas:
System definition of high goal objective: This requires defining the waterways by 
capturing gap between system functionality and standards. The scope of work for safely and 
environment risk and reliability analysis should define the boundaries for the study. Identifying 
which activities are included and which are excluded, and which phases of the system’s life are 
to deal with. 
Qualitative hazard identification and assessment: It involves hazard identification 
through qualitative review and assessment of possible accidents that may occur, based on 
previous accident as well as experience or judgment of system users where necessary. Though, 
using selective and appropriate technique depends on the range, magnitude of hazards and 
indicates appropriate mitigation measures. 
Quantitative hazard frequency and consequence analysis: once the hazards have been 
identified and assessed qualitatively. Frequency analysis involves estimation of how likely it 
is for the accidents to occur. The frequencies are usually obtained from analysis of previous 
accident experience, or by some form of analytic modelling employed in this thesis. In parallel 
with the frequency analysis and consequence modelling evaluates the resulting effects of the 
accidents, their impact on personnel, equipment and structures, the environment or business. 
Risk acceptability, sustainability and evaluation: Is the yardsticks to indicate whether 
the risks are acceptable, in order to make some other judgment about their significance. This 
begins by introducing non technical issues of risk acceptability and decision making. In order 
to make the risks acceptable. The benefits from these measures can be evaluated by iterative 
process of the risk analysis. The economic costs of the measures can be compared with their 
risk benefits using cost benefit analysis leading to results of risk based analysis. This input 
necessities to the design or ongoing safety management of the installation, to meet goal and 
objectives of the study. 
Process Suitable techniques
HAZID HAZOP, What if analysis, FMEA, FMECA
Risk analysis Frequency, consequence, FTA, ETA
Risk evaluation Influence diagram, decision analysis
Risk control option Regulatory, economic, environmental,function elements matching and iteration
Cost benefit analysis ICAF, Net Benefit
Human reliability Simulation/ Probabilistic
Uncertainty Simulation/probabilistic
Risk monitoring Simulation/ probabilistic
 
Table 7: Risk based design techniques.
The process of risk work can further be broken down into the following elements:
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• Definition and problem identification
• Hazard and consequence identification
• Analysing the likelihood’s of occurrence
• Analyzing consequences
• Evaluation of uncertainty
• Risk Control Option (RCO) and Risk Control Measure (RCM)
• Sustainability of (cost safety, environment, injury, fatality, damage to structure, 
environment) and risk acceptability criteria
• Reliability based model verification and validation: statistical software, triangulation, 
iteration.
Recommendation for implementation: Implement, establishing performance standards 
to verify that the arrangements are working satisfactorily and continuous monitoring, 
reviewing and auditing the arrangements
Employment of these benefit provide a rational. Formal environmental protection 
structure and process for decision support guidance and monitoring about safety issues. 
The scope of sustainable risk based design under consideration involves stochastic, analytic 
and predictive process work leading to avoidance the harms in water ways. Figure 8 shows 
block diagram of SERM components for IWT. Safety and Environmental Risk and Reliability 
Model (SERM) for IWT required having clear definition of the following issues: Figure 9
• Personnel, attendance 
• Identify activities
• Vessel accidents including passing vessel accident, crossing , random
• Vessel location and waterway geography on station and in transit to shore.
• Impairment of safety functions through determination of likelihood of loss of key 
safety functions lifeboats, propulsion temporary refuge being made ineffectiveness 
by an accident. 
• Risk of fatalities, hazard or loss of life through measure of harm to people and 
sickness. 
• Property damage through estimation of the cost of clean-up and property replacement. 
• Business interruption through estimation of cost of delays in production. 
• Environmental pollution may be measured as quantities of oil spilled onto the 
shore, or as likelihood’s of defined categories of environmental impact or damage to 
infrastructures.
 
Figure 9: IWT safety and environmentalmodel components block diagram.
Allowance should be made to introduce new issue defining the boundary in the port 
from time to time. The choice of appropriate types of risk tool required for the model depend 
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on the objectives, criteria and parameter that are to be used. Many offshore risk based 
design model consider loss of life or impairment of safety functions. There is also much 
focus on comprehensive evaluation of acceptability and cost benefit that address all the risk 
components. Figure 9 shows the risk and reliability model combined process diagram. The 
analysis is a purely technical risk analysis. When the frequencies and consequences of each 
modelled event have been estimated, they can be combined to form measures of overall risk 
including damage, loss of life or propulsion, oil spill. Various forms of risk presentation may 
be used. Risk to life is often expressed in two complementary forms. The risk experienced 
by an individual person and societal risk. The risk experienced by the whole group of people 
exposed to the hazard (damage or oil spill).
Accident and incident are required to be prevented not to happen at all. The consequence 
of no safety is a result of compromise to safety leading to unforget table loses and 
environmental catastrophic. Past engineering work has involved dealing with accident issues 
in reactive manner. System failure and unbearable environmental problem call for new 
proactive ways that account for equity requirement for human, technology and environment 
interaction. The whole risk assessment and analysis process starts with system description, 
functionality and regulatory determination and this is followed by analysis of:
• Fact gathering for understanding of contribution factor
• Fact analysis of check consistency of accident history
• Conclusion drawing about causation and contributing factor
• Countermeasure and recommendation for prevention of accident
Most risk based methods define risk as: 
Risk = Probability (Pa) x Consequence (Ca)                           (3)
or in a more elaborate expression risk can be defined as:
Risk = Threatx Vulnerability x {direct (short-term) consequences + (broad) 
Consequences}                   (4) 
In risk analysis, serenity and probability of adverse consequence hazard are deal with 
through systematic process that quantitatively measure, perceive risk and value of system 
using input from all concerned waterway users and experts. 
Risk can also be expressed as:
Risk = Hazard x Exposure                      (5)
Where hazard is anything that can cause harm (e.g. chemicals, electricity, Natural 
disasters), while exposure is an estimate on probability that certain toxicity will be realized.
Severity may be measured by No. of people affected, monetary loss, equipment downtime 
and area affected by nature of credible accident. Risk management is the evaluation of 
alternative risk reduction measures and the implementation of those that appear cost 
effective where:
Zero discharge or negative damage = Zero risk                (6)
The risk and reliability model subsystem in this thesis focus on the following identified 
four risks assessment and analysis application areas that cover hybrid use of technique 
ranging from qualitative to qualitative analysis:
• Failure Modes Identification Qualitative Approaches 
• Index Prioritisation Approaches
• Portfolio Risk Assessment Approaches and
• Detailed Quantitative Risk Assessment Approaches.
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Collision and risk modelling
Collision in waterways is considered low frequency and high consequence events that 
have associative uncertainty characteristics/component of dynamic and complex physical 
system. This makes risk and reliability analysis the modest methods to deal with uncertainties 
that comes with complex systems. Employment of hybrid deterministic, probabilistic and 
stochastic method can help break the barriers associated with transit numbers data and 
other limitation. Conventionally, risk analysis work often deal with accident occurrence, 
while the consequence is rarely investigated, addressing frequency and consequence analyze 
can give clear cuts for reliable objectives. Risk and reliability based design can be model by 
conducting the following analysis that includes the following process [9,10]:
• Risk identification
• Risk analyses
• Damage estimation
• Priotization of risk level
• Mitigation
Repriotization of exposure category: mitigate risk or consequence of events that meet 
ALARP principle. Reassess high risk events for monitoring and control plans.
• Recommendation 
• Implementation
• Continuous monitoring 
• Improvement.
Collision is likely to be caused by the following factors shown in Figure 10 derived 
from fault three analyses from RELEX software. The relex software is based on fault 
three analysis where consequence of causal events are add up through logic gate to give 
minimum cut set probability that trigger the event. It is more effective for subsystem 
analysis.
P (collision) = P (propulsion failure) + P (loss of navigation failure) + P (Loss of vessel 
motion)                            (7)
There is also causes are mostly as a result of causes from external sources like 
small craft are cause of cause, cause from other uncertainty including human error may 
attract separate subsystem analysis. 
Collision data: Collision data are drawn from relevant marine administrator; there 
is expectation that most data gaps can be covered by the probability estimations. The 
Langat River work model risk through systemic analysis procedures for sustainable 
inland waterways transportation. It determine the probability of failure or occurrence, 
risk ranking, damage estimation, high risk to life safety, cost benefit analyze, 
sustainability and acceptability criteria [7,11]. The study analyze causal accidental 
relating to navigational, mechanical failure and human error and ignored those identified 
as intentional for barge and tugs of 5000T and 2000T having respective drift of draft 
greater than 9 to 15 m. Table 8 shows some of the annual traffic summary, collision 
and the consequences on Langat. Seasonal trends can be stochastically modelled from 
probabilistic result, environmental condition and traffic volume fluctuation is also 
considered negligible. For visibility, navigation is considered to be more risky at night 
than day time, the analysis follow generic assumption for evenly safe distribution evenly 
during day and night Figure 10 and 11.
14
Figure 10: Collision contributing factors (RELEX).
 
Figure 11: Tugs puling barge inLangat.
Absence of data should not be used as an excuse for not taking an advantage of the 
added knowledge that risk assessment can provide on complex systems [12]. Approximation 
of the risks associated with the system can provide a definition of data requirements. The 
treatment of uncertainty in the analysis is important, and the limitations of the analysis 
must be understood. However, data management system and better approach can always 
accommodate little data or no data. Table 8 shown models that have been used design of 
system based on risks in marine industry.
Model Application Drawback
Brown et al., [12] Environmental Performance of Tankers
Sirkar et al., [12] Consequences of collisions and groundings Difficulties on quantifying  consequence metrics
Brown and Amrozowicz Hybrid use of risk assessment, probabilistic simulation and a spill consequence assessment model
Oil spill assessment limited 
to use of fault tree
Sirkar et al., [12] Monte Carlo technique to estimate damageAND spill cost analysis for environmental damage Lack of cost data
IMO 13F 1995 Pollution prevention index from probability distributions damage and oil spill. Lack [12]. rational
Research Council Committee Alternative rational approach to measuring impact of oil spills
Lack employment of 
stochastic probabilistic 
methods
Prince William Sound, Alaska, (PWS) The most complete risk assessment
Lack of logical risk 
assessment framework 
(NRC)
Volpe National Transportation Center Accident probabilities using statistics and expert opinion. Lack employment of stochastic methods
Puget Sound Area (USCG (1999). Simulation or on expert opinion for cost benefit analysis
Clean up cost and 
environmental damage 
omission
Table 8: Previous risk work.
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IMO and Sirkar et al., [12] methods lack assessment of the likelihood of the event, 
likewise other model lack employment of stochastic method whose result could cover 
uncertainties associated with dynamic components of channel and ship failure from causal 
factors like navigational equipment, training and traffic control [11]. Therefore, combination 
of stochastic, statistical and reliability method based on combination of probabilistic, goal 
based, formal safety assessment, deterministic methods and fuzzy method using historical 
data’s of waterways, vessel environmental, first principle deterministic and traffic data can 
deliver best outcome for predictive, sustainable, efficient and reliable model for complex and 
dynamic system like inland water transportation. The general hypothesis behind assessing 
physical risk model is that the probability of an accident on a particular transit depends 
on a set of risk variables require for analysis of prospective reliable design. Figure 7, 8 and 
9 show traffic data utilized in the model. Most of the method above used historical data, 
the novel method in this paper used limited data of traffic used to model the physics of the 
system, the transfer function and stochastically project accident frequency. The projection 
is generic and can be used for any waterways and it consider random collision not which is 
not considered by previous model Table 9,10 and 11.
Jetty 3 nos.
Daily 9 times.
Weekly 63 times.
Monthly 252 times.
Annually 3024 times.
Table 9: Tug boat & vessel activities along river for 2008.
Total number of barge Time Traffic
12 Every day (24 hrs.)
6 (every 4 hrs) Incoming
6 (every 4 hrs) outgoing
Table 10: Vessel traffic.
ALL Speed 2 – 3 knots
Traffic ALL single way traffic
Lay -bys Proposed four locations for Lay-bys
Table 11: Common to traffic.
Traffic Frequency Estimation Modelling: Traffic density of meeting ship Figure 12
Traffic density of meeting ship: 
. .W
mρ
ν τ
Ν
= Ships/m2               (8)
Where,
Nm is number of ships frequenting the channel
v is speed of the ship, T= time of traffic activities per annum
W is width of the channel.
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Figure 12: 5000 barge data and Langat waterway.
Analysis of Present Situation
Traffic situation: Below are representations of various collision situations for head on, 
over taking and crossing (angle) collision scenario (Figure 13). 
Where: B1 = mean beam of meeting ship (m), V1 = mean speed of meeting ship (knots), 
B2 = beam of subject ship (m), V2 = speed of subject ship (knots), Nm = arrival frequency of 
meeting ships (ship/time), D= relative sailing distance.
Expected number of collision Ni= 9.6.B. 𝜌s = 1/passage                                         Eq. 2
                                               a.      b. 
 
Figure 13: Collision situations, a. overtaking, b. passing cases, c. Random.
Table 12 shown, relevant data from previous analysis
17
Expression Head – on Overtaking Random
Basic 4 x B X D X 
1 2 1 2
M
1 2
. . ..N
.
+ +B B V V D
W V V  
4
. ( * 2* )
=
Π +
NNi
V L Bτ
Standardised 1 2 1 2 M
1 2
. . ..N
.
+ +B B V V D
W V V .n Bρ
Relative 1 1 2.4
Table 12: Expression for collision situation.
Approximations: 
L=6B, D=W, Ni = Pi                  (9)
Necessary period for ship to pass the fairway T=D/v = 3000/3 = 1000 sec           (10)
Table 13 and 14 shows primary data for approximation
µC (failure per nautical mile or hour) Pc (failure per passage or encounter
Head on 2.5 x10-5 2.7.x10-5
Overtaking 1.5 x10-5 1.4.x10-5
Crossing 1.5 x10-5 1.3 .x10-5
Table 13: Failure per nautical mile and failure per passage for collision situation [13].
Therefore average Pc and ( 5)2.5 10?cµ
−= ×  for random                           (11)
Probability of loosing navigation control within the fairway 
Pc = c .Tµ  failure/passage                  (12)
Fairway μc (failure per nautical mile or hour) Pc (failure per passage or encounter
UK 2.5 x10-5 1.x10-4
US 1.5 x10-5 1.4.x10-5
Japan 3.0 x10-5 1.3.x10-5
Table 14: Failure per nautical mile and failure per passage for different waterways [14].
Probability of collision Pa= (Pi. Pc collision/passage)                 (13)
Collision per annual (Na) = Pa. mN  Collision per year             (14)
In the frequency analysis, the annual frequency of each failure case is estimated. 
Separate frequencies are estimated for each operating phase as required. In modelling the 
development, consequences and impact of the events, each failure case is split into various 
possible outcomes. The outcomes are the end events on an event tree or chain of event 
trees. Each outcome probability is estimated by combining the probabilities for appropriate 
branches of the event tree. 
The outcome frequency (Fo) is then:
∏= beo PFF                                            (15)
Where, Fe is failure frequency, Pb probability of one segment, Not all possible outcomes are 
modelled. Representative scenarios are selected for modelling, and the scenario frequency 
is taken as:
∑=
outcomes
os FF                       (16)
Failure per nautical mile and failure per passage can be selected from previous 
representative work. Necessary period for ship to pass the fairway T=D/v = 3000/3 = 1000 
sec. The result of accident frequency (Fa) can be compare with acceptability criteria for 
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maritime industry. If it is two high the system could be recommended to implement TSS. 
If the result is high TSS can be model to see possible reduction due to its implementation. 
Table 15 shows frequency risk acceptability criteria for maritime and offshore industry.
Frequency classes Quantification
Very unlikely once per 1000 year or more likely
Remote once per 100- 1000 year
Occasional once per 10- 100 year
Probable once per 1- 10 years
Frequent more often than once per year
Table 15: Frequency acceptability criteria.
Frequency analysis result: This result indicates that the collision in Langat is not risk 
on ALARP graph. Accident per year of 5.3E-5 is observed for current 3 number of vessel 
operating at speed of 3 knot. But physical observation revealed that there is significant 
and exception increase in collision that needs to be address for a channel with less traffic 
density. It is also observed from the plot of frequency Vs speed that when traffic density is 
changing traffic density of 5 and 6 and speed up to 5 considered to be cause high risk of 
accident frequency in the waterway (Figure 14).
 
                                       (a)                                                                (b) 
Figure 14: Accident frequency Vs at changing number of ship.
Figure 15 a shows accident frequency at changing width and beam of the channel.
Risk is acceptable for accident per 10,000 year, if proposed maintenance of channel 
improvement plan is implemented. The maximum speed is round 10 knot for width of 
64 m and probability of 1/1000 years, other speed above this are intolerable. As width 
of the channel decrease there is higher risk -> Accident frequency probability increase. 
The maximum width considered for Langat River is 64 this width is considered too small 
and risky for the channel for accident per 1000 years. Different speed should be advised 
to ship for such situation. Width of channel can change as a result of erosion. Increasing 
channel width to 250m could allow speed of 20 knot at acceptable Fa (Na) of 1x10E-
4. Ship operating at Langat at 3 knot at River Langat, is considered not high risk for 
accident per 100, 000 years. The regression equation for the trend is represented by y is 
2E-08x + 1E-05 @ R² is 1. Similar trend is observe for Figure 15b, the beam and width 
are related according to PIANC W=3B AND L=6B. Table 16 shows regression equations 
for the frequency analysis
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                                           (a)                                                                       (b) 
Figure 15: (a) (b): Accident frequency Vs beam and width of the channel.
Figure 16 a and b shows cross ploting of the channel variable, both plots are the same, 
the defence is that Figure 12b is logged because of large number shows the risk level for 
all channel parameters variables (speed, width, number of ships and beam of ship). It is 
observed that the maximum of ship can up to 4 at the point where speed and Number of 
ship curves meet provided all channel and vessel safety parameters are in place. 
 
                                                                                 (a) 
                                                                                     (b) 
Figure 16: (a) (b): cross plotting of channel variables (speed, width, number of ships, and beam of ship).
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Figure 17 Table 16 shows number of expected collision (Ne = Ni) vs collision impact 
angle, since high impact is associated with high speed, the result show that high impact is 
likely to occur at angle between 105-115 degree at for al speed at Ni = Ne = 2.9E-5.
Frequency model
Fa @Nm changing Speed y = 2E-05e-0.11x R² = 0.826 Exponential
Fa @V y = 2E-05e
-0.11xR² = 
0.826 R² = 1 Square
Fa W y = 2E-08x + 1E-05 R² = 1 Square
Fa B y = 9E-07x + 0.000 R² = 0.999 Linear
Table 16: Regression equations for the frequency analysis.
N
i
Ni VS THETA
VELOCITY=10
VELOCITY=20
VELOCITY=30
VELOCITY=40
Figure 17: Impact Vs Angle, Highest impact expected at v= 50 and collision angle between 105-115l.
Uncertainty and system complexity analysis
Subsystem level analysis: For total risk work the following analysis could perform 
separately as part of subsystem risk level analysis:
• Power transmission
• navigation
• vessel motion and
• human reliability
Subsystem level analysis can be facilitated by using frequency calculation through. 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) modelling involve top down differentiation of event to branches 
of member that cause them or participated in the causal chain action and reaction. While 
consequence calculation can be done by using Event Tree Analysis (ETA), where probability 
is assigned to causal factor leading to certain event in the event tree structure.
Channel complexity analysis: Channel complexity that could be addressed in the risk 
and reliability work is visibility weather, squat, bridge, river bent and human reliability. 
Figure 18 show channel complexity for Langat. Poor visibility and the number of bend 
may increase in the risk of and collisions. A model extracted from Dover water way studies 
concluded with the following:
Fog Collision Risk Index (FCRI) = 1 1 2 2 3 3P VI P VI P VI+ + + + +                       (17)
Where: KP  = Probability of collision per million encounters, KVI  = Fraction of time that 
the visibility is in the range k, K = Visibility range: clear (>4km), Mist/Fog (200 m-4 km), 
Tick/dense (less than 200 m). 
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Figure 18:  Langat channel complexity.
Empirically derived means to determine the relationship between accident risk, 
channel complexity parameters and VTS is given by equation
R = -0.37231-35297C+16.3277N+0.2285L-0.0004W+0.01212H+0.0004M           (18)
For predicted VTS consequence of 100000 transit, C = 1 for an open approach area 
and 0 otherwise, N = 1 for a constricted waterway and 0 otherwise, L = length of the 
traffic route in statute miles, W = average waterway/channel width in yards, H = sum 
of total degrees of course changes along the traffic route, M = number of vessels in the 
waterway divided by L.
Barge movement creates very low wave height and thus will have insignificant impact 
on river bank erosion and generation of squat event. Speed limit can be imposed by 
authorities for wave height and loading complexity. Human reliability analysis is also 
important to be incorporated in the channel; complexity risk work, this can be done 
using questionnaire analysis or the technique of human error rate prediction THERP 
probabilistic relation.
1
. . . CmEA EA K KkP HEP FPS W== +∑                          (19)
Where: EAP = Probability of error for specific action, EAHEP = Nominal operator error 
probability for specific error, KPSF = numerical value of kth performance sapping factor, 
KW = weight of (constant), m = number of PSF, C = Constant
Reability based validation: Reliability analysis is designed to cater for uncertainty 
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and to provide confident on the model. It is important for this to be carried out 
separately. Reliability work could include projection for accident rate for certain 
number of year the following techniques: 
• Accident mean 
• Variance and 
• Standard deviation from normal distribution 
For 10 years =>Mean ( )µ = 10 x Na               (20)
Variance ( )σ = 10 x Na x (1-Na), Standard deviation = σ  , Z = (X- µ )/σ            (21)
Stochiatic process using poison distribution, year for system to fail from binomial, 
mean time to failure and poison distribution or determination of exact period for next 
accident using binomial function. Ship collisions are rare and independent random event 
in time. The event can be considered as poison events where time to first occurrence is 
exponentially distributed.
( ) ( ).T , .T ).N
,T
NFr eγ γ γ
γ
 Ν
= 
 
!                        (21)
Binomial distribution for event that occurs with constant probability P on each trail, 
the likelihood of observing k event in N trail is binomial distribution.
( ) ( ) ./ , 1 N KK
N
L K N P P P
P
 
= − 
 
                         (22)
Where average number of occurrence is NP
Comparing the model behaviour apply to other rivers of relative profile and vessel 
particular
Triangulating analysis of sum of probability of failure from subsystem level failure 
analysis
Implementation of TSS is one of the remedies for collision risk observed and predicted 
in Langat; this can be done through integration of normal distribution along width of 
the waterways and subsequent implementation frequency model. And the differences in 
the result can reflect improvement derived from implementation of TSS. Figure 19 shows 
the impact of waterways variables on implementation of TSS. The revealed that beam of 
ship play important role in implementation of TSS. Optimum beam is representing by 
the meeting point of the variables.
( )Xsouth
f =  
1
21 12( )
2
−
−e x
µµ π
                                       (23)
( )Xnorth
f =
1
21 12( )
2
−
−e x
µµ π                             (24)
Variables behaviour in implementation of TSS is shown. The meeting Point signified 
the right beam for the ship to be safe for TSS. The beam plays a very important role in 
the implementation of TSS.
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Figure 19: shows the impact of waterways variables on implementation of TSS.
Safety level and cost sustainability analysis. Figure 20 shows the best accident frequency 
that is acceptable. Ct is is the total cost, Co is the cost of damage and Cc is the cost of repair.
Figure 20: Risk cost benefit analysis.
Reliability based validation: Validation and reliability analysis of the model yield the 
following result. Figure 21 shows accident frequency residual plot from Minitab is shown 
with good fitness. Figure 22 Shows accident consequence validations, accident consequence 
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good to fit to the method, residual graph of Cumulative Density Function (CDF) profile 
tracing infinity. In this analysis Frequency is refer to as Fa or Na.
Figure 21: Accident frequency residual plot.
Figure 22: Residual histograms distribution diagram for accident frequency.
Figure 23a Shows Log normal plots Accident frequency (Na), distribution shows a good 
to fit. Curve Figure 23b also show a very good curve fit for the model.
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Figure 23: (a) (b): Log normal plot Accident frequency (Na).
Figure 24 shows process reliability capability, the fitting of the curve revealed the 
reliability of the frequency model
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Figure 24: Process capability.
Figure 25 shows the matrix plot for the model, the safe areas for the variable workability 
are shown in the matrix plot.
 
                                                                             (a) 
Figure 1: Matrix plot. 
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Figure 25: Matrix plot.
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Figure 26: (a) (b) (c): Log normal plot Accident frequency (Na).
Conclusions
Hybrid of deterministic, statistical, historical, probabilistic and stochastic method along 
with channel and vessel profile baseline data has been used to model accident possibility 
in waterway in order to meet condition for safe transits, and environmental conditions for 
inland waterway. Factors such as vessel type and size, traffic density, speed and visibility 
conditions are major risk factor of accidents the probabilistic method represent reliable 
method to develop models for safety and environmental prevention and collision accident 
risk aversion who precedence is could be short term (damage) or long term (impact of oil 
outflow) environmental impact. Accident collision per number of year has been determined 
for potential decision support for limit definition for number of ship, speed, required width 
and beam of ship.Variables that affect accident rates have been simulated for necessary 
limit acceptability purpose for the channel. Accident rate has increased compare to previous 
year, a situation that required attention for solution. Advantage of implementing of TSS 
in respect to beam requirement is also presented. Implications of concept of uncertainty 
can help also on decision support relating to navigational aids and transit regulations for 
poor visibility conditions as well has employment of improved navigation systems, such as 
electronic charts, GPS receivers, and VTS, to mitigate causal factors.
Appendix: Nomenclature
Nm Number of ship movement Nm Number of ship movement
V Speed Pi Probability of impact
T Draft of the ship Chead Head on Collision
B Beam of the ship Cov Overtaking Collision
D Depth of waterways Ccr Crossing Collision
W Width of fairy Can Collision at specific angle
B1 Mean beam of meeting ship (m) CCi Collision at circular situation
B2 Mean beam of subject ship (m) Pi Impact probability
V1 Mean speed of meeting ship (knot) E1 Accident drafting collision energy
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V2 Mean speed of subject ship (knot) E2 Accident Power collision energy
Theta Angle E Consequence energy
L Length of ship Pa Probability of accident
Ps Traffic density of meeting ship (Ship/nm2) Pc Probability of losing control per passage of the fairway
2. Collision Damage Consequence Risk Reliability for Langat River 
(Malaysia) Sustainable Inland Water Transportation
Abstract
Accident consequences resulting from collision remain a big threat to coastal water 
transportation operation. The nature of the threat can be worrisome the danger may involve 
instantaneous and point form release of harmful substance to water, air and water causing 
a long time ecological impact. That may lead to the loss of life, damage to the environment, 
disruption of operation, injuries. This makes scientific risk based design that analyse 
all components of risk including the quantification for consequences of accident very 
imperative for reliable design and exercise of technocrat stewardship of safety and safeguard 
of environmental. System risk has been widely assessed using traditional environmental 
impact assessment, a checklist based approach that ends up bypassing a lot of uncertainty 
that comes with complex and dynamic systems. Novel analysis of frequency, consequence, 
subsystem an4 uncertainty components of system risk using g hybrid of deterministic, 
probabilistic and stochastic process represent a modest best practice for sustainable system 
design. This paper discusses the result from analysis of damage components for collision 
accident towards generic risk mitigation option and decision support required for operational, 
societal and technological change for sustainable inland water transportation system for 
Langat River. The risk on Langat River determines by consideration the actual situation 
of the channel and suppressing the system parameters under pressure and determines 
the reliability of the trend generated from the model. The present risk consider on Langat 
is found to be low in the absence with ongoing improvement plan.Accident frequency is 
of 3.8E-5 and consequence energy of 31 MJ, resulting to length of collapse of 9.3 m. The 
damage estimation is further simulated for all channel variable parameters to determine the 
generic risk and reliability condition that can be used for traffic situation limit definition for 
safety and environmental preventive risk avoidance within inland waterways.
Keywords: Collision; Marine Vehicle; Risk; Reliability; Transportation; 
Introduction
Collision risk is a product of the probability of the physical event and the probability 
of occurrence as well as economic losses. Earlier risk modelling focus more on frequency 
estimation and leave analysis with more uncertainties to account for, incorporating 
consequence estimation and quantification make collision risk work more complete. 
Collision accident scenarios carry heavy consequence thus its occurrence is infrequent. 
These accidents represent a risk because they expose vessel owners and operators, as 
well as the public, to the possibility of losses such as vessel and cargo damage, injuries 
and loss of life, environmental damage, and obstruction of waterways [15]. Like frequency 
analysis, damage collision data are hard to come by, however available data should be 
made meaningful as much as possible through hybrid use of available tools especially 
predictive tools for necessary mitigation decision for sustainable waterways [16]. This paper 
discusses the modelling of waterways collision risk and associated consequence related 
with other variables risk factors like vessel characteristics, channel characteristics, traffic 
characteristics, operator skill, topographic and environmental difficulty of the transit [17]. 
The paper discuss of implementation of risk and reliability model to prevent collision on 
Langat River. Determined accident frequencies per year are plotted against the consequence 
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in term of damage and energy release during accident to determine collision risk in one 
millionth years. The paper also discuss outcome of validation analysis of the model as 
function of reliability for sustainable IWTS design.
Background
The study area is Langat River, 220 m long navigable inland waterway that has been 
under utilized. Personal communication and river cruise survey revealed that collision 
remain the main threat of the waterways despite less traffic in the waterways. This makes 
the case for analysis of risk and reliability for sustainable development of the waterways a 
necessity [6]. Data related to historical accidents, transits, and environmental conditions 
were collected. Accident data are quite few, this is inherits to dynamic and complex system 
like most Inland Water Transportation System (IWTS). This equally makes probabilistic 
methods the best preliminary method to analysis the risk, the outcome of which can be 
optimized through simulation method and expert rating as required Figure 27.
 
Figure 27: Langat River map.
Barge and tug of capacity 5000T and 2000T are currently plying this waterway at 
draft of 9 and 15respectively. Safety associated with small craft is not taken into account. 
Collisions including contact between two vessels and between a vessel and a fixed structure 
are considered, also, causes of collision are linked to navigation system failure, mechanical 
failure and vessel motion failure are considered in risk based worked for use of the river for 
transportation [6]. Below are other information relating to channel, vessel and environment 
considered employed in the risk process, lacking information about the distribution of 
transits during the year, or about the joint distribution of ship size and flag particular, 
environmental conditions are systematically derived of the probabilistic and stochastic 
estimation process. Figure 27 shows aerial view of Langat River.
Baseline data: The channel width data plays a very important role in possibility of 
accident and damage caused to physical structures. Therefore beside fatality and societal 
consequence analysis, extent of damage can be analysed to determine risk of collision in 
water ways [13]. Figure 28 shows data of channel width parameter required for damage 
analysis, where the channel width is one of the parameters way traffic, straight channel is 
98 m, bend is 120 m and depth is 8 m). Table 17 shows Langat River waterways parameters 
where Langat River length is represented by 135.7 km, estuarine data Langat in North 
Estuary is 44.2 km and South Estuary is 9.9 km. The main risk contributing factors can 
fall under the following: [5]
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• Operator
• Vessel characteristics
• Traffic characteristics
• Topographic difficulty of the transit
• Environmental condition including water level and tide
• Quality of operator’s information including
• Uncertainty in Surveys/Charts
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Figure 28: Channel width parameter.
Vessel width parameter plays a very important role in collision scenario and potential 
damage. Vessel movement for the case under consideration currently has no vessel traffic 
separation system. However, there is traffic movement from both inbound and out bound 
navigation in the channel. The same type of barge size is considered for the estimation work 
[14-17]. Table 17-19 shows barge and tug parameter use for the analysis of vessel on Langat 
River. Figure 29 shows Langat River vessel and channel requirement.
Basic Maneuvering Lane 1.5B
Addition for cross wind (less 15 knots) 0.0B
Addition for cross current (negligible<0.2 knots) 0.0B
Addition for bank suction clearance 1.0B
Addition for aids to navigation (Excellent) 0.0B
Addition for cargo hazard (medium) 0.0B
Channel width for Inland Waterways (B= Beam of the ship) 2B=53m
Channel width at Bend 3.0B = 64m
Table 17: Waterway parameter.
Barge parameter 2000 tons 5000 tons
Length (m) 67.3 76.2
Beam (m) 18.3 21.3
Depth (m) 3.7 4.9
Draft (m) 2.9 4.0
Table 18: Vessel requirement, Barge and Tug parameter.
Tugs parameter 2000 tons 5000 tons
Length (m) 23.8 23.8
Beam (m) 7.8 7.8
Depth (m) 3.5 3.5
Draft (m) 2.8 2.8
Horse Power (hp) 1200 1200
Table 19: Vessel requirement, Barge and Tug parameter.
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Figure 29: Langat vessel requirement.
Risk analsys modeling: The reliability process involves deriving rate of accident from 
deterministic first principle, historical data, probability and stochastic estimation. Individual 
risk involve hypothetical individual who is positioned there for 24 hours per day, 365 days 
per year. Average individual risk is usually qualitatively calculated from historical data [18].
Individual risk = Number of fatalities/number of people at risk            (1)
Individual risk per year and Fatal Accident Rate (FAR) for workers are commonly expressed 
as a Fatal Accident Rate (FAR), which is the number of fatalities per 108 exposed hours. 
FARs are typically in the range 1-30 and are more convenient and readily understandable 
than individual risks per year, which are typically in the range 10-5-10-3. FAR can be 
expressed as: 
Onshore FAR = Fatalities at work x 108/Person hours at work                   (2)
Conversion between Individual Risk and FAR when calculated in a risk analysis, the 
FAR is usually derived from the calculated individual risk of death per year, divided by the 
number of hours exposed in a year x. the conversion from individual specific risk to FAR is: 
FAR = Individual - specific risk per year x l08/3360 hours per year            (3)
Conversion between individual risk and group risk related using the Personnel on 
Board (POB) as follows; this conversion is only recommended as a check. It is preferable to 
calculate individual and group risks separately. Expectation Value (EV) of group risk is the 
correct mathematical term, but makes the risk sounds inevitable. Potential Loss of Life (PLL) 
per year is also sometimes used for the expectation value of lifetime group risk as the life 
time fatality rate or Rate of Death (ROD).
In the fatality estimation, the consequences of each scenario can be represented by the 
probability of death for an individual initially at a particular location on the platform when 
the event occurs. In hydrocarbon events, the overall probability of death is calculated from: 
Probability of local fatality in the fire/explosion Pfl, Probability of fatality during escalation/
mustering Pfm, Probability of fatality during evacuation Pfe . The total fatality probability PF is: 
F fl fm fl fe fm flP P P (1 P ) P (1 P )(1 P )= + − + − −                            (4)
The Location Specific Individual Risk (LSIR) for a hypothetical individual continuously 
present in a particular area of the accident location is: 
s F
allscenarios
LSIR F P= ∑                               (5)
Where Fs frequency of scenario, PF is probability of death in the scenario for an individual 
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at the location, the Individual Specific Individual Risk (ISIR) for the specific groups of workers 
from events on the platform is: 
L
alllocations
ISIR LSIR * P= ∑                                 (6)
PL is the proportion of time an individual spends in a location
The Fatal Accident Rate (FAR) for each group of workers is: 
8ISIR *10FAR
H
=                    
(7)
Where H is the hours offshore per year (3360 hours per year is a typical value)
For group risks, the total number of fatalities in the scenario is given by: 
∑=
Locations
LFF NPN                               (8)
NL represents average number of people on location
Group (or societal) risk involves the risk experienced by the whole group of people 
exposed to the hazard. It is interchangeable with group risk. Societal risks may be expressed 
in the form of Frequency Number (FN) or Annual fatality rate (AFR). FN curves show the 
relationship between the cumulative frequency (F) and number of fatalities (N), annual 
fatality rates, in which the frequency and fatality data is combined into a convenient single 
measure of group risk. For each scenario, frequency fatality (FN) curve can be obtained. The 
annual fatality rate is given by:
S F
allscenarios
AFR F N= ∑                                    (9)
Alternative damage costs estimate could be modelled using the consequence analysis, 
where damage fraction is estimated for each scenario. This is equal to the cost of the accident 
as a fraction of the total infrastructure cost. For fires and explosions, the consequences of 
each scenario may be represented by fractions of each module’s volume damaged. The total 
terminal damage fraction is: 
∑= tmmF CCDD /*                    (10)
Where: DM fraction of module damaged, Cm/Ct cost of module as fraction of terminal cost. 
The annual damage fraction is represented as:
∑=
scenarios
FS DFADF *                  (11)
Oil Spills is another consequence analysis where the quantity of oil spilled, S is estimated 
for each scenario. 
The annual spill rate is given by: 
S
allscenarios
ASR F *S= ∑                   (12)
Damage data requirement: Collision data are drawn from relevant marine administrator, 
previous risk work for complex system like offshore. There is expectation that most gaps will 
be covered by stochastic and probability estimations. The Langat River work model involve 
systemic risk and reliability analysis using scientific procedures for inland waterways 
risk to deduce the probability of failure or occurrence, consequence risk ranking, damage 
estimation, high risk to life safety, cost benefit analysis and sustainability and acceptability 
criteria [19] Table 20 and 21.
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Case Hit
Hit
2 nos. of concrete pile have a scratched mark. 5 nos. of concrete pile were broken.
The protection pipe at the nearby jetty was damaged & missing. 3 nos. of welded pipe were missing.
Hit/ Tug and vessel
The protection pipe at the nearby jetty was damaged & missing. 3 nos. of welded pipe were missing/
bended I- beam
Temporary jetty at Pier 9a.
I-Beam that is used for Gen-Set was bent. Workers jetty was badly damage.
Bended I-Beam.
Protection pipe at Pier 9a.
Temporary jetty at Pier 9a. Welding set & crane collapsed & sank into the river.
Table 20: Chronology of accident along Langat River due to inland navigation activities.
Operation parameters Activities
Jetty 3 nos
Daily 9 times
Weekly 63 times
Montly 252 times
Annually 3024 times
Total 12 nos. of barge will used every day (24hours)
Incoming 6 nos every 4 hours
Outgoing 6 nos every 4 hours
Speed 2-3 knots
Traffic situation Single way traffic
Layby Four
Table 21: Tug boat & vessel activities along river for 2008.
Couple with the analysis of annual frequency of occurrence, potential accident causal factor 
and damage consequence in term of energy of hit resulting from collision of vessel is studies. 
Ship barge and tugs of 5000T and 2000T having respective draft of 9-15 m is presented in Table 
21 where, magnitude of hit are described theoretically. By using probabilistic risk method, 
system uncertainty can be uncovered under absolutism principle of discrete probability. 
Seasonal trends and limit is estimated from result of stochastic process outcome and system 
behavior. Limitations of data for high risk complex and dynamic system like inland water ways 
demand use of hybrid use of historical and stochastic analysis. Future data collected during 
monitoring and simulation can open opportunity to cover deficiencies gap, validation work, 
improved analysis and understanding of accident risk. The general hypothesis behind assessing 
physical risk consequence model is to determine the probability of an accident impact and 
energy release on particular events and the variables that make magnitude of the consequences 
more meaningful for decision support input [20].
Damage estimation analysis: Based on available accident statistics and the results from 
the Hazard analysis, eight generic accident scenario umbrellas that required deep analysis 
are: collision, fire or explosion, grounding, contacts, and heavy weather/loss of intact stability, 
failure/leakage of the cargo containment system, incidents while loading or unloading cargo, 
emission of ship power sources [21]. It is recommended that further efforts should focus on 
measures relating to safety function impairment like [22]:
Risks of safety function impairment: 
• Damage Risks
• Annual damage cost
• Frequency Cost (FC) curves 
• Oil Spills, annual spill rate
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• Frequency Damage size (FD) or Frequency energy curves
• Risk Measures for Loss of Life
Initial kinetic energy of ship ( ) ( )21 .K
2 1000
ME V MJ=                        (13)
Where: E = impact energy (MJ), M= vessel mass (tonnes), V= vessel speed
K= hydrodynamic added mass constant, taken as 
K factor assignment of 1.1 for head on collision (powered) impacts, and 1.4 for for 
broadside (drifting)
Absorbed collision impact Ea= 47.2.Vc+32.8 (MJ) [16]              (14)
Where, Vc = collapse material volume (m3)
Interpolation between equation 1 and 2 could give an estimate of how much volume 
damage is experienced in collision case. Advantage derived from channel improvement work 
like channel widening, deepening and straightening could be quantified into sustainability 
equity for determination of cost control option required to reduce further and future risk in 
the channel [23].
1 . . . .
2 c
Na D Pi Nmµ=                             (15) 
Total integrated risk is represented by:
Rt= fs (Rc, Re, Rs) +Rw +Rh               (16)
Where, Rc (crew) = fc (qualification, fatigue). re (environment), fe (sensitivity, advert 
weather), Rs (ship) = fs (structural and system reliability, ship layout and cargo arrangement). 
Rw = Fw (water way, channe.l), Rh = Fh (Human reliability analysis). Table 22 shows 
consequence of risk acceptability criteria for maritime industry.
Limited Consequence limited to accident area with no public impact Impact Energy <40 MJ
Minor Impact has no consequence on public health 50 MJ
Serious potential for serious injury Impact Energy >50 MJ
Extensive potential for fatality
Table 22: Consequence acceptability criteria.
The consequence could further be broken down into effect for ship, human safety, oil 
spill and ecology.
Result presentation
Figure 30a shows that head on collision has the highest risk potential as the curve touch 
ALARP high risk area. Derived equation for each collision is shown in the graph. Figure 30b 
shows expected number of impact (Ni), accident energy at variable speed plot for head on 
collision, as the number of ships in the waterway increases. Figure 30b shows that there 
is higher risk and potential rise in Ni as the number of ship in the channel increase, 1 to 
2 number of accident is likely to occur. Interestingly, the graph also shows that the risk 
of accident of occurrence is possible when the speed is moving at much lower speed. For 
3 number of ship in the channel navigating at 4 knot, there is likelihood of 0-1 accident 
occurrence. Figure 30c shows that, for overtaking collision, at 3 number of ship that Langat 
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is currently operating there is likeliness of zero a-1 accident for overtaking collision, accident 
will only occur if vessel slows down less than 1 knot.
 
(a)      (b)     (c) 
 
Figure 30: a. Collision risk potential for different collision situation, b. Number of accident impact vs speed and number of ship 
traffic and accident energy for head on collision situation c. Number of accident impact vs speed and number of ship traffic and 
accident energy for overtaking collision situation.
Figure 31a shows relationship between Ni and velocity, from the graph there is high 
probability for accident occurrence between 90 and 150 following precision principle, where 
high impact can be experienced if accident happens at that angle and at speed of about 12 
knot. Figure 31b shows relationship between Ni, released energy and volume of collapse for 
different accident situation. Excess number of Ni up to 7-8 with high energy release and 
catastrophic volume of collapse up to 14 cubic meters can occur at the point where the 
energy and Ni graph meet. 
 
                                                 (a)      (b) 
Figure 31: a.Number of accident impact vs angle of collision b.Number of accident impact, accident released energy and volume 
of collapse for different collision situation.
Figure 32a shows the mass and energy release relation for vessel mass of 5000 t, there is 
12 MJ of energy released, while for vessel mass of 2000t, there is 1.2 MJ of energy released. 
The derived equation for the trend can be used for model iteration and validation of model of 
similar waterway profile. Figure 32b shows relationship between impact energy, volume of 
collapse (Vc) and length of penetration (Lp). The gragh shows that at avaerage enegry (Ea) of 
36 MJ, power colision energy (Ep) of 39 MJ, the lenght of collapse is about 11 m.
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                                          (a)      (b) 
Figure 32: a. Accident consequence energy and mass, b. Impact energy, volume of collapse and length of collapse.
Figure 33a shows the energy and volume of collapse relation for powered collision energy 
(Ep), drifting collision (Ed) and interpolated average collision energy (Ea). It is observed that 
volume of collapse of 51 cubic meter occur at 12 MJ release of energy from Ep and 27 MJ 
from Ea, the speed at this point is observed to be 8-12 knot, catastrophic energy will occur 
at speed of 38 knot, at point where E1, Ea and VC are equal with respective value of E1= 
3000MJ, Ea is 3008MJ and Vc is 60 cubic meter. Similarly result is observed for drifting 
collision as shown in Figure 33b. The value is a bit higher for drifting colision and the 
gragh of drifting colision is much more steeper than the gragh of powered collision. Driftng 
collision, for example can be due to lost of mooring function, that can consequentially leads 
to vessel moving at higher spped to nearby structure while powered colision can be due 
to loss of propulsion function. Respectively subsytem level risk analysis can be perform 
for cause of cause function using fault three and event tre analysis to deduce much more 
reliability on the system.
                                                   (a)      (b) 
Figure 33: a. Powered collision energy and volume of collapse, b. Drifting collision energy and volume of collapse.
Figure 34a and b show variation in accident consequence, mass of ship and volume of 
collapse, at curent speed of 3 knot the maximum mass of vessel that can give minimum 
volume of collapse of 0494 is 1500t and 9.45 MJ energy. The accepable energy for low 
impact event is below 50 MJ, which can lead to 3.1 volume of collapse at allowable speed 
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of at speed of 5knot. For vessel of of 2000 t mass, there is release of 224 MJ of energy and 
0.22 cubic meter of volume of collapse, for vessel of 5000 t mass, there is release of 35 MJ of 
energy and 6.7 cubic meter of volume of colapse. The derived equation for volume of colapse 
is y = 0.567x2-11.68x + 51.41 with corelation of 0.995 correlation. The equation derived for 
energy trend is trend is y = 0.35x3 with correlation of 1, while the derived equation for mass 
is 500 x at R²=1. Catastrophic volume of colapse can occur at 90 cubic meter with of vessel 
mass up to 12300t. Also it is observed that vessel of up to 19000t could lead catastrophic 
relase of energy up to 19205 MJ. 
                                           (a)               (b) 
Figure 34: a. Powered collision mass, energy, volume of collapse and speed, b. drifting collision.
ALARP principle, risk acceptability criteria, and risk control option:
The acceptability matrix is based on ALARP principle. The ALARP outcome risk influence 
curve can be compared with risk acceptability criteria in offshore in maritime industry. 
This is followed by risk control option and sustainability balancing of cost and benefit 
towards recommendation for efficient, reliable and effective decision. This is followed by 
risk acceptability criteria whose analysis is followed with cost control option using cost of 
Averting Fatality Index (ICAF) and ALARP Principle. Risk acceptability criteria established in 
many industries and regulations to limit the risk. Risk is never acceptable, but the activity 
implying the risk may be acceptable due to benefits to safety, environment and economy, 
reduction of fatality, injury, individual and societal risk. Perception regarding acceptability 
is described by the rationality may be debated, societal risk criteria are used by increasing 
number of regulators. The outcome of risk and reliability work on Langat River revealed that 
the current situation acceptable but indication about increase number of accident per year 
for a channel of such magnitude posed lots of question to be answered before the elapse of 
millionth years.
Figure 35a shows the accident frequency per annum and consequence energy graph 
at changing speed, the current situation on Langat River good The situation only become 
risky at 0.00035 and corresponding volume of collapse of 2.07E+07. Similar comparative 
studies revealed the same trend on the length of penetration, where deep penetration into 
struck structure can start to occur at 7.18 m. Figure 35b shows a cross plotting for accident 
frequency and consequence at changing speed, the trend revealed that maximum speed for 
Langat is 4 knot if all safety requirements are in place. The risk at that point is 2.1786E-05 
x 20 MJ.
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                                        (a)      (b) 
Figure 35: a. Accident frequency and accident energy, b. Cross plot for accident frequency and consequence at changing 
speed.
Figure 36a shows the graph frequency and damage (volume of collapse) graph, from the 
graph figure, based on ALARP principle and sustainability analysis, decision can be made 
for waterways requirements. The ALARP influence diagram show at that a speed of up 7 
knot there will be likehood of high accident for the waterways and energy of impact of about 
137.5 MJ which is considered a high consequence energy. It is also observed from the figure 
that positive volume of collapse of 1.3 cubic meters occurs at 7.1E-5. Thus, the risk curve 
at maximum acceptable is value of 0.0035 is at the top ALARP high risk area; from that 
point interestingly accident is likely to occur at reduced speed. Similar trend is observed 
for accident frequency and volume of collapse for drifting collision except that, with a small 
difference of 0.01 cubic meters (See Figure 36b). Figure 36c shows that acceptable risk at 
10e + 4 is at length of penetration equivalent to 7.1 m.
 
          (a)      (b)    (c) 
Figure 36: ALARP graph of Accident frequency Vs Consequence volume of collapse for powered collision, b. ALARP graph 
of Accident frequency length of penetration, c. ALARP graph of Accident frequency Vs Consequence length of penetration.
Figure 37a shows respectively risk situation for accident frequency at changing number 
of ships, risk become higher with more number of ships. Figure 37b shows accident energy 
vs accident frequency@changing beam of ship, risk become higher at large beam of ship. 
Figure 37c shows accident energy vs accident frequency@Changing mass, vessel mass of 
10000 t, pose highest risk for collision. 
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                                                    (a)                                    (b) 
 
 
 
                                                                             (c) 
Figure 37: a. Accident frequency and consequence energy at changing number of ships, b. Accident frequency and 
consequence energy at changing beam of ship, c. Accident frequency and consequence energy at mass of ship.
Figure 38a shows accident average energy and accident occurrence frequency. The 
maximum speed that should not be exceeded is when Fa is 2.06E-06, and Ea is72E-MJ. 
For the current speed of 3 knot at Langat River, Ea value is 14 MJ and Ea is 3.8e-5. Figure 
38b shows the limit definition for risk when the graph of drifting and powered collision are 
combined. The point 64 MJ, E2 is 82 MJ and 2.8 E-6 represent point of limit definition 
against catastrophic release of energy.
 
                                              (a)      (b) 
Figure 38: a. Cross plotting for accident frequency and accident consequence energy Vs consequence energy@changing 
beam of ship.
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Between reliability and validation: Reliability analysis is required to have assurance 
about the model; the purpose of reliability testing is to discover potential problems with 
the design as early as possible and, ultimately, provide confidence that the system meets 
its reliability requirements. Reliability testing may be performed at system and subsystem 
level. It can be conducted in the following way for a system in question [24]:
Accident mean, variance and standard deviation from normal distribution 
For 10 years =>Mean (  = N x Fa              (17)
Variance ( )σ  = N x Fa x (1-Fa)              (18)
Standard deviation= σ  , Z = (X-µ )/ ( )σ               (19)
Year for system to fail from binomial, mean time to failure and poison distribution.
( ) ( ).T , .T ).N
,T
NFr eγ γ γ
γ
 Ν
= 
 
!                                                                                    (20)
Implementation of TSS is one of the remedies for collision risk observed and predicted in 
Langat; this can be done through integration of normal distribution along thewidth of the 
waterways and subsequent implementation frequency model. The differences in the result 
can reflect improvement derived from implementation of TSS.
( )Xsouth
f =
1
21 12( )
2
e x
µµ π
−
−
                  (21)
 ( )X
northf =
1
21 12( )
2
e x
µµ π
−
−
                                         (22)
Comparing the model behavior applied to other rivers of relative profile and vessel 
particular, Triangulating analysis of the sum of probability of failure from subsystem level 
failure analysis, Probability Density function (PDF) and Cumulative Density Function (CDF) 
of the model determination. Calculate the cumulative probability of each residual using 
the formula. PDF can be systematically represented by the histogram curve while CDF is 
calculated from:
P(i-th residual) = i/(N+1)                (23)
Table 23 shows sample consider for accident for accident damage for PDF and CDF 
estimation. Figure 39a and b show theoretical PDF and CDF plots for sampled data. The 
CDF tailing assymptote, while the PDF has exponential droping is sign of good reliability for 
the data used to generate the trend. Damage distribution based on 10 ship accidents per 
year.
Damage size Frequency of damage Damage size Frequency of damage
100-500 7 5000-10000 4
500 – 1000 6 10000-15000 2
1000-5000 5 15000-100000 1
Table 23: Damage size.
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Figure 39: Theoretical PDF and CDF plot. a. Probability density function for accident consequence, b. Cumulative density 
function for accident consequence.
Figure 40a and b show collision impact variation for powered collision energy E1, 
normal distribution and histogram curve fit is good. On average the damage distribution is 
acceptable. The overall pattern of the residual observed is similar for the plot of histogram 
of normally distributed data. Thus the S-shaped curve on the normal distribution graph give 
indication of bimodal distribution of residuals.
 
                                             (a)      (b) 
Figure 40: Collision damage impact (Powered collision) a. Normal distribution plot for E1 residual, b. Histogram plot of the 
e1 residual.
Figure 41 a and b show collision impact variation for drift collision (anchored ship).
                                           (a)                     (b) 
Figure 41: Collision damage impact (Drifting collision) a.Nomal Probability plot of the residual, b. Histogram plot of the residual.
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Figure 42 shows collision impact for alternative interpolation for collision energy (Ea) 
with respective volume of collapse, curve fit is good, The regression work show standard 
deviation of 0.00115 and correlation up to 86.
                                          a.     b. 
Figure 42: Collision impact and volume of collapse for alternative interpolation a. Normal probability plots if the residual b. 
Regression for the risk curve.
Figure 43 shows curve fit and residual analysis for frequency and consequence risk model 
on Langat River. Figure 44 shows matrix plot for accident frequency and consequence, the 
graphs shows scatter plot of response with good pattern of inter relationships among the 
predictor variables. It shows that there is no much gaps and outlying in the data points. 
From the, matrix curve it is observe that risk is totally unacceptable for reckless increase 
in number of ship and also high speed. The matrix observation also show that B and w 
parameter risk are tolerable for long-term.
Figure 43: curve fit and residual analysis for frequency and consequence risk model on river Langat.
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Figure 44: Matrix plot for accident frequency and consequence.
Channel complexity analysis: Various channel components enter channel complexity 
components, these can be visibility weather, squat, bridge, river bent, human reliability. It 
is important to Account for each of them in channel design work. Figure 45 show channel 
complexity for Langat. Poor visibility might be expected to increase the risk of groundings 
and collisions [25]. The increase in accident risk due to poor visibility is more consistent and 
more significant than the change associated with high wind. A model extracted from Dover 
waterway studies concluded with the following:
Fog Collision Risk Index (FCRI) = ( )1 1 2 2 3 3.P VI P VI P VI+ + + +            (22)
Where: KP = Probability of collision per million encounters, KVI = Fraction of time that 
the visibility is in the range k, K = Visibility range: clear (>4km), Mist/Fog (200m-4km), tick/
dense (less than 200m).
 
Figure 45: Langat channel complexity.
Empirically derived means to determine the relationship between accident risk, channel 
complexity parameters and VTS is:
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R C N L W H M= − − + + − + +0 37231 35297 16 3277 0 2285 0 0004 0 01212 0 0004. . . . . . .           (23)
Where, predicted VTS-consequence 100000 transit, C = 1 for an open approach area and 
0 otherwise, N = 1 for a constricted waterway and 0 otherwise, L = length of the traffic route 
in statute miles, W = average waterway/channel width in yards, H = sum of total degrees of 
course changes along the traffic route, M = number of vessels in the waterway divided by L.
Barge movement creates very low wave height and thus will have insignificant impact on 
river bank erosion. Speed limit can be imposed by authorities for wave height and loading 
complexity [26]. Other important analysis is reliability analysis for uncertainty estimation. It 
is important for this to be carried out separately. Reliability work could include projection for 
accident rate for certain number of year, using poison distribution or determination of exact 
period of next accident using binomial function. Ship collisions are rare and independent 
random event in time [27]. The event can be considered as poison events where time to first 
occurrence is exponentially distributed
Another critical reliability stochastic estimation is human reliability assessment which 
can be done using questionnaire analysis or the technique of human error rate prediction 
THERP probabilistic relation.
1
. . . CmEA EA K KkP HEP FPS W== +∑                 (24)
Where, EAP = Probability of error for specific action EAHEP = Nominal operator error 
probability for specific error, KPSF = numerical value of kth performance sapping factor, 
KW = weight of KPSF  KPSF (constant), m=number of PSF, C= Constant.
Navigation of vessel in shallow water at a hull displacement cause vertical sink age, or 
squat, as a result of a pressure drop beneath its hull to avoid ship groundings with possible 
severe economic and environmental consequences, the relevant governmental, port and 
maritime agencies and organizations need a reliable method of predicting ship squat [9]. 
Squat analysis of squat and channel clearance based on the physical characteristics of a 
channel and the ships that travel through it can be used to issue appropriate regulations 
regarding vessel size and speed and to plan channel dredging operations. Model on weather 
and human reliability assessment and expert judgment as well as simulation could help 
perfect the reliability on safety and environmental risk study for inland water ways [8].
Conclusion
System level damage estimation modeling of consequence in risk analysis is important. 
Hybrid use of use deterministic using first principle characteristics of the system with 
stochastic process give better reliability for the system design. Associated risks relating to 
system level consequence has been modeled for Langat River from River physical system 
behavior and stochastic process. The validated result is useful for limit definition for 
preventive safety and environmental risk has been presented. Generated risk graph have 
been used to simulate real time risk in the waterways for relevant decision support the 
respective result has been validated statistically. 
Implications of quantifying cost on benefit attached to waterways as part of decision 
support. Damage estimation does have some degree of linear relationship with the risks to 
people and the environment, getting their actual data about damage is hard on this case, 
thus interpolation of has been employed to generate resulting damage. Risk measurement 
can further be reliable by determining risk control option through sustainability balance 
between environmental, economic and safety aspect of IWTS. Thus, it is important to use 
caution when comparing accident rates across ports and over time because of the differences 
in reporting criteria. 
ALARP comparison show that Langat River is risk is not appalling yet; risk graph is at 
44
the lower portion of ALARP. Accident frequency is of 3.8E-5 and consequence energy of 31 
MJ, resulting to length of collapse of 9.3m. For a River with such a low traffic, the risk is 
could conservatively consider high.Incorporation ofadvantage from traffic improvement like 
implementation of Traffic Separation Scheme (TSS), Vessel Traffic System (VTS), Automatic 
Identification System (AIS), better training, International Safety Management (ISM) in 
the risk process could achieve reduction in risk of the channel, real-time environmental 
information about environmental conditions, including currents, tide levels, winds, transit 
parameters and improvement against other channel complexity, are useful in sustainability 
balance work for waterways developments.
Appendix: Nomenclature
Nm – Number ship movement
W – Width of fairway
B2 – Mean beam of subject ship (m)
V1 – Mean speed of meeting ship (Knot) 
Ps – Traffic density of meeting ship (ship/nm^2)
Pn – Traffic density
Pi – Impact probability 
Th -head- on
To-Overtaking
Tc-Crossing
Ts - specific angle
Tc - Circular
Tr -Random
Ea – Consequence energy
Ni – Expected number of impact 
Pa –Probability of accident 
Fa =Na Expected number of collision per year
Lp – Length of penetration
Vc –Volume of collapse
Df- Damage function
3. Environmental Risk and Reliability for Sustainable Dredging
Abstract
Dredging work and placement leads to changes to the environment. Environmental 
impact assessment has been employed to address these changes. Risk assessment which 
rarely covers large part of uncertainty associated with dredging work is captured in EIA. 
EIA focus on fixed and inflexible standards which have led to post dredging failures. This 
makes it necessary to do critical and dependability scientific risk analysis that quantitatively 
determine whether the changes are serious or irreversible. This paper discuss the new 
internationally recognized philosophy of risk analysis or formal and system risk based 
design that provide opportunity to focus on real concern of the dredging project. The 
paper will discuss case study of failed project based on conventional EIA and best practice 
performance of systemic risk base design approach.
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Introduction
Dredging is process of digging under water for purpose to maintain the depth in 
navigation channels. Dredging is required to develop and maintain navigation infrastructure, 
reclamation, maintenance of river flow, beach nourishment, and environmental remediation 
of contaminated sediments. Study on environmental impact of dredging is not new and 
recently there is concerned about balance between the need to dredge, economic viability, 
social technical approval and adequate environmental protection can be challenge. Various 
methods has been implemented for management of dredging activities, but choose in the 
best practice approach is also a bog challenge that require high level of understanding of the 
technical and economical aspects of the dredging process. Input from ecological experts and 
dredging specialists. Community participation from port authorities, regulatory agencies, 
the dredging industry and non-governmental organisations such as environmentalists and 
private sector consultancies. 
The Need for and dredging requirement: Dredging is the excavation, lifting and 
transport of underwater sediments and soils for the construction and maintenance of 
ports and waterways, dikes and other infrastructures for reclamation, maintenance of river 
flow, beach nourishment, to extract mineral resources, particularly sand and gravel, for 
use for example in the construction industry, and for the environmental remediation of 
contaminated sediments.
Globally, many hundreds of millions of cubic meters (m3) of sediments are dredged 
annually with most of this volume being handled in coastal areas. A portion of this total 
represents capital dredging which involves the excavation of sediments to create ports, 
harbors and navigable waterways. Maintenance dredging sustains sufficient water depths 
for safe navigation by periodic removal of sediment accumulated due to natural and human-
induced sedimentation. Maintenance dredging may vary from an almost continuous activity 
throughout the year to an infrequent activity occurring only once every few years. Dredging 
activities offer social, economic and environmental benefits to the whole community. 
Hydrography chart and bathymetric map are used as guidance to vision of discrete bottom of 
water. Vigilant is requiring for the bottom as the, they are proned to sudden change leading 
to shoaling due to flood or drought. Survey of a navigation channel to locate dredging area 
done through drawing of isolines or lines connecting points of equal depth on the map so 
that captains and ships pilots can get an idea of the hills and valleys underwater [28,29]. 
Remote sensing equipment is used by hydrographers on top of the water of the water 
to see the bottom of the channel. Isoline are drowned based on statistical data record for 
accuracy and reducing risk of missing important underwater features like rocks or shoals. 
Dredgers: dredger is a machine that scoops or sucks sediments from under the water. There 
are a few different types of dredgers, the three main types of dredges are mechanical dredges, 
hydraulic dredges and airlift dredges. Mechanical dredges are often used in areas protected 
from waves and sea swells. They work well around docks and shallow channels, but not 
usually in the ocean. Hydraulic dredges work by sucking a mixture of dredged material and 
water from the channel bottom. There are two main types of hydraulic dredges the cuter 
head pipeline dredge and the hopper dredges. Airlift dredges are special use dredges that 
raise material from the bottom of the waterway by air pressure. Split hull hopper dredges 
are self-powered, so they can move to the dredging and disposal site by themselves. Figure 
46 shows typical hydrographic survey of a channel.
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Figure 46: Typical hydrography survey channel condition survey for a channel, 53 m deep, the survey lines are at 50-foot 
intervals. Shaded areas are shoals.
Dredge material: Dredging is necessary to maintain waterways channel. Nearly 400 
million cubic yards of material is dredged each year. Consequently, about 400 million 
cubic yards of material must be placed in approved disposal sites or else used for another 
environmentally acceptable purpose. Sustainable disposal of dredge material is very 
imperative as it ends up saving a lot of money and maintains reliability and efficiency use of 
resources advantage of sustainable beneficial disposal are [29,30]:
• Cost saving on money spent on finding and managing disposal sites. 
• It avoids habitat and ecological impacts that disposal may cause. 
• It saves capacity in existing disposal sites. 
• It can be a low-cost alternative to purchasing expensive fill for construction 
projects.
• It can be used to enhance or restore habitat.
Environmental requirement of dredging project: The tendering of a dredging contract 
typically occurs after a full engineering design has been completed (i.e. after the planning 
and design phase). However, for other types of contracting mechanisms (e.g., design-build), 
the tendering of contract may occur early in the overall project process, thus requiring the 
Contractor to perform much of the evaluation and design work himself. Table 24 shows 
phases of dredging project and the risk control components.
Project Phase Planning and design Construction Post construction
Impact
Need for dredging is translated into 
project design. Physical and biological 
impacts will depend on project 
specification.
Project construction 
will cause temporary or 
permanents physical 
change, Advert effect 
should be mitigated 
through best practice 
method
Physical change may result 
to long term environmental 
effects that should be mitigated 
by appropriate project design, 
planning and execution
Scope
Functional requirements, Conceptual 
design, Potential environmental 
impacts, and Final design and 
specifications
Tendering and contract 
award, Construction 
methods and equipments 
selection, Monitoring and 
feedback
Infrastructures in service and 
their may have additional mode 
of impact, Long term monitoring 
and feedback may be needed to 
evaluate RCO
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Environmental 
component
Planning and design decision, RCO 
to prevent or reduce environmental 
impact if of the whole project
Construction decision, 
RCO to prevent 
environment impact cause 
by physical change
Certain RCO may apply to 
mitigation of future impacts
Table 24: Dredging project phases and risk components.
The planning and design phase begins with defining overall functional requirements 
to meet the project objectives. This involves evaluating potential environmental impacts 
and any regulatory constraints, and concludes with preparing projects specifications. 
The planning and design phase is used to identify risk areas and risk control option in 
advance to help protect the environment during dredging, transport and disposal activities 
and subsequent monitoring and possible remedial actions. Elements of project formulation 
include:
• Functional Requirements
• Conceptual Design
• Regulatory Framework
• Baseline Environment
• Stakeholder Input
• Potential impact Review the baseline condition as a consequence of construction 
and post-project activities. 
• Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
• Risk control option
• Prepare Final Project Design and Specifications
Afinal design addresses all major elements of the project: engineering design, 
environmental management, construction sequencing, and construction management. 
The specification’s level of detail will depend on the type of contract, thecomplexity 
of the project, and the experience with dredging of both the project proponent and 
contractor(s). Figure 47 shows example operational disposal control measure to limit 
impact of dredge disposal.
 
                                             a.                   b. 
Figure 47: a. uncontrolled disposal, b. control disposal (PIANC).
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It is important to integrate risk control option that have been evaluated in the 
environmental review process to ensure that the desired balance between minimizing 
potential environmental impacts and constraints on construction is achieved. Additional 
environmental review may be required to establish that any residual risk, or actual impact, 
is acceptable Risk control option must be based on a clear definition of the project’s technical 
and regulatory requirements. Studies conducted during the EIA or project planning, as well 
as information from regulators and stakeholders can contribute technical information for 
informed risk control option including [29,31]:
Sediment characterization (e.g., grain size distribution, level of contamination, etc.)
Bathymetric/topographic surveys with design profiles, which establishes the volume 
of sediment to be dredged; An understanding of hydraulic/hydrodynamic/oceanographic 
conditions that may restrict operations; The destination or final use of the dredged 
material, including placement options and locations; The environmental functions and 
value of the area to be dredged, establishing environmental boundary conditions; The 
environmental value of dredged material management areas (e.g., placement in confined 
or unconfined areas or beneficial use options) Existing site uses (e.g., navigation, 
recreational use, commercial fishing, quality of life impacts (air, noise, light) to establish 
reasonable operational measures;
Legal conditions: Environmental aspects related to future use and maintenance of 
the project’s post construction condition should consider the areas of facility operations, 
future maintenance, long-term monitoring. During the construction phase, the contractor 
assumes primary responsibility for meeting the requirements of the project specifications, 
including meeting permit and contractual environmental conditions and implementation of 
risk control options. Major steps in the construction phase include: Figure 48
Tendering and Contract Award
Contractor Defines Construction Methods and Selects Equipment
Project Execution: Risk control option should based on best practice 
 
 
Figure 48: Post dredging impact in Kuala Terengganu.
Environmental risk requirements of dredging project: Risk analysis in a dredging 
project, including taking into account adherence to the Precautionary Principle. It involves 
methods for assessing the significance of the likely impacts and essential environmental 
characteristics that require consideration during both the planning and implementation 
phases and the mechanisms whereby impacts can occurs Figure 49. 
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Qualitative based environmental impact assessment: Dredging and disposal of 
dredged material have many potential implications for the environment, like disturbance of 
benthic invertebrates, disruption of their 
 
Figure 49: Risk based model for dredging projecthabitats and direct mortality.
The scale of these impacts depends on several factors, including the magnitude, duration, 
frequency and methodology of the dredging activity and the sensitivity of the affected 
environment. The need for RCO to reduce the effects of dredging, transport and placement 
depends on the results of the impact assessment process and effectiveness to meet goal 
of protecting sensitive environmental resources, maintenance of healthy ecosystems and 
ensuring sustainable development and exploitation of resources. 
Understanding the environments in which dredging and dredged material placement 
occur is a prerequisite of prudent decision making for environmental protection. A thorough 
knowledge of baseline conditions is needed so that a dredging project’s environmental 
effects can be assessed properly and monitored against an agreed baseline. The baseline 
data must address natural variations, seasonal patterns and longer term trends to provide 
a context for determining whether a change is the result of dredging or not. As a minimum, 
characterization of the potentially affected environment should consist of recent surveys 
(performed within the last three years) and studies of the relevant environmental attributes. 
For reliability the studies must be conducted by qualified scientific and engineering 
personnel using accepted methods. The boundary includes the physiographic, hydrologic, 
ecologic, social, and political boundaries of the project areas. In general, the following types 
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of data are required for characterization of the dredging and placement sites, the transport 
corridor and the areas around these sites, which could be indirectly affected, to adequately 
address the range of management options [32,33]:
• Bathymetric and adjacent topographic data
• Habitat and species distribution
• Resources such as fish populations, shellfish beds, oil and gas fields, aggregate 
mining and spawning grounds
• Physical and chemical nature of sediments
• Water quality
• Hydrodynamic data
• Cultural resources, including archaeological and anthropological conditions
• Human demography and land use characteristics
• Users of the environmental resources, such as commercial, recreational, and 
subsistence fisheries
• Navigation routes and
• Services in the project area, such as pipelines and cables.
In addition, it is necessary to take into account any cumulative impacts. Certain ongoing 
activities, such as fisheries and navigation, could have impacts that in combination with 
the proposed dredging result in more significant effects than would result from the project 
activities alone. This information is generally included in the impact assessment.
Between environmental risk assessment and environmental impact 
assessment 
In practice, different approach is used to evaluate and measure the environmental 
impacts of a dredging project. ERA is defined as the examination of risks resulting from the 
technology that threaten ecosystems, animals and people. There are three main types of 
ERA: human health, ecological, and applied industrial risk assessment. The origin of ERA is 
the assessment of risks in the industry. Then, the same approach was applied in a broader 
scale for assessing the risks of the release of chemicals posed to human health. The more 
recently developed ecological risk assessment follows the same approach as human health 
ERA, but extending the assessed end-points to species other than human beings.
A conventional approach of an environmental risk assessment begins with the problem 
formulation and the identification of the hazard (or hazards). Then, the possible ways of 
release of the hazard are estimated and the exposure of those chosen target species is 
assessed. The final steps are the consequence assessment and the estimation of the risk. 
Some of the steps require the use of models (e.g. the assessment of the release and the 
exposure) and the outcome is usually a quantitative assessment. It should be noted that 
many choices have to be done in the design of the risk assessment and thus the definition 
and method used in each of them will be of importance to the final outcome [34].
It has also been common that human health and ecological ERA are normally applied 
for assessing the risks regarding the release of one single chemical. They would need to be 
adapted for assessing the impacts of dredging operations, where more than one chemical 
might be released together. It is cleared that the consequences of dredging might be broader 
than the release of chemicals. Another group of tools widely used at present is Environmental 
Impact Assessment (EIA). 
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There are also several methodologies for performing an EIA. They depend on the assessed 
activity, and of course the way the final impacts are presented and aggregated. The effects 
considered in an EIA are very wide, from pollution effects to a wider range of ecological 
effects, and it is often a statutory requirement under holistic doctrine to consider all possible 
effects, including economic, social and political.
The difference between ERA and EIA is that the later do not treat risks as probabilities. 
Generally the potential impacts are predicted, and assessed quantitatively or qualitatively. 
However, it also uses models requires for making many decisions in the design of the 
assessment, which could influence the final result. Any evaluation of the impacts of a certain 
project has to face difficulties and uncertainties in part due to the scientific uncertainties 
involved but in part due to the decisions to be made for framing and defining the problem. 
The impact assessment will have to specify the range of species to include and thus get 
entangled in nontrivial normative (ethical, ecological and economic) issues.
Risk based design and precautionary principle: The Communication from the 
Commission of the European Communities on the precautionary principle (Commission 
of the European Communities) states that the Precautionary Principle should be applied 
within a structured approach to the analysis of risk. As outlined above, this comprises three 
elements: risk assessment, Risk analysis, risk management and risk communication. The 
Precautionary Principle is particularly relevant as an instrument in the management of risk.
In the context of dredging projects it can be stated that because of great natural variability 
there will often be a lack of full scientific certainty about the scales of potential impacts. In 
accordance with the Precautionary Principle decision to forego a project should be a last 
resort following exhaustive consideration of all reasonable RCO and reaching a conclusion 
that adequate environmental protection could not be achieved. Prohibiting dredging may 
ensure that no impacts occur, but may also generate high risk to human safety (e.g., lack 
of removal of shoals that pose navigation hazards) or result in lost commerce and harm to 
the economy. The RCO should be selected such that clear, defined, and ideally quantitative 
thresholds of protection can be achieved (e.g. to control measures of suspended sediment 
within a specified concentration/duration range). Figure 50 shows typical system risk 
components [35,36].
Personal Safety
Sub-System SafetySystem Safety
Figure 50: Components of risk assessment and analysis.
The approach to risk assessment begins with risk analysis, a systematic process for 
answering the three questions posed at the beginning of this chapter: What can go wrong? 
How likely is it? What are the impacts? The formal definition of a risk analysis proceeds 
from these simple questions, where a particular answer is Si, a particular scenario; pi, the 
likelihood of that scenario; and Ci, the associated consequences. See Figure 51. 
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Figure 51: Risk based method.
Thus cost of environmental sustainability is not cheap, but whenever we compare the 
benefit and longtime reliability with the cost, there is no doubt that the later will supersede 
the earlier. Dedication on scientific analysis, environmental assessment work, never get 
attention in the past like to today. The fact that everything stays with us, is recently calling 
for philosophy for minimum used of toxic material in our daily activities. Yes, scientific work 
or test required prudent analysis over time but once we have information we should restrain 
under the doctrine that prevention is better than cure.
Work on environmental issue has always involved dispute because of impacts analysis. 
Global climate Change might be regarded as a primary example where this strong interlinkage 
between science and policy making is broadly acknowledged, Social science studies have 
shown how the production of scientific knowledge played a crucial part in the rise of climate 
change as a topic of worldwide interest and to the political arena while, on the other hand, 
knowledge and research on climate change issues is influenced by social factors 
In most countries, the majority of dredged material is placed at sea. Land disposal 
options are normally much more expensive therefore, they are applied only when either 
transport costs to sea are inhibitory, or beneficial use is not an option, or the material is 
too contaminated. In order to meet sustainability requirement the following describe 3 case 
studies where beneficial work in dredging are translated to cost [37,38].
On environmental sustainability According to US green port project, 2001, case study 
on Boston port navigation improvement project done in the US dredging and construction 
project use mitigation like Surface sediments contaminated with metals, PAHs, PCB, and 
other organics, Channels were over-dredged by 20 ft. Contaminated material was placed on 
barge and deposited into over-dredged in channel disposal cells and covered with 3 ft. clean 
material, All clean material deposited in Mass Bay Disposal Site.
Another case done in port of los Angelis use copper treatment by developing onsite 
system to treat copper contaminated marine sediments, Pilot study dredged, treated and 
disposed of 100 tons of contaminated sediment, Full-scale project cleaned up 21,000 cubic 
yards of contaminated sediment, Saved $1.5 million in cleanup costs over alternative.
Studies done in Europe also confirm use of processing plant for dredge material. Also 
regional sediment management program done by compiled various methodologies to reduce 
shoaling.
Reliability and decision support framework: Various studies have been carried out 
to find the best hybrid supply for given areas. Results from specific studies cannot be 
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easily applied to other situations due to area-specific resources and energy use profiles 
and environmental differences. Energy supply system, with a large percentage of renewable 
resources varies with the size and type of area, climate, location, typical demand profiles, 
and available renewable resource. A decision support framework is required in order to 
aid the design of future renewable energy supply systems, effectively manage transitional 
periods, and encourages and advance state of the art deployment as systems become more 
economically desirable. The DSS could involve the technical feasibility of possible renewable 
energy supply systems, economic and political issues.  
Reliability based DSS can facilitate possible supply scenarios to be quickly and easily 
tried, to see how well the demands for electricity, heat and transport for any given area can 
be matched with the outputs of a wide variety of possible generation methods. This includes 
the generation of electricity from intermittent hybrid sources. DSS framework provide the 
appropriate type and sizing of spinning reserve, fuel production and energy storage to be 
ascertained, and support the analysis of supplies and demands for an area of any type 
and geographical location, to allow potential renewable energy provision on the small to 
medium scale to be analyzed. DSS can provide energy provision for port and help guide 
the transition towards higher percentage sustainable energy provision in larger areas. The 
hybrid configuration of how the total energy needs of an area may be met in a sustainable 
manner, the problems and benefits associated with these, and the ways in which they may 
be used together to form reliable and efficient energy supply systems. The applicability and 
relevance of the decision support framework are shown through the use of a can simulate 
case study of the complex nature of sustainable energy supply system design.
Regulatory requirement and assessment: The current legal requirements have been 
developed based on reactive approach which leads to system failure. Reactive approach 
is not suitable for introduction of new technology of modern power generation systems. 
This call for alternative philosophy to the assessment of new power generation technologies 
together with associated equipment and systems from safety and reliability considerations, 
such system required analysis of system capability and regulatory capability. System based 
approaches for regulatory assessment is detailed under goal based design as shown in 
figure. 
IMO has embraced the use of goal based standards for ship construction and this process 
can be equally well applied to machinery power plants. Figure 52 illustrates the goal based 
regulatory framework for new ship construction that could be readily adapted for marine 
system. 
 
Goal based verification of compliance 
criteria 
Tier 
1&2 
IMO instrument/classification rules, industrial standards, class guides, and 
technical procedure 
Tier 3 
Tier 4 
Approval process 
Goal Analysis 
Secondary standard for company or individual ship 
Code of practice, safety and quality system shipbuilding, operation maintenance 
and manning 
 
Design process 
High level goal assessment/Safety and environment protection objective: 
 
Tier 5 
i  
technical procedure
and anning
i) Standard requirement ii) Functional requirement
Figure 52: Components of level goal standard assessment.
Legal framework for dredging: The most important international agreements regarding 
dredging are the London Convention 10, issued in 1972 and reviewed in the 1996 Protocol 
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11 and the OSPAR Convention 12 from 1992. IMO also unveil Formal safety assessment 
for marine system. These international agreements establish frameworks within which the 
contracting countries are obliged to operate with respect to their handling of materials 
destined for placement in the sea. However, these Conventions do not include regulations 
of the dredging operations per se, which are mainly established at the national level nor for 
the conditions of disposal of in land.Convention for the prevention of marine pollution by 
dumping of wastes and other matter [39]. 
A review of the Convention began in 1993 and was completed in 1996 with the acceptance 
of The 1996 Protocol to the London Convention. The 1996 Protocol has not yet come into 
force as it has not yet been ratified by a sufficient number of countries (19 out of 26). 
Conventions for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic [40]. On 
the other hand, dredging activities are subject to national regulations, which can vary very 
much among the countries. In some cases there is a specific directive regarding dredging in 
Malaysia the royal Malaysia navy regulate the dredging. Thus they are other agencies but 
there is not integration for effectiveness of the system (personal communication).
Quantitative and formal system engineering based risk analysis: Risk is generally 
understood as an expression of the quantified link between an environmental hazard or 
stressor and the potential negative consequences it may have on targets or receptors. When 
discussing risk the types of stressors as well as the targets of interest must be specified. 
Thus project risk can be distinguished from engineering risk, and environmental risk. But, 
in practice it may be very difficult to establish a quantifiable relationship between hazard 
and target response because of the many uncertainties in the cause effect chain and the 
dynamic nature of aquatic ecosystems. Risk analysis provides a means to accommodate 
these uncertainties. Formal risk assessment procedures have not been adopted by many 
regulatory agencies or they have been applied mainly to dredging of contaminated sediments. 
Typically risk assessment takes the form of professional judgment based on the experience 
and expertise of parties engaged in project co-ordination [41].
Risk analysis provides an opportunity to focus on the real concerns of a project, instead 
of relying on fixed and inflexible standards such as threshold levels for contaminants or 
fixed percentages of allowable overflow of a dredger. For the purpose of this report, risk 
assessment is mainly captured in the EIA, whereas risk management takes the form of best 
management practice determination. Risk evaluation is the path from the scientific system 
based quantitative risk analysis is the internationally recognized best practice and modest 
concept of risk analysis. Table 25 shows components of risk analysis.
Components Purpose / Process
Risk analysis Involve the overall process of risk assessment and risk management, including screening and scoping
Risk assessment Involve qualitative process of identifying risk potential to quantitative risk characterization
Risk screening Involve the specification and setup of a general framework for managing risk
Risk evaluation
Involve:
Scientific evaluation of risks through use of stochastic process
Public/political evaluation of risks
Risk management
Involve:
Process of identifying and selecting measures
Procedures for implementation and evaluation of measures
Table 25: Components S.
An outline about risk assessment and the application of risk informed decision making 
can be found in Bridges. This document does not address the scientific methods to evaluate 
the human health and ecological risks of a project. In this case other guidance, like the 
PIANC Working Group Envicom 10 report on Environmental Risk Assessment of Dredging 
and Disposal Operations, should be reviewed and properly qualified professionals engaged 
to perform the necessary work. Analysis tools that now gaining general acceptance in the 
55
marine industry is Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA). The adoption of analysis 
tools requires a structure and the use of agreed standards. The use of analysis tools must 
also recognize lessons learnt from past incidents and experience and it is vital that the 
background to existing requirements stemming from rules are understood. Consistent with 
the current assessment philosophy, there needs to be two tenets to the process safety and 
dependability. A safety analysis for a hybrid power generation system and its installation 
on board a ship could use a hazard assessment process such as outlined in Figure 53. The 
hazard assessment should review all stages of a systems life cycle from design to disposal. 
Figure 53:  Components of risk and reliability analysis.
Figure 53 shows the components of risk assessment and analysis. The analysis leads 
to risk curve or risk profile. The risk curve is developed from the complete set of risk 
triplets. Table 26 shows elementsof risk analysis. The fourth column is included showing 
the cumulative probability, Pi (uppercase P), as shown. When the points <Ci, Pi> are 
plotted, the result is the staircase function. The staircase function can be considered 
as discrete approximation of a nearly continuous reality. If a smooth curve is drawn 
through the staircase, that curve can be regarded as representing the actual risk, and 
it is the risk curve or risk profile that tells much about the reliability of the system. 
Combination of qualitative and quantitative analyses is advised to for risk estimates of 
complex and dynamic system.
Scenario Probability Consequence Cumulative Probability
S1 P1 C1 P1=P1+P2
S2 P2 C2 P2=P3+P2
Si Pi Ci Pi=Pi+3+Pi
Sn+1 Pn+1 Cn+1 Pn-1=Pn+Pn+1
Sn Pn Cn Pn=Pn
Table 26: Components of risk and reliability analysis.
The analysis that describes and quantifies every scenario, the risk estimation of the 
triplets can be transformed into risk curve or risk matrix of frequency versus consequences 
that is shown in Figure 54.
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Figure 54: Stair case risk curve.
Figure 55:  Risk priority matrix.
L = low risk; M = moderate risk; H = high risk; VH = very high risk.
The design concept needs to address the marine environment in terms of those imposed 
on the power plant and those that are internally controlled. It is also necessary to address 
the effects of fire, flooding, equipment failure and the capability of personnel required to 
operate the system. In carrying out a hazard assessment it is vital that there are clearly 
defined objectives in terms of what is to be demonstrated. The assessment should address 
the consequence of a hazard and possible effect on the system, its subsystems, personnel 
and the environment. An assessment for reliability and availability of a hybrid power 
generation system and its installation in a ship could use a FMEA tool. An effective FMEA 
needs a structured approach with clearly defined objectives 
The assessment analysis processes for safety and reliability need to identify defined 
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objectives under system functionality and capability matching. These two issues are 
concerned with system performance rather than compliance with a prescriptive requirement 
in a standard. The importance of performance and integration of systems that are related to 
safety and reliability is now recognized and the assessment tools now available offer such 
means. Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) is recognized by the IMO as being an important 
part of a process for developing requirements for marine regulations. IMO has approved 
Guidelines for Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) for use in the IMO rule-making process 
(MSC/Circ.1023/MEPC/ Circ.392). Further reliability and optimization can be done by 
using stochastic and simulation tools [35,42].
Uncertainties and risk in dredging projects
The physical and biological characteristics of aquatic environments vary both spatially 
and temporally. Therefore characterizing these environments and assessing impacts and risk 
will always involve some uncertainty. This requires the need for basic understanding of how 
marine and the ecosystems function and how natural events and anthropogenic activities 
affect these functions. In the ideal situation, all environmental risks associated with a 
dredging project would be quantifiable, making the need for specific management practices 
clear. In reality, dredging can potentially affect diverse assemblages of organisms or their 
habitats on both spatial and temporal scales. Because the scales of the interactions between 
organisms and the dredging process are difficult to determine, often the consequences of a 
project are largely speculative. Some degree of uncertainty will therefore always be present 
indecisions regarding the need for special management practices to protect the environment.
It is important to recognize that even with extensive baseline data and input from qualified 
professionals, an element of uncertainty will always be associated with the results of an 
environmental assessment, simply due to the dynamic nature of marine and freshwater 
environments and the complexity of stressors and drivers apart from anthropogenic 
influences. Effects of dredging operations have to be seen against the background of similar 
natural effects. Figure 56 shows that in a typical dredging project the risk assessment 
is made after the preparation of the Conceptual Design. If at this stage it proves that 
the environmental risks are such that they cannot be mitigated by implementation of 
the appropriate best practice then the project should be reconsidered. This means that 
functional requirements will need to be redefined followed by a revision of the Conceptual 
Design.
 
Figure 56: Possible Environmental Effects of Dredging [38].
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In the process of risk work, newer refined RCOs may become necessary during the 
process of risk management. During the preparation of the final project design it is essential 
to establish the degree of residual risk. Figure 57 shows potential impact to marine aquatic.
 
Figure 57: Possible Environmental Effects of disposal [38].
Potential Physical Changes and Environmental Impacts from Dredging and Disposal of 
Dredged Material 
Below water, the sound from the dredge vessel could have environmental effects such 
as interfering with fish behavior, possibly leading to disturbed migratory routes, although 
fish might easily avoid temporarily disturbed areas without consequence. Other potential 
environmental effects not directly related to dredging but associated with the presence of 
the dredger include spills of oil and fuel, exhaust emissions, and the possible introduction of 
invasive species via the release of ballast water.One of the less understood areas of concern 
is the impact of sediment released into the aquatic environment that may occur at any of 
the stages from excavation to placement. A high concentration of sand in suspension will 
have very low turbidity while a relatively low concentration of fine silt or clay in suspension 
will have a high turbidity. Also sediment effect on the flora and fauna, concentration, the 
turbidity, the total amount of loss of sediments or the spatial distribution of a sediment 
plume are other impacts.
Sediment re-suspended in the water column in high concentrations can directly lead 
to physical abrasion of, for example, filter-feeding organs or gill membranes of fish and 
shellfish. Indirectly, if present for sufficient duration, high turbidity (i.e. reduced light 
penetration), can result in decreased growth potential or total loss of submerged aquatic 
vegetation. The resuspension of sediments can also release toxic chemicals or nutrients 
such as phosphates and nitrates, which may increase the atrophic status of the system 
(this reinforces the need for appropriate sediment characterization). Release of anaerobic 
sediment and organic matter in high concentrations mayin some cases deplete the dissolved 
oxygen. Subsequent sedimentation around the dredging site can smother benthic flora and 
fauna or compromise habitat quality.
Spatial and temporal scales of effects: The environmental effects vary spatially and 
temporally from project to project. When the effects are considered to have a significant 
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adverse impact it is necessary to investigate means to reduce or mitigate them. The 
significance of the environmental effects depends on site-specific factors that govern the 
vulnerability and sensitivity of environmental resources in the project area. When the 
sediment being moved is chemically contaminated, the need for environmental protection is 
generally recognized by all stakeholders. 
Complexity with respect to uncertainty has made necessity for several efforts to find tools 
for the assessment and management of different types of uncertainty. As mentioned before, 
the word uncertainty is used in many different situations for expressing a lack of certain, 
clear knowledge for taking a decision. Uncertainty is any departure from the unachievable 
ideal of complete determinism. In the case presented here, uncertainty signifies that is 
not possible to provide a unique, undisputable, objective assessment of a certain action 
(for example an environmental risk assessment of the dredging). However, depending 
on the actor (e.g. the modeller, the policy maker, or stakeholders), the perception of the 
nature, kind, object and meaning of uncertainty can be very different. This will be clear 
when presenting the perception of uncertainty of the stake holders involved in the case. 
Nevertheless, the simple definition presented above gets more complicated when trying to 
describe the sources, or the sorts or dimensions of uncertainty. 
Typology approaches adopted for characterization and assessment of uncertainty by 
this group focus on uncertainties encountered from the point of view of the modeler that 
assesses policy makers (which they call model based decision support). Therefore, their 
proposal aims to be useful for expressing the uncertainty involved in the use of models, 
perhaps rather than expressing uncertainty from the point of view of the policy makers or 
stakeholders. The typology is based in the distinction of three dimensions of uncertainty:
• The location of uncertainty (where within the model); 
• The level of uncertainty (from deterministic knowledge to total ignorance) and,
• The nature of uncertainty (whether the uncertainty is due to the imperfection of our 
knowledge or is due to the inherent variability of the phenomena being described). 
Risk communication and management: Parties involved in a dredging project view the 
process differently depending on their individual perceptions of these risks and rewards, 
as well as their individual tolerance of the perceived risk. In this sense there may be 
several types of risk in a project. For the proponent the consequences of failure of the 
whole project may be very severe and will usually be measured in economical terms. For 
an environmentalist the potential effects on the environment may be recognized as the 
highest priority risk. Communication is an essential component of sharing concerns and 
identifying means to mitigate them to the fullest extent reasonably possible. During the risk 
analysis, it is important to balance the identified environmental effects and risks against the 
economic and social consequences of the project. Figure 58 shows stake holder involvement 
in dredging decision.
Decision
Design Regulation 
EcomomicEnvironmentalistMethod
Environmenta
l requirement
Figure 58: Stake holder involvement in dredging decision.
Complete and transparent communications are therefore essential throughout the 
process from beginning to end. This refers to all parties involved. Communication should 
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address uncertainties and natural variability in the environment. Seldom does an actual 
project present a clear choice between unbiased, neutral, and generally accepted options. 
Rather, the choice among options is frequently driven by values and perceptions. This 
tension can best be reduced through open lines of communication that include:
• A transparent process
• Outreach that begins during the earliest possible stage of the project and continues 
throughout all phases
• An open and honest process
• Proactive engagement of local and/or regional media, because their influence on 
public opinion can be large.
Risk perception is very much influenced by the social, political and historical 
contexts. Environmental Protection Agency’s (USEPA) can be found giving some generic 
recommendations. Figure 59 shows expected impact in dredging project. The figure also 
shows the interrelation ships between physical changes above and below the water and 
their potential to cause environmental effects. The figure also illustrate physical changes 
can create multiple environmental effects. 
 
Figure 59: Conceptual Model of Physical Changes and Ecological Effects from Dredging - Related Activities.
Selecting evaluation and risk control option for dredging project: Action might be taken 
to adjust the monitoring program itself or as a direct response to the monitoring results. Based 
on the monitoring data, adjustments to the monitoring program could include:
• Reducing the level of monitoring because no effect was observed;
• Continuing with the existing monitoring program to gain further clarification of the 
response; or
• Expanding the monitoring program to include additional parameters or sites.
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So that responding can be quick and effective, it is necessary to establish hierarchy of 
options to adverse monitoring results. The level of response can be targeted to the receptor 
and its sensitivity. Options could include:
• Continuing with dredging under the existing regime;
• Modifying the dredging regime to reduce the actual effect on a sensitive parameter;
• Ceasing dredging within an area until further information is gathered;
• Ceasing dredging within an area altogether; or
• Ceasing dredging and implementing recovery measures.
For a monitoring program to be fully effective, it must include a timely communication of 
results and related actions. Stakeholders should be involved to help build overall program 
credibility. Risk control options are meant to improve the environmental performance 
of a dredging project. Some form of environmental evaluation or Environmental Impact 
Assessment (EIA) is normally required by international conventions. One example is the 
London Convention, which establishes a framework for the evaluation of placement of 
dredged material at sea. The Specific Guidelines for Assessment of Dredged Material [29] 
comprises the following steps:
• Dredged material characterization
• Waste prevention audit and evaluation of disposal options
• Is the material acceptable for marine placement?
• Identify and characterize the placement site;
• Determine potential impacts and prepare impact hypothesis(ies)
• Issue permit
• Implement project and monitor compliance and
• Field monitoring and assessment.
• Within the LC-DMAF guidance it is stated that 
Assessment of potential effects should lead to a concise statement of the expected 
consequences of the sea or land disposal options i.e., the Impact Hypothesis. When 
applying these Guidelines uncertainties in relation to assessments of impacts on the marine 
environment will need to be considered and a precautionary approach applied in addressing 
these uncertainties. Figure 60 shows risk matrix for risk measure of risk based design.
Figure 60: Risk priority matrix.
All dredging and placement projects will cause some changes to the environment. It is 
therefore necessary to determine whether these can be considered serious and or irreversible. 
Because adequate information is rarely available to answer these questions with absolute 
certainty, an evaluation of the relative risk of permanent detriment to the environment is 
required. Many factors affect this assessment of the general environmental risk including 
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the scale of the project, the natural variability of all of the elements of the system likely to be 
affected, possible contamination levels, and the timing of the project. Preparation of an EIA 
involves collaboration among environmental scientists and engineers in consultation with 
port authorities, dredging companies and often a diverse assemblage of stakeholders. The 
amount of technical information available will be important but should be used in tandem 
with the perceptions and knowledge held by the engaged stake holders. Risk evaluation 
is a value judgment reached by consideration of the total body of evidence offered by all 
interested parties.
An overview of the selection process is shown in Figure 60, which also shows how 
the process can be repeated to achieve a project that optimally conforms to acceptable 
environmental risks. The flow chart shows that there are multiple stages within the process 
that allow feedback and repetition in order to achieve a project that is in full compliance 
with acceptable environmental risk. For example, if the application of certain RCO does 
not reduce the risk to an acceptable level then the project would need to be reevaluated 
to determine if other alternatives could be used or the project design modified to reduce 
or remove such unacceptable risks. Feedback loops also occur following the analysis of 
monitoring results against the required objectives. The effectiveness of the RCO is assessed 
against the degree of derived protection of the environmental resource and if found to be 
ineffective then further RCO may be necessary. Monitoring to measure the effectiveness of 
the selected RCO provides adaptive feedback that can be applied to future projects, and is 
always a prudent strategy.
These constrains are very important to bear in mind when we think of environmental 
management at the local or regional level with projects with are used limited time and 
budget of money. Therefore the lack of knowledge that can be experienced by both managers 
and citizens in assessing a concrete project may have more to do with limited resources than 
general scientific ignorance. Benefit-Cost Analysis (BCA) is a tool for organizing information 
on the relative value of alternative public investments like environmental restoration 
projects. When the value of all significant benefits and costs can be expressed in monetary 
terms, the net value (benefits minus costs) of the alternatives under consideration can be 
computed and used to identify the alternative that yields the greatest increase in public 
welfare. However, since environmental goods and services are not commonly bought or sold 
in the marketplace, it can be difficult to express the outputs of an environmental restoration 
project in monetary terms. 
Risk monitoring: It is acknowledged that monitoring can take many forms and fulfill 
various objectives before, during, and after any dredging and placement project. This 
document does not provide an exhaustive description of monitoring technology but rather 
focuses on the role of monitoring as a necessary element in the context of BMP application. 
In particular, monitoring can be proposed as a management practice in itself or used to 
assess the effect of other management practices. Monitoring is the first step-in determining 
whether corrective actions will be necessary to ensure the required outcomes [42,43]. 
One of the key issues related to any environmental monitoring program is the scope 
for combining broad monitoring objectives for separate parameters into a single survey. 
Monitoring programmes can be categorized into three types:
• Surveillance monitoring
• Feedback monitoring
• Compliance monitoring
Formulating a suitable monitoring strategy requires the following elements:
• Targeted objective
• Beeline condition
• Monitoring criteria
• Methodology for measuring change
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• Threshold values
• Timely review procedure
Requirements for monitoring are site-specific and based on the findings of the baseline 
surveys. For example, surveys could be necessary to record:
• The abundance and distribution of species, which is needed to determine
• the rate of species and community recovery within the study area;
• The effect of dredging on seabed morphology;
• The effect of dredging on the concentration of suspended sediments in the water 
column;
• The type of substrate remaining following dredging;
• Use of the area by fish and
• Actual effects on any sensitive species or communities within the study area.
Sometimes, model studies can be used to determine the appropriate locations for 
monitoring. Monitoring involves many uncertainties and difficulties that need to be 
considered. Models are generally not well validated or calibrated and so it is not easy 
to quantify the results with certainty though they are continually improving. After the 
monitoring criteria have been selected, the methodology for measuring change against those 
criteria needs to be determined.
A number of biological, physical, and chemical variables need to be considered when 
defining a monitoring scheme. The variety of possible effects depends on the Characteristics 
of the dredging and placement areas and the dredged material itself, therefore, the 
monitoring programmed sign must be site and case-specific and proportional to the extent 
of the environmental concern. It is also important to understand the possible causes of the 
environmental problem to identify the source of the problem. There should be a specific 
hypothesis that can be tested using easily acquired data. 
The monitoring could be in the water column, on the seabed, on land or in the air. It could 
be physical, chemical, or biological or a combination. Key considerations in establishing the 
monitoring methodology are summarized below:
The methodology used to monitor environmental effects should be the same as that used 
to determine the characteristics of the relevant parameter during the baseline survey, to 
ensure comparability.
The sampling stations should be the same, although there are likely to be fewer stations 
(e.g., the feature of interest may require a more targeted approach than was adopted for the 
baseline survey).
For parameters where timing is critical (e.g., benthic and fish sampling), repeat surveys 
should be undertaken at the same time of year as the baseline survey to ensure that seasonal 
changes in abundance and distribution do not affect the results.
The frequency of sampling is determined based on the monitoring objectives and criteria. 
The expected impact is also a factor to consider when determining frequency of sampling. 
For some parameters (e.g., impacts on geology), changes occur over a long time scale and 
therefore require less frequent monitoring, possibly post project.
It is important to identify a level above or below which an effect is considered unacceptable, 
referred to as an environmental threshold. If the monitoring shows that the threshold level 
is close to being reached then remedial action is required to reduce the level of effect. In 
the absence of a threshold value, monitoring of many parameters is justified to improve 
the knowledge base of the particular effect. Timely review of monitoring results is essential 
to ensure the success of the program. It is recommended that the results of monitoring 
should be reviewed at times that will allow for meaningful adjustments to the dredging and 
placement activities. 
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Conclusions
Dredging provides economic and social benefits for the whole community. However 
dredging can and often will have an impact on the environment outside of the desired change 
of say deepening a channel. To assess the significance of these effects an environmental 
impact study often needs to be undertaken. During such a study, cumulative and in-
combination effects should be considered as it is important to place the dredging activity 
into context with other activities e.g., fisheries, navigation, etc. Previous regulatory work for 
system design has been prescriptive by nature. Performance based standards that make 
use of alternative methods of assessment for safety and reliability of component design, 
manufacture and testing is recommended for hybrid alternative energy system installation. 
System failure and carefree of environment in past project poised all field of human 
endeavor to adopt precautionary principle by providing tools to conduct dredging projects 
in an environmentally sound manner and design based on comprehensive system based 
scientific method discussed in this paper. Properly applied the precautionary principle 
provides incentives to develop better solutions. The paper present structured approach 
and strives for an objective means of selecting the most appropriate Risk control option 
for that lead to the best protection of the environment and meet sustainable development 
requirement. Absolute Reliability of the dredge work can be realized by using predictive 
statistical tools and the data collected.
4. Risk and Hazard Operability Process of Deep Water Marine System
Abstract
The maritime and offshore industry has made use of the ocean in a very responsible way, 
the challenged posed by environmental concern in the coastline is evolving new technology 
and new ways for technological development. In an age so dire to find alternative and 
sensitive ways to mitigate challenge of global warming, climate changes and its associated 
impact, maritime and offshore activities is loaded with requirement to build new sustainable 
and reliable technology for deep sea operation in order to fulfil alternative mitigation options 
for climate change, decline of coastline resources and enthophication. Expanding deep sea 
operation require development of technology related to dynamic position, mobile berthing 
facilities, collision aversion, impact of new environment, wave, wind on marine structure, 
supply vessel operation and fact that coastal water transportation attracts low probability 
and high consequence accidents. This makes reliability requirements for the design and 
operability for safety and environmental protection very necessary. This paper discusses 
process work in risk, hazard and reliability based design and safe and efficient operability 
deep water operation waters. This includes a system based approach that covers proactive 
risk as well as holistic multi criteria assessment of required variables to deduce mitigation 
options and decision support for preventive, protective and control measures of risk of 
hazard for deep water marine offshore operation.
Keywords: Deepwater; Environment; Marine Risk; Reliability; Safety; 
Introduction
Offshore operation and marine transportation service provide substantial support 
to various human activities; its importance has long been recognized. The clear cut 
advantage of inland transportation over other modes of transportation, short sea service 
and evolving deep sea activities are being driven by recent environmental problems and 
dialogues over alternative renewable ways of doing things. The criticality of offshore and 
marine transportation operations within the coastline and the prohibitive nature of the 
occurrence of accidents due to high consequence and losses have equally made it imperative 
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and necessary to design operate and maintain sustainable, efficient and reliable deepwater 
offshore operation and marine transportation systems. Marine accidents fall under the 
scenarios of collision, fire and explosion, flooding, and grounding. This paper discusses a 
model of reliability for the assessment and analysis of marine accident scenarios leading 
to design for the prevention and protection of the environment. The paper will address risk 
process that can optimize design, existing practice, and facilitate decision support for policy 
accommodation for evolving offshore deepwater regime [44,45].
Risk reliability modelling requirement: In order to build reliable deep water offshore 
system and supporting transportation system, it is important to understand the need 
analysis through examination of the components of system functionality and capability. This 
functionality capability of the platform, environmental loading and other support system 
environmental risk as well as ageing factors related to design, operation, construction, 
maintenance, economic, social and disposal requirement for sustainable marine system 
need to be critically analysed. Risk identification work should be followed by risk analysis 
that include risk ranking, limit acceptability and generation of best options towards 
development of safety and environmental risk mitigation and goal based objective for 
evaluation of the development of sustainable cost effective inland water transportation that 
fall under new generation green technology [46,47]. Weighing of deductive balancing work 
requirement for reliable and safety through iterative components of all elements involved 
should include social, economic, health, ecological and technological considerations. Other 
concerns are related to other uses of water resources and through best practice of sediment 
disposal, mitigation for environmental impact, continuous management, monitoring, and 
compensation for uncertainty as well as preparation for future regulation beyond compliance 
policy or principles.
Risk assessment has been used by the business community and government, and 
safety cases of risk assessment have been used by United Kingdom (UK) Health Safety 
and Environment (HSE). In the maritime industry, risk assessment has been used for 
vessel safety, marine structure, transportation of Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) and offshore 
platforms. In Europe maritime risk assessment has been used for coastal port risk analyses 
and pilot fatigue. International Maritime Organization (IMO) and United State Coast Guard 
(USCG) rule making have issued guidelines and procedures for risk based decision making, 
analysis and management under formal safety assessment [48,49]. Risk analysis when 
used for rulemaking is called Formal Safety Assessment (FSA), while when it is used for 
compliance is addressed as Quantitative Risk Analysis (QRA). Contemporary time has seen 
risk assessment optimization using scenario based assessments, which considered the 
relative risks of different conditions and events. In the maritime industry, contemporary time 
risk assessment has been instrumental to make reliable decisions related to prediction of 
flood, structural reliability, intact stability, collision, grounding and fire safety. Probabilistic 
and stochastic risk assessment and concurrent use of virtual reality simulation that 
considers the broader impacts of events, conditions, scenarios on geographical, temporal 
impacts, risks of conditions is important to for continuous system monitoring. Additionally, 
sensitivity and contingency (what if) analyses can be selectively used as tools to deal with 
remnant reliability and uncertainty that answer hidden questions in dynamic and complex 
systems [50]. 
System Failure and Risk Based Design Requirement for Deep Water System: A basic 
principle for risk-based design has been formulated: the larger the losses from failure of a 
component, the smaller the upper bound of its hazard rate, the larger the required minimum 
reliability level from the component. A generalized version and analytical expression for this 
important principle have also been formulated for multiple failure modes. It is argued that 
the traditional approach based on a risk matrix is suitable only for single failure modes/
scenarios. In the case of multiple failure modes (scenarios), the individual risks should be 
aggregated and compared with the maximum tolerable risk. In this respect, a new method 
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for risk-based design is proposed, based on limiting the probability of system failure below 
a maximal acceptable level at a minimum total cost (the sum of the cost for building the 
system and the risk of failure). The essence of the method can be summarized in three steps: 
developing a system topology with the maximum possible reliability, reducing the resultant 
system to a system with generic components, for each of which several alternatives exist 
including non-existence of the component, and a final step involving selecting a set of 
alternatives limiting the probability of system failure at a minimum total cost. Determining 
the set of alternatives for the components can be facilitated through the following elements.
The goal of risk based design for marine system and its goal is to enhance safety. 
Advantage of such system in system design includes:
• Establishment of systematic method, tools to assess operational, extreme, accidental 
and catastrophic scenarios and integrating human elements into the design 
environment
• Development of safety based technology for reliable operation and deign
• Establishment of regulatory framework to facilitate first principle approach to 
facilitate first principle approaches to safety
• Development of model that can demonstrate validation and practicability
Today, design shift towards knowledge intensive product, risk based design is believed 
to be key elements for enhancement of industrial competitiveness. The use of risk based 
design, operation and regulation open door to innovation and radical novel and inventive, 
and cost effective design solution. Risk based approach for ROV follow well established 
quantitative risk analysis used in offshore industries. The key to successful use of risk 
based design require advance tool to determine the risks involved and to quantify the effects 
of risk preventing/reducing measures as well as to develop (evaluation criteria to judge their 
cost effectiveness. Components of integrated risk include:
Front End: Model potential causes, locations, sizes, and likelihoods of acid releases from 
System. Analysis of system capabilities: identify those releases that are mitigatable.
Successful mitigation: release less than 1,500 gallons
Consideration of diagnosis and response times
Back End: Model potential failure modes of each system design, and estimate failure 
likelihoods
Analysis of system reliabilities reliability block diagram analysis systematic identification 
of failure 
Modes: human errors, equipment failures, support system failures
Analysis of consequences of unmitigatable or unmitigated releases:
Release size used as surrogate consequence measure
Risk can be calculated from:
( ) ( )mI mn m i iR A C J D= Χ Χ + Χ∑ ∑                           (1)
Where: R = Risk metric, Im = Annual probability of mitigatable leak at location/size m, 
Ji = Annual probability of unmitigatable leak at location/size I, Amn = Probability of AIES 
failure via moden given leak m, Cm/Di = Consequence severity of leak m.
ROV operating capabilities requirement that can be investigated is under risk based 
design are: 
• Standardized intervention ports for all subsea BOP stacks to ensure compatibility 
with any available ROV
67
• Visible mechanical indicator or redundant telemetry channel for BOP rams to give 
positive indication of proper functioning (e.g., a position indicator). 
• ROV testing requirements, including subsea function testing with external hydraulic 
supply. 
• An ROV interface with dual valves below the lowest ram on the BOP stack to allow 
well-killing operations. 
Electrical power requirement: General requirements refer to SOLAS requirements. 
Chapter-II-1 outlines requirements for Ship construction sub-division and stability, 
machinery and electrical installations. The five parts of these parts are: Part A-General, Part 
B-Sub-division and stability, Part C-Machinery installations, Part D-Electrical installations, 
Part E-Additional requirements for periodically unattended machinery spaces.
Benefits and Limitations of Using Risk and Reliability Models: Rampant system 
failure and problems related to reliability have brought the need to adopt a new philosophy 
based on top down risk and life cycle model to design, operate and maintain systems based 
on risk and reliability. Likewise, election of alternative ways to mitigate challenges of safety 
and environmental risk of system deserve holistic, reliability analysis approaches that 
provide the following benefits:
• Flexibility and redundancy for innovative, alternative improvised design and concept 
development
• Evaluation of risk reduction measure and transparency of decision making process
• Systematic tool to study complex problem
• Interaction between disciplines
• Risk and impact valuation of system
• Facilitate proactive approach for system, safety, current design practice and 
management
• Facilitate holistic touching on contributing factor in system work
• Systematic rule making, limit acceptability and policy making development
• Analysis of transportation system
The dynamic distributive condition, long incumbent period and complexity of marine 
system with limited oversight makes the process of identification and addressing human 
as well as organizational error including checks and balances, redundancy, and training 
more complicated. Other inherits drawbacks associated with risk and reliability model are 
[51,52]:
• Lack of historical data (frequency, probability, expert judgment)
• Linking system functionality with standards requirement during analysis (total safety 
level vs. individual risk level, calculation of current safety level)
• Risk indices and evaluation criteria (individual risk acceptance criteria and 
sustainability balance)
• Quantification of human error and uncertainty 
The complexity associated with human and organization requires human reliability 
assessment and uncertainty analysis to be modeled independently.
Marine Pollution Risk Challenges: A group of experts on the scientific aspects of marine 
pollution comment on the condition of the marine environment in 1989, stated that most 
human product or waste ends their ways in the estuarine, seas and finally to the ocean. 
Chemical contamination and litter can be observed from the tropics to the poles and from 
beaches to abyssal depths. But the conditions in the marine environment vary widely. The 
open sea is still considerably clean in contrast to inland waters. However, time continue to 
see that the sea is being affected by man almost everywhere and encroachment on coastal 
areas continues worldwide, if unchecked. This trend will lead to global deterioration in the 
quality and productivity of the marine environment [51].
This shows the extent and various ways human activities and uses water resources affect 
the ecological and chemical status of waterways system. Occurrence of accident within 
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the coastline is quite prohibitive due to unimaginable consequences and effects to coastal 
habitats. Recent environmental performance studies on transportation mode has revealed 
that transportation by water provides wide advantages in term of less, low Green House 
Gas (GHG) release, large capacity, congestion, development initiative etc. These advantages 
tells about high prospect for potential modal shift of transportation and future extensive 
use of inland water marine transportation where risk based system will be necessary to 
provide efficient, sustainable and reliability safe clean waterways as well as conservation of 
environment.
This equally shows that increase in human activities will have potential effects in 
coastal and marine environment, from population pressure, increasing demands for 
space, competition over resources, and poor economic performances that can reciprocally 
undermine the sustainable use of our oceans and coastal areas. Different forms of pollutants 
and activities that affect the quality of water, air and soil as well as coastal ecosystems are: 
Water: pollution release directly or washed downed through ground water: Air pollution, 
noise population, vibration, Soil: dredge disposal and contaminated sediments, Flood 
risk: biochemical reaction of pollution elements with water, Collision: operational, and Bio 
diversification: endangered and threatened species, habitat. 
Main sources of marine pollution: Point form pollution, Nonpoint form pollution.
Point form pollution: toxic contaminants, marine debris and dumping
Nonpoint form pollution: sewage, alien species, and watershed Issues. 
Main sources from ships are in form of: Operational, Accidental risk.
Operational: operational activities along the shipping routes discharging waters 
contaminated with chemicals (whether intentionally or unintentionally)
Accidental risk: Collision due to loss of propulsion or control.
Risk associated with environmental issue in the context of ship, design has impacts 
related to shipping trends, channel design criteria, ship and oil platform manoeuvrability 
and dynamic positioning and ship controllability. 
Modeling the risk and reliability components of complex and dynamic system: 
The consequence of maritime accident comes with environmental problem. Marine system 
are dynamic system that have potential for high impact accidents which are predominately 
associated with equipment failure, external events, human error, economic, system 
complexity, environmental and reliability issues. This call for innovative methods, tools 
to assess operational issue, extreme accidental and catastrophic scenarios. Such method 
should be extensive use to integration assessment of human element, technology, policy, 
science and agencies to minimise damage to the environment. Risk based design entails 
the systematic risk analysis in the design process targeting risk prevention and reduction 
as a design objective. They should be integrated with design environment to facilitate and 
support sustainable approach to ship and waterways designs need (Figure 61).
 
Total Risk Concept
• Technology, Human, and 
Enviromental element
Risk based Method
• Risk based Regulation, Operation , 
and Design
Figure 61: Risk modeling Components.
Integrated risk based system design requires the availability of tools to predict the safety 
performance and system components as well as integration and hybridization of safety and 
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environmental factors, lifecycle phases and methods. It important to develop refines, verify, 
validate through effective methods and tools. Such integrative and total risk tools required 
logical process with holistic linkage between data, individual risk, societal, organizational, 
system description, conventional laws, principle for system design and operation need to 
be incorporated in the risk process. Verification and employment of system based approach 
in risk analysis should be followed with creation of database and identification of novel 
technologies required for implementation. Unwanted event which remain the central front 
of risk fight is an occurrence that has associated undesirable outcome which range from 
trivial to catastrophic. Depending on conditions and solution based technique in risk and 
reliability work, the model should be designed to protect investment, properties, citizens, 
natural resources the institution which has to function in sustainable manner within 
acceptable risk. 
The risk reliability modeling process begins with definition of risk which stands for the 
measure of the frequency and severity of consequence of an unwanted event. Frequency at 
which a potential undesirable event occurs is expressed as events per unit time, often per 
year. Upon establishing understanding of whole system from baseline data that include 
elements of channel and vesseldimensioning as shown in Figure 62, the frequency can 
be determined from historical data. However, it is quite inherent that event that does not 
happen often attract severe consequence and lack data, such event is better analysed 
through probabilistic and stochastic model hybrid with first principle and whatever data 
is available [53]. Incidents are unwanted events that may or may not result to accidents 
if necessary measure is taken according to magnitude of event and required speed of 
response.While accidents are unwanted events that have either immediate or delayed 
consequences. Immediate consequences variables include injuries, loss of life, property 
damage and persons in peril. Point form consequences variables include further loss of life, 
environmental damage and financial costs. 
Risk (R) = Probability (P) X Consequence (C)                           (2)
The earlier stage of the risk and reliability process involves finding cause of risk, level of 
impact, destination and putting a barrier by all means in the pathway of source, cause and 
victim. Risk and reliability process targets the following:
Risk analysis and reduction process: This involves analytic work through selective 
deterministic and probabilistic method that assures reliability in the system. Reduction process 
will target initial risk reduction at design stage, risk reduction after design in operation and 
separate analysis for residual risk for uncertainty and human reliability.Risk in complex systems 
can have its roots in a number of factors ranging from performance, technology, human error 
as well as organizational cultures, all of which may support risk taking or fail to sufficiently 
encourage risk aversion. 
Cause of risk and risk assessment: This involve system description, identifying the 
risk associated with the system, assessing them and organizing them according to degree of 
occurrence and impact in matrix form causes of risk can take many ways including the following:
Root cause: Inadequate operator knowledge, skills or abilities, or the lack of a safety 
management system in an organization. 
Immediate cause: Failure to apply basic knowledge, skills, or abilities, or an operator 
impaired by drugs or alcohol. 
Situation causal factor: Number of participants time/planning, volatility environmental 
factors, congestion, time of day risk associated with system can be based on.
Organization causal factor: Organization type, regulatory environment, organizational age 
management type/changes, system redundancy, system incident/accident history, individual, 
team training and safety management system. 
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To deal with difficulties of risk migration marine system (complex and dynamic by 
nature), reliability assessment models can be used to capture the system complex issues as 
well as patterns of risk migration. Historical analyses of system performance is important 
to establish performance benchmarks in the system and to identify patterns of triggering 
events which may require long periods of time to develop and detect. Like wise, assessments 
of the role of human/organizational error and their impact on levels of risk in the system 
are critical in distributed, large-scale systems. This however imposes associated physical 
oversight linked to uncertainty during system design. Effective risk assessments required 
three elements:
1) Framework 
2) Model
3) Process
Risk framework: Risk framework provides system description, risk identification, 
criticality, ranking, impact, possible mitigation and high level objective to provide system 
with what will make it reliable. The framework development involves risk identification which 
requires developing a structure for understanding the manner in which accidents, their 
initiating events and their consequences occur. This includes assessment of representative 
system and all linkages that are associated to the system functionality and regulatory 
impact.
Model: The challenges of risk and reliability method for complex dynamic systems like 
ship motion at sea require reliable risk models. Risk mitigation measures can be tested and 
the tradeoff between different measures or combinations of measures can be evaluated. 
Changes in the levels of risk in the system can be assessed under different scenarios and 
incorporating “what if” analyses in different risk mitigation measures. Performance trend 
analysis, reassessment of machinery, equipment, and personnel can be helpful in assessing 
the utility of different risk reduction measures. Figure 62 and 63 shows the risk components, 
system functionality and regulatory requirement for reliability model that can be followed 
for each risk scenario.
 
 
Figure 61: Risk model. 
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Figure 62: Risk model.
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Figure 63: Goal based assessment.
Process: The process should be developed to provide effective and sound risk analysis 
where accuracy, balance information that meets high scientific standards of measurement 
can be used as input. This requires getting the science right and getting the right science 
by targeting interests of stakeholders including port, waterway community, public officials, 
regulators and scientists. Transparency, community participation, additional input to the 
risk process, checks the plausibility of assumptions could help ask the right questions of 
the science. Total integrated risk can be represented by:
Rt = fs (Rc, Rw,Re, Rs)     (3)
Where: Re (environment) = fe (sensitivity, advert weather…), Rs (ship) = fs (structural 
and system reliability, ship layout and cargo arrangement…), Rc (crew) = fc (qualification, 
fatigue, etc)
Holistic and integrated risk based method combined various techniques in a process 
as depicted in Figure 64 and 65, this can be applied for each level of risk for system in 
question. Each level is complimented by applying causal analysis (system linkage), expert 
analysis (expert rating) and organizational analysis (Community participation).
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Figure 64: Holistic Risk analysis Process Map.
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Figure 65: Holistic risk analysis process.
Table 27 shows models that have been used in the design system based on risks. IMO 
and Sirkar et al.,[12] methods lack assessment of the likelihood of the event. Other models 
lack employment of stochastic method whose result may cover uncertainties associated 
with dynamic and complex components of channel, ship failure and causal factors like 
navigational equipment, better training and traffic control. Therefore, combination of 
stochastic, statistical, reliability and probabilistic together with hybrid employment of goal 
based, formal safety assessment methods and fuzzy multi criteria network method that 
use historical data of waterways, vessel environmental and traffic data could yield efficient, 
sustainable and reliable design product for complex and dynamic systems. The general 
hypothesis behind assessing physical risk model of ship in waterways is that the probability 
of an accident on a particular transit depends on a set of risk variables which required to be 
analyzed for necessary conclusion of prospective reliable design [54].
Process Suitable techniques
HAZID HAZOP, What if analysis, FMEA, FMECA
Risk analysis FTA, ETA
Risk evaluation Influence diagram, decision analysis
Risk control option Regulatory, economic, environmental and function elements matching and iteration
Cost benefit analysis ICAF, Net Benefit
Human reliability Simulation/ Probabilistic
Uncertainty Simulation/probabilistic
Risk Monitoring Simulation/ probabilistic
Table 27: Risk Model.
Risk and reliability modeling involves hazard identification, risk screening, broadly 
focused, narrowly focused and detailed Analysis, Table 27 shows iterative method that can 
be incorporated for various needs and stages of the process.
Accident analysis: Accident and incident need to be prevented as the consequence 
of is a result of compromise to safety leading to unforgettable losses and environmental 
catastrophic. Past engineering work has involved dealing with accident issues in reactive 
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manner. System failure and unbearable environmental problems call for new proactive ways 
that account for equity requirement for human, technology and environment interaction in 
the system. The accidental categories and potential failure in waterways is shown in Figure 66.
Major 
Accident 
Risk
Hull & machinery failure
Fire explosion
Grounding & stronding
Allision
Collision
Failure to controll 
vessel movement
Failure to navigateMissing
Foundering & flooding
Contact
Miscellorious
Figure 66: Accident scenario.
The methodologies that may be used to identify safety critical systems, subsystem and 
elements include:
Major Accident Hazard: definition, examples, compliance with regulations such as 
SEVESOII (COMAH) and PFEER.
Qualitative method for determination of the safety risk including: Brain storming session 
methodology and example-safety criticality criteria. Required supporting documents and 
evidences Action tracking
Quantitative method for frequency and consequence analysis: Quantitative Risk 
Analysis (QRA) is widely use quantitative method for offshore industry, while Formal Safety 
Assessment (FSA) is use in marine industry. QRA should be simplified for to be used for 
determination for safety criticality criteria, safety criticality test for failure on demand and 
time of test/repair, HSE toolkit application, combined Event tree, Fault tree Analysis.
Standards safety critical elements identification could be analyzed through development 
of risk matrix,regulation scope and boundary compliance, performance standard and 
assessment, system capability, functionality, reliability, survivability assurance and 
verification analysis.The dynamic risk analysis process starts with system description, 
functionality, regulatory determination and this is followed with analysis of [46]:
• Fact gathering for understanding of contribution factor.
• Fact analysis for check of consistency of accident history.
• Conclusion on causation and contributing factor.
Counter measures and recommendations for prevention of accident and studies of the 
system or project. Major areas of concern of HSE analysis are:
• Examination of relevant case of risk, hazard, Process Safety and reliability leading to 
HAZID. 
• Identification of Safety Critical Elements.
• Examination and comparison of performance standards.
• Examination of release and consequence model (Fire, Explosion and Toxic Release 
Consequence Modelling & Design).
• Training on fundamental of the Risk Assessment & Case Study and Implementation 
of HSE Management System.
• Conduct of HAZOP Methodology and Simultaneous Operation. 
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• Risk Based Design acceptability criteria and & Integrity Assurance.
• Applications of Dynamic Simulation in Process Safety Design.
• Risk management, life cycle, traceable and auditable reference different phases of the 
project. 
Risk analysis is conducted using brain storming worksheets, action tracking and follow-
up.HAZID, HAZOP involve Process safety Engineers, plant managers, safety supervisors, 
process engineers, safety Engineers and discipline engineers. 
Elements of QRA include: Failure Case definition, Consequence assessment, Frequency 
analysis, Risk calculation, ALARP demonstration, Identification of Safety Critical Systems, 
Traceability and audibility of Safety Critical Elements.
HAZARD operability (HAZOP): Hazard operability (HAZOP) is done to ensure that the 
systems are designed for safe operation with respect to personnel, environment and asset. 
In HAZOP all potential hazard and error, including operational issues related to the design 
is identified. A HAZOP analysis is detail HAZID, it mostly divided into section or nodes 
involve systemic thinking and assessment a systematic manner the hazards associated 
to the operation. The quality of the HAZOP depends on the participants. Good quality of 
HAZOP participants are [55]. Politeness and unterupting to the point discussion avoid 
endless discussion, be active and positive, be responsible and Allow HAZOP leader to lead.
It involve How to apply the API 14C for those process hazard with potential of the 
Major Accident. Dynamic simulation for consequence assessment of the process deviation, 
failure on demand and spurious function of the safety system, alarm function and operator 
intervention is very important for HAZOP study. Identification of HAZOP is followed with 
application of combined. Event tree and Fault tree analysis for determination of safety critical 
elements, training requirement for the operators and integrity and review of maintenance 
manuals. HAZOP involved use of the following:
Guide word i.e. No pitch, No blade
Description: i.e. No rotational energy transformed, object in water break the blade
Causes: i.e. operation control mechanism
Safety measurement to address implementation of propeller protection such grating, jet
The following are some of the guideword that can be used for Propulsion failure HAZOP 
includes: no pitch, no blade, no control bar, no crank.
HAZOP process is as followed:
Guide word/brain storming-> Deviation-> Consequence-> Safeguard->Recommended 
action
Also important HAZOP is implementation of IEC61511 to assess the hazards associated 
to failure on demand and spurious trips. In HAZOP record the worksheets efficiently to 
cover all phases also play important role. Advance HAZOP can also e implemented through 
Simulation operations to identify, quantify, and evaluate the risks. SIMOP Methodology 
includes: Consequence Assessment, Frequency Analysis, Risk Calculation, Risk Analysis, 
and Safety Criticality Elements. HAZOP is not intended to solve everything in a meeting. 
Identified hazard is solved in the closing process of the finding from the study. Table 28 
shows typical HAZOP report. Safety barrier management involves optimisation between the 
preventive and mitigation measuresfundamental. 
Safety barrier management helps in determination of the Safety Critical Elements 
(SCE), performance standards for the design of safety Critical Elements and in integrity 
assurance. Safety Level Integrity (SIL) involves assessment and verification according to 
IEC61508 and IEC61511Qualitative SIL assessment uses the risk graphs and calibration 
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tables during the brain storming sessions where the required SIL is assigned to the safety 
systems. Integrity and insurance Involve iteration of assessment of identification the credible 
scenarios, consequence assessment, frequency analysis, risk calculation, risk evaluation 
and ranking. Dynamic simulation help to identify the process hazards, measure the extent 
and duration of the consequences and the effect and efficiency of the safety barriers. With 
dynamic simulation could be optimised with greater accuracy. This saves a significant effort, 
time and cost for the project. It involves application of: HAZOP & SIL assessment, Alarm 
Management, Fire & Explosion and Case study.
Compression area Fire Hot work 3
Manfold area Toxicity Radioactive products 4
HP gas area PPE 2
Separation area Management of work permit (A) If PTW is not followed correctly , the accident may happen 3
Compressor area Fire & Explosion 3
Process area Handling Handling of proximity of process under pressure 4
Utility area Fire fighting system No availability of Fire Fighting system 2
Separation Fire & Explosion Escape routes are obstructed 3
PPE Contractor not using PPE 2
PPE 3
Tank area Fire No Fire & Gas detection 2
Compression area Explosion Escape routes are obstructed 3
Compression area Fire Hot work 3
Manfold area Toxicity Radioactive products 4
Table 28: Typical HAZOP report.
Subsystem analysis-Fire and explosion: Consequence modelling of Fire, Explosion 
and Toxic release, understanding of the fundamental and the science, governing scenarios, 
consequence analysis criteria. Gas dispersion & hazardous area classification, Fire zones 
(passive fire protection zones, the active fire protection zones, Blast Zones, blast protection 
zones restricted areas) Thermal & blast effect on equipment, people and environment is 
important to be incorporated in the risk process. Figure 67 shows a typical fire and explosion 
risk model.
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Figure 67: Typical fire and explosion risk model.
Collision scenario: Collision is the structural impact between two ships or one ship 
and a floating or still objects that result could to damage. Collision is considered infrequent 
accident occurrence whose consequence ineconomical, environmental and social terms 
can be significant. Prevention of collision damages is likely to be more cost-effective than 
mitigation of its consequences. Probabilistic predictions can be enhanced by analyzing 
operator effects, drifting and loss of power or propulsion that take into account ship and 
waterway systems, people and environment into consideration. Other causative factor like 
the probability of disabled ship as function of ship type, the probability of a disabled ship 
drifting towards objects also need to be accounted for. The collision model scenario also 
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involves data that characterize of hull areas and environmental information. Figure 68 show 
a typical collision consequence situation [52,56,57].
 
Figure 68: Cause of collision (Langat River).
Outcome of analysis is followed by suitable Risk Control Options (RCO), where iteration 
of factual functionality and regulatory elements is checked with cost. The benefit realised 
from safety, environmental protection and effect of the probability of high level of uncertainty 
associated with human and organizational contributing factor to risk of collision are also 
important. The risk process functions to determine and deduce the idea for modest, efficient 
sustainable and reliable system requirement and arrangement [20,56]. Collision carried the 
highest statistic in respect to ship accident and associated causality. The consequences of 
accident are: 
• The loss of human life, impacts on the economy, safety and health, or the environment
• The environmental impact, especially in the case where large tankers are involved. 
However, even minor spills from any kind of merchant ship can form a threat to the 
environment
• Financial consequences to local communities close to the accident, the financial 
consequence to ship-owners, due to ship loss or penalties
• Damage to coastal or off shore infrastructure, for example collision with bridges
Accident events are unplanned, always possible, but effectively manageable and frequently 
preceded by related events that can be detected and corrected by having underlying root 
causes ranging from human errors, equipment failures, or external events. The result of 
frequency and consequence analysis is checked with riskacceptability index for industry of 
concerned. Table shown in Tables 29 and 30 shows risk acceptability criteria for maritime 
industry. The analyzed influence diagram deduced from the comparison can be followed 
with cost control option using cost of averting fatality index or Imply Cost of Averting Fatality 
(ICAF) and As Low as Reasonable Possible (ALARP) principle [49].
Frequency Class Quantification
Very unlikely less than once per 10000 years (P<1/10000)
Remote once per 100 -1000 years (1/1000= P< 1/100)
Occasional once per 10 - 100 years (1/100 = P< 1/10)
Probable once per 1-10 years (1/10=P<1)
Frequent more than once per year (P =1)
Table 29: Frequency risk acceptability criteria for maritime industry.
77
Quantification Serenity Occurrence Detection RPN
current failure that can result to death failure, 
performance of mission Catastrophic(10) 1 2 10
failure leading to degradation beyond accountable limit 
and causing hazard Critical (7) 3 4 7
controllable failure leading to degradation beyond 
acceptable limit Major(5) 4 6 5
Nuisance failure that do not degrade system overall 
performance beyond acceptable limit Minor(1) 7 8 2
Table 30: Consequence risk acceptability criteria for maritime industry.
Failure Modes Effect Analysis (FMEA): A Failure Modes Effect Analysis (FMEA) is a 
powerful bottom up tool for total risk analysis. FMEA is probably the most commonly used 
for qualitative analysis and is also the least complex. FMEA has been employed in the 
following areas: The aerospace industry during the Apollo missions in the 1960s.The US 
Navy in 1974 developed a tool which discussed the proper use of the technique. Today, 
FMEA is universally used by many different industries. There are three main types of FMEA 
in use today:
System FMEA: concept stage design system and sub-system analysis. 
Design FMEA: product design analysis before release to manufacturers. 
Process FMEA: manufacturing assembly process analysis.FMEA process is shown in 
Figure 69:
Figure 69: FMEA process.
It is strongly recommended that Serenity, Occurrence and Detection (SOD) for weak 
control should be noted. SOD numbers is multiplied and the value is stored in RPN (risk 
priority number) column. This is the key number that will be used to identify where the 
team should focus first. If, for example, we had a severity of 10 (very severe), occurrence of 
10 (happens all the time), and detection of 10 (cannot detect it) RPN is 1000. This indicates 
a serious situation that requires immediate attention. The consequence could further be 
broken down into effect for ship, human safety, oil spill, damage, ecology, emission andother 
environmetal impacts.Number 1-10 are assigned according to level of serenity. Risk priority 
number (RPN) for total serenity is determining as follows Table 31 show typical risk matrix 
arrangement:
RPN = S X O X D                              (4)
ALARP Principal, Risk Acceptability Criteria And Risk Control Option 
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Risk acceptability criteria establishment is dynamic because of differences in 
environment, diversity in industries and choice of regulations requirement to limit the risk. 
Risk is never acceptable, but the activity implying the risk may be acceptable due to benefits 
of safety reduced, fatality, injury, individual risk, societal risk, environment and economy. 
The rationality may be debated, societal risk criteria are used by increasing number of 
regulators. Figure 70 shows ALARP diagram by IMO [45].
Figure 70 shows prescribed illustrative influence diagram by IMO. Based on the 
region where the graph falls, step for risk control option and sustainability balancing, 
cost benefit effectiveness towards recommendation for efficient, reliable, sustainable 
decisioncan is taken. The frequency (F) of accidents involving consequence (N) or more 
fatalities may be established in similar ways as individual or societal risk criteria. For risks 
in the unacceptable/Intolerable risk region, the risks should be reduced at any cost. Risk 
matrix constructed from system and sub system level analysis can be deduced according 
to acceptability index and defined according to Table 31 and Figure 11 to deduced measure 
of As Low as Reasonably Practicable (ALARP). Within ALARP range, Cost Effectiveness 
Assessment (CEA) or Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) shown in Figure 70 may be used to select 
reasonably practicable risk reduction measures. 
Consequence Criteria
1 –Insignificant 2 – Minor 3 – Moderate 4 – Major 5– Catastrophic
Li
ke
lih
oo
d
A Consequence certain to occur Medium (M) High (H) High (H)
Very High 
(VH) Very High (VH)
B Consequence likely to occur Medium (M) Medium (M) High (H) High (H) Very High (VH)
C
Consequent possibly 
likely to occur some 
time
Low (L) Medium (M) High (H) High (H) High (H)
D
consequence unlikely 
to occur but could 
happen
Low (L) Low (L) Medium (M) Medium (M) High (H)
E
consequence 
may occur only 
in exceptional 
circumstances
Low (L) Low (L) Medium (M) Medium (M) High (H)
Table 31: Risk Matrix.
ALARP = As Low As Reasonably Practicable: Risk level boundaries (Negligible/ALARP/
Intolerable)
 
Minimum sum of cost
Minimum sum of cost
costt
Cost of polution control
High damage cost with
no control
No economic gain from
polusion control
Cost of damage from
polution
Diferent between cost of polution
control and environmetal damage
Figure 70: Risk cost benefit analysis.
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Risk analysis considerations: In addition to a sound process, robust risk framework 
and eventual deductive risk model, there are other considerations that should be factored 
into the design of an effective risk model. These items include the use of available data, the 
need to address human factors, areas of interest, stake holder interest and approaches to 
treating uncertainty in risk analysis. Data required for risk work should involve information 
on traffic patterns, the environment (weather, sea conditions and visibility), historical, 
current operational performance data, and human performance data. The models intentions 
are highly dependent on appropriately selected databases that accurately represent the 
local situation and the effectiveness of the models However, there is always issue of missing 
data or data limitations especially for complex system and their allow frequency, high 
consequence nature. Therefore creative procedures are required to develop compensation 
for data relationships. The model could use probabilistic, stochastic, simulation and expert 
judgments couple existing deterministic and historical method for a reliable system analysis 
of desired design [57]. 
When insufficient local data is available, world wide data from other areas may be 
referred to (e.g., Europe, south and North America), make assumptions about the similarity 
of operations in the concerned area or elsewhere. This is to ensure how behaviour in one 
aspect of operational (e.g., company management quality) parameter (e.g., loss of crew time) 
correlates with another area (e.g., operations safety). The data from other areas can be used 
as long as major parameter and environmental factors are compared and well matched. 
Care is required with the use of worldwide data as much of those data are influenced by 
locations or local environmental conditions Electronic access to worldwide casualty data 
such as the Paris MOU, U.K. and Marine Accident Investigation Board (MAIB) and IMO Port 
State detention databases makes possible access to worldwide casualty statistics. Diligence 
should also be observed about the large number of small scale, localized incidents that occur 
that are not tracked by marine safety authorities, e.g small craft (not always registered or 
being able to be detected by VTS, AIS) accidents in waterways. American Bureau of Shipping 
(ABS) has begun an effort to identify precursors or leading indicators of safety in marine 
transportation.
Human factor modeling should be considered for distributive, large scale systems with 
limited physical oversight. Assessing the role of human and organizational performance on 
levels of risk in the system is important, such error is often cited as a primary contributor 
to accident, which end up leaving system with many more unknown. Expert judgments and 
visual reality simulation can be used to fill such uncertainty gaps and others like weather 
data. Even when attempts are made to minimize errors from expert judgments, the data are 
inherently subject to distortion and bias. With an extensive list of required data, there are 
limits that available data can place on the accuracy, completeness and uncertainty in the 
risk assessment results. Expert judgments give prediction about the likelihood that failures 
that would occur in specific situations can be used to quantify human reliability input in 
risk process. 
Uncertainty is always part of system behaviour. Two common uncertainties are: aleatory 
uncertainty (the randomness of the system itself) and epistemic uncertainty (the lack of 
knowledge about the system). Aleatory uncertainty is represented by probability models while 
epistemic uncertainty is represented by lack of knowledge concerning the parameters of the 
model. Aleatory uncertainty is critical, it can be addressed through probabilistic risk analysis 
while epistemic uncertainty is critical to allow meaningful decision making. Simulation offers 
one best option to cover extreme case uncertainty beside probability. Evaluationand comparison 
of baseline scenario to a set of scenarios of interest (tugescort) and operational circumstance 
including timelines and roles. Response Scenarios can also be analyzed for things that cannot 
be imagined or model to be accounted for in the simulator (especially real time). A flexible critical 
path and slack analysis can be performed as input to the system simulation and uncertainty 
analysis. Human reliability is best modeled separately for a good result [48].
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Risk and reliability can be achieved by employing probability stochastic and expert rating 
in the risk process. A safety culture questionnaire which assesses organizational and vessel 
safety culture and climate can be administered to provide quantitative and qualitative input 
to the safety culture and environmental perception analysis for sustainable system design.
Conclusion
Following need for maritime activities to operate in much harsh condition, institutions 
are adopting system based approach that account for total risk associated with system 
lifecycle to protect the environment and prevent accident. Those that cannot be prevented 
and protected need or must be controlled under risk and reliability based design/operability 
platform. Employment of risk method to address each contributing factor to accident is 
very important. Qualitative risk in system description and hazard identification can best be 
tackled through HAZOP. The outcome of HAZOP can be processed in quantitative analysis 
which may include probabilistic and stochastic dynamic simulation process for system level 
analysis, while fault tree and event tree quantitative analysis can be utilized to determine 
risk index of the subsystem factors. Interpretation of risk index into ALARP influence 
diagram can provide decision support information necessary for cost control option towards 
sustainable, reliable, efficient technology choice for system design and operation. The 
cumulative results from qualitative analysis can be made more reliable through iterative 
quantitative, scientific stochastic and reliability analysis. Risk methods provide valuable 
and effective decision support tool for application of automated system engineering analysis 
that facilitate inclusion of reliability, environmental protection and safety as part of the 
iterative design processes for new and innovative marine system designs, operability and 
deployment of deep sea operability system. Intelligently adoption of HAZOP and other risk 
processes eventually can results to safer, efficient, more reliable and sustainable system. 
5. Environmental Risk Compliance for Nature Gas Ship Design and 
Operation
Abstract
The quests for an efficient fuel friendly to the environment have been recognized in 
maritime industry for a long time through improvements of gasoline and diesel by chemical 
reformulation. Inconvenience posed by these reformulation chemicals is performance 
problems; cold start ability, smooth operation and avoidance of vapor lock. Climate change 
problem has further aggravated need to use fuel that could contribute to decrease in green 
house gases and ozone-forming pollutants. Alternative fuels to petroleum have been identified 
to include, Compressed Natural Gas (CNG), liquefied petroleum gas (LPG); methanol from 
natural gas LNG. Selection of this towards centralized reduction of Green House Gases 
(GHGs) will depend on ease of use, performance and cost. LNG cargo is conditioned for long 
distance transfer while CNG and LPG cargo are conditioned for end user consumption and 
short distance transfer. It is therefore, clear that promoting the use of CNG will catalyze 
boosting of economy of coastal ship building and transportation, including environmental 
friendly utility fuel, and new generation of intermodal transportation and supply chain. Since 
the danger behind use of this gas could not be either underestimated by virtue regarding 
coastal operation proximity and consequence. The paper will discuss risk and potential 
regulation that will formulate beyond compliance, decision towards use of top-down risk 
based design and operations that will reinforce new integrative, efficient, environmental 
friendly, reliable multimodal and intermodal links advanced concepts for LPG ship operating 
in coastal and restricted waters. 
Keywords: CNG; HAZOP; LNG; LPG; NG; Persekitaran; Penilaian Risiko; Rekaan 
Berdasarkan Risiko Dan Matlamat; Terusan; Tenaga;
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Introduction
Fuel technology has been dominated with ways to improve gasoline and diesel by 
chemical reformulation that can lead increase efficiency and additional inconvenience 
leading to ozone depletion, green house and acid rain forming pollutants. Likewise, side 
effects problems posed to transportation vehicles have been dominated by condition, other 
performance issues. Time has shown that the global trend in de-Carbonization of the energy 
system follow the following path: Coal -> Oil-> Natural Gas -> Hydrogen
The drive towards environmentally friendlier fuels points next to Natural Gas (NG) and 
the infrastructures to support that trend are being pre-positioned by corporate mechanisms 
as well as governmental bodies worldwide. NG is cheap and its reserve is plentiful. 
Natural Gas as fuel is becoming more and more established in urban transport and Power 
Generation sectors. Its use will also take aggressive approach for all inland vessel including 
ferries in the eyes of potential environmental compliance new regulations. Internationally its 
operational record and GHG gas score is rated as GOOD. However, CNG, LPG and ethanol 
has been proven to be environmental friendly and has fuel economy of 50 percent. This 
shows that, CNG and LPG have potential for large market for use in niche markets in both 
developed and developing countries. Other gains from CNG and LPG depend on the amount 
of associated methane emissions from gas recovery, transmission, distribution, and use. On 
a full-cycle basis, use of LPG can result in 20-25% reduction in GHG emissions as compared 
to petrol, while emission benefits from CNG are smaller about 15% [58].
Furthermore, it is clear that promoting the use of CNG and LPG will be a catalyst to boost 
economy of coastal ship building, environmental friendly intermodal transportation for 
supply chain. Efficient and reliable operation can be made afforded by LPG, transportation, 
supply vessel, tugs to support this potential development. On the regulatory regime, IMO 
focus more on operational issues relating to carriage of gas with no specification for CNG 
and LPG, while the ICG code and class society guidelines elaborate on the design as well as 
operational consideration. Local administration imposes additional regulation as required 
for their respective implementation.
Time has revealed that there will be large demands for these gases. This paper focus on 
integrative use of IMO prescriptive goal and risk based standards with holistic consideration 
of factors require for safe design and operation of LPG ships in inland water. Including 
hybrid use of elements of Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) and Goal Based Standards (GBS) 
to prevent, minimize control and guarantee the life span of LPG ships and protection of 
environment. The paper will discussed top down environmental risk generic risk model and 
operations of LPG ship. It will describe the characteristics of LPG, regulatory issues and 
environmental issues driving today’s beyond compliance and selection of new technology 
policy. Since it is the consequence of accident and incident that leads to environment 
disaster, the paper will discussed issues that allow prevention and control of accident. Since 
issues relating to global warming, GHG releases is strictly linked to ship energy source, 
the paper will also discuss impact areas and potential new technology driving beyond 
compliance policy adoption for LPG design and operation.
Natural gas and its products: Natural gas in its liquid state (LNG) or liquid natural 
gas that comprise of liquid hydrocarbons that are recovered from natural gases in gas 
processing plants, and in some cases, from field processing facilities. These hydrocarbons 
involve propane, pentanes, ethane, butane and some other heavy elements. LNG accounts 
for about 4% of natural gas consumption worldwide, and is produced in dozens of large-
scale liquefaction plants. Natural gas contains less carbon than any other fossil fuel and, 
therefore produces less carbon Dioxide (CO2) when compared to any conventional vehicles. 
Its usage also results in significantly less carbon monoxide (CO), as well as less combustive 
organic compounds than their gasoline counterparts. It is produced by cooling natural gas 
to a temperature of minus 260 degrees F (minus 160 Celsius). At this temperature, natural 
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gas becomes liquid and its volume reduces 615 times. LNG has high energy density, which 
makes it useful for energy storage in double walled, vacuum insulated tanks as well as 
transoceanic transportation.
The production process of LNG starts with Natural Gas, being transported to the LNG 
Plant site as feedstock, after filtration and metering in the feedstock reception facility, the 
feedstock gas enters the LNG plant and is distributed among the identical liquefaction 
systems. Each LNG process plant consists of reception, acid gas removal, dehydration 
removal, mercury removal, gas chilling and liquefaction, refrigeration, fractionation, 
nitrogen rejection and sulfur recovery units. LPG and CNG are made by compressing 
purified natural gas, then stored and distributed in hard containers. Mostly, LPG station 
is created by connecting a fuel compressor to the nearest natural gas pipeline distribution 
system. The process through which Liquefied Natural Gas is produced consists of tree main 
steps, namely:
Transportation of gas: The best place to install the plant is near the gas source. The gas 
is basically transported through pipelines or by truck and barge.
Pretreatment of gas: The liquefaction process requires that all components that solidify 
at liquefaction temperatures must be removed prior to liquefaction. This step refers of 
treatment the gas requires to make it liquefiable including compression, filtering of solids, 
removal of liquids and gases that would solidify under liquefaction, and purification which 
is removal of non-methane gases.
Liquefaction of gas: Today, alternative fuels to petroleum have been identified to include 
Compressed Natural Gas (CNG), Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG), methanol from natural gas, 
coal or biomass; ethanol from biomass, electricity and hydrogen. However NG quality may 
be expressed with the Wobbe Index. Methane Number MN80 (Volume percent hydrogen 
atoms/carbon atoms) or Methane->=88%
Since 1960s, CNG and LPG are recognized as vehicle fuel alternative to oil-based gasoline 
and diesel fuel that reduces pollution of the air. It is a natural gas compressed to a volume 
and density that is practical as a portable fuel supply. Compressed Natural Gas (CNG) and 
Liquefies Petroleum Gas (LPG) are use as consumer fuel for vehicles, cooking food and 
heat homes. There exist a vast number of natural gas liquefaction plants designs, but, all 
are based on the combination of heat exchanger and refrigeration. The gas being liquefied, 
however, takes the same liquefaction path. The dry, clean gas enters a heat exchanger and 
exits as LNG. The capital invested in a plant and the operating cost of any liquefaction plant 
is based on the refrigeration techniques. 
Natural gas is transported through pipelines to refuelling stations then compressed at a 
pressure of 3,000 psi with the help of specially installed compressors that enables it to be loaded 
as gas cylinders for vehicles. The process consists of drawing the natural gas from underground 
pipelines by the compressor. The composition of pipeline natural gas varies considerably 
depending on the time of year, pipeline demand, and pipeline system. It may contain impurities, 
like oil, particulates, hydrogen sulphide, oxygen or water. Hence, the modern day, quality LPG 
plant system consists of facilities to address these problems. Using LNG as the feedstock to 
make CNG and LPG eliminates or mitigates each of the above stated concerns as contains no 
water or any such impurity. This eliminates the concerns for corrosion, plugging of fuel lines, 
and the formation of hydrates. Significant design innovation will involve developmentof liquefied 
gas technology that promises lower costs and shorter scheduling time than Liquefied Natural 
Gas technology or a pipeline transport as well as provision of unique solution to the development 
of distressed or stranded gas reserves and alternative to associated gas re-injection. Liquefied 
Petroleum Gas (LPG) can also be produced either as a by-product when refining crude oil or 
direct from the gas wells. The two most common LPG gases are known as Commercial Propane 
and Commercial Butane as defined in BS 4250 [59].
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Up to 15 kg and generally used for leisure applications and mobile heaters. Commercial 
Propane is predominately stored in red cylinders and bulk storage vessels and especially 
used for heating, cooking and numerous commercial and industrial applications. LPG has 
one key characteristic that distinguishes it from Natural Gas. Under modest pressure LPG 
gas vapor becomes a liquid. This makes it easy to be stored and transported in specially 
constructed vessels and cylinders. The combustion of LPG produces Carbon Dioxide (CO2) 
and water vapor therefore sufficient air must be available for appliances to burn efficiently. 
Inadequate appliance and ventilation can result in the production of toxic Carbon Monoxide 
(CO). All things being equal, it produces much less hydrocarbon compare to diesel. 
Hazards associated with LPG ships are linked to the gas characteristics that attract beyond 
compliances operability and design policy. Selection of this towards centralized reduction of 
GHGs will depend on ease of use, performance and cost.
Natural gas properties: Everyone dealing with the storage and handling of LPG should 
be familiar with the key characteristics and potential hazards. Matter either in their solid, 
a liquid or a gaseous form is made from atoms which combine with other atoms to form 
molecules. Air is a gas, in any gas, large numbers of molecules are weakly attracted to 
each other and are free to move about in space. A gas does not have a fixed shape or size. 
Each gas that the air is composed of consists of various different properties that add to the 
overall characteristics of a particular gas [60]. Gases have certain physical and chemical 
properties that help to differentiate a particular gas in the atmosphere. Depending on 
different properties the gases are used widely in several applications. Below are some of the 
gases properties Natural gas may consist of:
Methane CH4 -> .80%
Ethane C2H6 ->.20%
Propane C3H8 ->20%
Butane C4H10 ->20%
Carbon Dioxide CO2->.8%
Oxygen O2 ->0.2%
Nitrogen N2 ->5%
Hydrogen sulphide H2S ->5%
Rare gases-> A, He, Ne, Xe trace 
Hazards associated with LPG ships are linked to the gas characteristics and beyond 
compliances operability and design. CNG are a non toxic gas liquid at -259°F/-162°C which 
ignites at 1350°F/ 732°C. The octane number is 120; it can inflame having a share of 5.3 
to 15% in air. Methane has only 42.4% of the density of air and thus is lighter and may 
disappear in case of leakages.
Natural gas and LPG: LG carriers has proven considerable good safe ship in term of 
designed, constructed, maintained, manned and operated of all the merchant fleet of today. 
So far they have low accident record and non major has leads to release of large amounts 
of LG have ever occurred in the history of LG shipping. Nevertheless, there have been major 
concerns regarding safety of LG shipping and vivid that one catastrophic accident has the 
potential for serious consequential fatal and environmental damage. Therefore it became 
imperative to use IMO Goal-based and risk based instruments to quantify a baseline risk 
level to identify and evaluate alternative risk control options for improved safety. Toward 
zero accident and zero, incident, apart from normal SOLAS standards for all ships, there 
is additional international regulation/Code for the Construction and Equipment of Ships 
Carrying Liquefied Gases in Bulk this include The IGC Code. This Code is applicable to 
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Liquefy gas carriers which are made mandatory under the SOLAS Convention. Thus, Risks 
associated with LPG ships encompass the following areas:
• Loading
• shipping in special purpose vessels 
• Unloading at the receiving terminal.
• Third party risks to people onshore or onboard 
NG shipping industry is undergoing considerable changes, e.g. an expected doubling of the 
fleet over a 10-year period, emergence of considerable larger vessels, alternative propulsion 
systems, new operators with less experience new trading route, offshore operations and 
an anticipated shortage of qualified and well trained crew to man Liquefies gas carriers in 
the near future. With this development, there is tendency for gas shipping to experience an 
increasing risk level in the time to come. Most IMO previous rules were made on reaction 
basis, in this age of knowledge employment of the new philosophy to design construct and 
operate based on risk and considering holistic factors of concern for sustainability and 
reliability remain a great invention of our time to save LPG ship and shipping.
Maritime regulation: The International convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 
(SOLAS) is the fundamental IMO instrument that deal with regulation requirement for 
basic construction and management for all types of ships. It covers areas like are stability, 
machinery, electrical installations, fire protection, detection and extinction systems, life-
saving appliances, Surveys and inspections, SOLAS also contains a number of other codes 
related to safety and security that applies to shipping in general. Examples of these are 
the Fire Safety Systems Code (FSS Code), the International Management Code for the Safe 
Operations of Ships and for Pollution Prevention (ISM Code) and the International Ship 
and Port Facility security Code (ISPS Code). These codes imply requirements aiming at 
enhancing the safety on Liquefy Gas (LG) shipping activities as well as shipping in general 
[61,62].
Classification society rules apply for structural strength while special code for ships 
carrying liquefied gas included in the SOLAS regulations the IGC code. Other IMO regulations 
pertaining to safety are contained in the International convention on Load Lines which 
addresses the limits to which a ship may be loaded, the International Convention for the 
Prevention of Collisions at Sea (COLREG) addressing issues related to steering, lights and 
signals and the International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watch 
keeping for Seafarers (STCW Convention) which addresses issues related to the training of 
crew. The International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) 
addresses issues related to marine and air pollution from ships. These regulations are 
applicable to all ships as well as LPG ships. The issue of global warming has initiated 
MARPOL annex VI, was given preferential acceptance beyond tacit procedure and there is 
indication that more will follow [63].
Maritime regulations for liquify gas regulation: IMO regulation for safety regarding 
carriage of gas was never specifically for LNG, CNG or LPG carriers. However safety 
regulations exist in order to ensure the LPG ships are safe. Thus Gas carriers need to 
comply with a number of different rules that are common to all ship types, as well as a set of 
safety regulations particularly developed for ships carrying liquefied gas and the their crew 
as well as site selection and design of LG terminals. This include issues relating to control of 
traffic near ports, local topology, weather conditions, safe mooring possibility, tug capability, 
safe distances and surrounding industry, population and training of terminal staff. These 
considerations contribute to enhance the safety of LPG shipping in its most critical phase, 
i.e. sailing in restricted waters or around terminal and port areas. The IGC code prescribes 
a set of requirements pertaining to safety related to the design, construction, equipment 
and operation of ships involved in carriage of liquefied gases in bulk. The IACS unified 
requirements for gas tankers were partly derived from the IGC code.
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The code specifies the ship survival capability and the location of cargo tanks. According 
to the type of cargo, a minimum distance of the cargo tanks from the ship’s shell plating 
is stipulated in order to protect the cargo in case of contact, collision or grounding events. 
Thus the code prescribes requirements for ships carrying different types of liquefied gas, 
and defines four different standards of ships, as described in Table 32. LNG carriers are 
required to be ships of type 2G and all LNG carriers should be designed with double hull 
and double bottom, while 2PG type is for LPG Ships.
Ship type Cargo
3G Require moderate prevention method
2G Ship less than 150m Require significant preventive measure
2PG Require significant preventive measure cargo are carried in C tanks
1G Require significant maximum preventive measure
Table 32: Requirement for ship carrying liquefied gas.
The IGC code requires segregation of cargo tanks and cargo vapor piping systems from 
other areas of the ship such as machinery spaces, accommodation spaces, control stations; 
it also prescribes standards for such segregation. It provides standards for cargo control 
rooms and cargo pump-rooms are as well as standards for access to cargo spaces and 
airlocks. It defines requirements for leakage detection systems, as well as loading and 
unloading arrangements. Different types of cargo containment systems are permitted by 
the IGC code, and the two main types of containment systems in use in the world liquefied 
tanker fleet are membrane tanks and independent tanks. Membrane tanks are tanks which 
consist of a thin layer or membrane, supported through insulation by the adjacent hull 
structure. The membrane should be designed in such a way that thermal expansion or 
contraction does not cause undue stress to the membrane. The independent tanks are self-
supporting in that they do not form a part of the ship’s hull [64].
The IGC code defines three categories of independent tanks: Type A, B and C. Type C 
tanks are pressure tanks for LPG and will not be required for LNG vessels since LNG are 
transported at ambient pressure. Regardless of what containment system is used, the tanks 
should be design taking factors such as internal and external pressure, dynamic loads 
due to the motions of the ship, thermal loads, sloshing loads into account, and structural 
analyses should be carried out. A separate secondary barrier is normally required for the 
gas liquefied gas containment systems to act as a temporary containment of any leakage 
of LNG through the primary barrier. For membrane tanks and independent type a tanks, a 
complete secondary barrier is required. For independent type B tanks, a partial secondary 
barrier is required, whereas no secondary barrier is required for independent type C tanks. 
The secondary barrier should prevent lowering of the temperature of the ship structure in 
case of leakage of the primary barrier and should be capable of containing any leakage for 
a period of 15 days. 
The code contains operational requirements related to i.e. cargo transfer methods, filling 
limits for tanks and the use of cargo boil-offs as fuel as well as requirements on surveys 
and certification. Equivalents to the various requirements in the code are accepted if it 
can be proven, e.g. by trials, to be as effective as what is required by the code. This applies 
to fittings, materials, appliances, apparatuses, Equipments, arrangements, procedures. 
Additional requirements regarding insulation and materials used for the cargo containment 
systems as well as construction and testing, piping and valving etc. are included in the 
IGC code. The IGC code also requires certain safety equipments to be carried onboard 
LPG carriers. These include ship handling systems such as positioning systems, approach 
velocity meters, automatic mooring line monitoring and cargo handling systems such as 
Emergency Shutdown Systems (ESD) and Emergency Release System (ERS). In addition, 
systems for vapor, fire detection, fire extinguishing (dry chemical powder) and temperature 
control are required. 
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In addition to the numerous regulations, codes, recommendations and guidelines 
regarding gas carriers issued by IMO, there are extensive regulations, recommendation and 
guidelines under international and local umbrella related to safety LPG shipping exist that 
undoubtedly contributing to the high safety standard and the good safety record that has 
been experienced for the fleet of LG carriers. E.g. standards of best practice issued by 
SIGTTO (The Society of International Gas Tanker & Terminal Operators) [61,65].
Traning requirement: Any person responsible for, or involved with, the operation and 
dispensing of LPG should have an understanding of the physical characteristics of the 
product and be trained in the operation of all ancillary equipment. Thus acquiring sufficient 
crew with the required level of experience, training and knowledge of LG are believed to be 
one of the major safety-related challenges to the maritime LG industry in the years to come. 
In addition to strict regulations on the ship itself, there are also extensive international 
regulations specifying the necessary training and experience of crew that operate LPG 
carriers. These include the international rules on training requirements are contained in 
regulations such as the STCW 95, ISM code, tanker familiarization training, as well as 
flag state or company specific training requirements that go beyond these international 
regulations [66,67].
The competence level of Liquefied gas crew has generally been regarded as quite high 
compared to that of other ship types. A study presented in demonstrates that the performance 
score of crew onboard gas and chemical tankers are the best among cargo carrying ships, 
second only to that of passenger vessels. STCW 95 contains minimum training requirements 
for crew engaged in international maritime trade. In particular, chapter V of the STCW code 
contains standards regarding special training requirements for personnel on certain types 
of ships, among them liquefied gas carriers. One requirement for masters, Officers and 
ratings assigned specific duties and responsibilities related to cargo or cargo equipment on 
all types of tankers, e.g. LNG tankers, is that they shall have completed an approved tanker 
familiarization course. Such a course should have minimum cover the following topics:
• Characteristics of cargoes and cargo toxicity
• Hazards and Hazard control
• Safety equipment and protection of personnel
• Pollution prevention
The course must provide the theoretical and practical knowledge of subjects required in 
further specialized tanker training. Specialized training for liquefied gas tankers should as 
a minimum include the following syllabus:
• Regulations and codes of practice
• Advanced fire fighting techniques and tactics
• Basic chemistry and physics related to the safe carriage of liquefied gases in bulk
• Health hazards relevant to the carriage of liquefied gas
• Principles of cargo containment systems and Cargo-handling systems
• Ship operating procedures including loading and discharging preparation and 
procedures
• Safety practices and equipment
• Emergency procedures and environmental protection
In addition to these training requirements, masters, chief engineering officers, chief 
mates, second engineering officers and any persons with immediate responsibilities for 
loading, discharging and care in transit of handling of cargo in a LG tanker are required to 
have at least 3 months sea service on a liquefied gas tanker. Due to the extensive training 
requirements and experience level of their personnel, the maritime LNG industry claims 
that the crew sailing the LNG fleet are among the best in the world. However, a shortage of 
experienced LG crew is foreseen in the near future especially with the expected growth of 
the LPG fleet.
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Transportation of LPG inland Water: LPG and CNG and LNG are next in line of alterative 
for transportation to gasoline because of their associated environmental benefits including 
reduction of GHGs. Thus, it is more useful for countries with natural gas resources and a 
relatively good gas distribution system. LPG has been explored in the 1930s but its used 
has been slowed because of favorable economy of petroleum. However, the current threat 
of climate change has increased the focus on alternative transport fuels which include. 
Countries with programmes on the use of CNG and LPG as a transport fuel include the USA, 
Canada, UK, Thailand, New Zealand,Argentina and Pakistan [58,59] CNG and LPG are used 
in both private vehicles and transport fleets. It is estimated that about 250 million vehicles 
are using this fuel worldwide, and its use is on the increase, representing 2% of total global 
transport fuel use. The advantages of using LPG are:
• Environmental friendliness
• reduced engine maintenance cost
• Improved engine and fuel efficiency
However limitations are the following:
• Storage containment 
• High cost of conversion
• Need for high skill operator 
Each category of this required thorough, holistic risk, goal based design and operability 
assessment for safety, reliability and protection of environment.
Environmental concern a driving force for beyond compliance policy
Over the last decade, each passing years has been augmented concerned about issue 
of environment importance in design, construction, operation and beneficial disposal of 
marine articraft. The overriding force is increasing the resources of the planet that we live 
and that only a few are renewable. This accumulated to production that has elements of 
long-term sustainability of the earth. Precipitated effect over the year has call for public 
awareness and translated into impact through these the following manners:
Regulations: Public pressure on governmental and non-governmental organization 
regulation due to untold stories of disaster and impact, the public is very concerned and 
in need of fact that if the quality of life of people enjoy is to be sustained, for them and the 
future generation then the environment must be protected. conspicuous issue, expertise 
and finding of regulations make them to go extra length on unseen issue, contrasting 
between the two, while commercial force act on hat will be forth problems. 
Ship concept design: Is very important in shipping and it account for 80 percent of 
failure, therefore compliance and making of optimal design has a great impact in ship whole 
life cycle. The impact of environment in ship design is very difficult because of large numbers 
of uncertainties. Environmental impact hat need to be taken into considerations in concept 
design can be classified into the following. 
Operations: Considering limiting life cycle of ships at estimate of 25 years, issues relating 
to the following are equally not easy to quantify in design work, even thus a lot of research 
effort has been set on move on this, but the call of the day require allowable clearance and 
solution to be given to the following: Known emission, Accidental, Ballast waste, Coating.
Commercial forces: Where company that or product that operate in unenvironmental 
friendly way, people are prone to spurn the companies products and service, there fore 
having impact on company return on investment. 
Construction and disposal: Use of meticulous scantling and factors worth consideration 
with the ship at the end of her life cycle.
Shipboard environmental protection should Pollution Prevention (P2) or Pollution Control. 
Pollution Prevention uses fewer environmentally harmful substances and generates less 
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waste on board. Pollution Control: Increase treatment, processing, or destruction of wastes 
on board. The basic P2 principles follow: Eliminating the use of environmentally harmful 
chemicals and reducing the amount of waste we generate on board is often better that 
treating it on board. Typical environmental green house gas release from different prime 
movers is shown in Table 33.
Emission LPG Gasoline Diesel
Cox 1 10.4 1.2
HC 1 2.0 1.2
NO 1 1.2 1.1
PM neg present Very high
SOx neg neg Very high
Table 33: Environmental performance.
Emission is inherent consequence of powered shipping, Fuel oil burning as main source, 
Continuous combustion machineries-boilers, gas turbines and incinerators. And this made 
the following issue very important
• Worldwide focus of fuel-> Exhaust gas emission law by IMO and introduction of local 
rules
• Emission limits driving evolution to development and adaptation to new technology
• Solution anticipated to maintenance of ship life cycle at average of 25 years
• Focus is currently more on, NOx and SOx-HC, COx and particulate will soon join
• Consideration involves not only fuel use and design but also operational issues.
Environmental parameters Environmental demand
Ship design Need for longer safe life cycle
Construction High worker safety standards, low energy input
Emission Minimum pollution and emission, Minimum Sox, Nox and Cox, PMs-Zero discharge
Scrapping Zero harmful emission
Operation waste Efficient maneuverability
Energy Maximum fuel efficiency
Antifouling Harmless
Ballast water Zero biological inversion or transfer of alien species
Sea mammal interaction Maneuverability capability
Accident Able officer, ship structure, integrity
Fire Harmless
Wave wash of high speed marine Zero inundation and spray a shore
Table 34: Environmental demand for ships.
Table 34 below shows the environmental regulatory demand of out time for ships that 
need to be considered in design and operation of LPG ships.
Hybrid use of High Level Objective Based and Safety Risk Based Design towards Beyond 
Compliance
It is clear that the shipping industry is over killed with rules and recent environmental 
issues are have potential to initiate new rules, this made firms to selectively adopt beyond 
compliance policy that are more stringent than the required extant law due to. Beyond 
compliance policy are mostly intra firm process which could be power based or leadership 
based. It draw insight from institutional theory, cooperate social performance perspective, 
and stakeholder theory that relate to internal dynamic process. While external forces create 
expectation and incentive for manager, intra firm politics influence how managers perceive, 
interpret external pressure and act on them [68,69] Policy towards beyond compliance fall 
into 2 categories:
89
• Whether they are now required by law but they are consistent with profit maximization. 
• Requirement by law and firm are expected to comply by them.
Towards sustainable reliability, it is preferable to use stochastic and probabilistic 
methods that could help improve in the existing methodology this method involve absolutism 
that will cover all uncertainty complimented by historical and holistic matrix investigation. 
Hybridizing models is also a plus for the best solution of sustainable maintenance of 
navigation channel. Beyond compliance towards meeting required safety level and life cycle 
and environmental protection required systematic employment of hybrid of OBS and RBS 
systems. Below is the general step of RBS and OBS which can be apply for above described 
characteristic of LPG Ships.
Components of goal based standards
Objective Based Standards (OBS) are ship safety standards comprising five tiers (Figure 71):
Level I: Consists of goals expressed in terms of safety objectives defined by risk level.
Level II: Consists of requirements for ship features/capabilities, defined by risk level, 
that assure achievement of ship’s safety objectives.
LEVEL III: Here Tier IV and V are to be verified for compliance with Tier II.
Level IV: Consists of rules, guidelines, technical procedures and programs, and other 
regulations for ship designing and ship operation needs, fulfillment of which satisfies ship’s 
feature/capability requirements.
Level V: Consists of the code of practice, safety and quality systems that are to be applied 
to guarantee the specified rules by quality level.
 
Compliance 
Level 
1&2 
Regulatory instrument class guides 
Level 4 & 5 
Approval process 
Goal Analysis 
Secondary Standards: For company or individual ship 
Design process 
High level goal assessment;  
i) Standard requirement ii) Functional requirement 
Level 3 
Figure 71: High level Goal Based Assessment.
Sustainable risk assessment: Sustainability remain a substantial part of assessing risk 
and life cycle of ships however, they are very complex and require long time data for accurate. 
Environmental risk and Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) procedure is laid out 
by various environmental departments and will continue to remain similar except that the 
components of risk area cover different uncertainty to sustain a particular system are different. 
EIA has been a conventional process to identify, predict, assess, estimate and communicate 
the future state of the environment, with and without the development in order to advise the 
decision makers the potential environmental effects of the proposed course of action before a 
decision is made. RBS is improvised version of EIA where holistic consideration, community 
participation, expert rating, cost benefit analysis and regulatory concerned are core part of the 
philosophy leading to reliable decision making and sustainable system design and operation. 
In risk assessment, serenity and probability of adverse consequence (HAZARD) are deal with 
through systematic process that quantitatively measure, perceive risk and value of ship using 
input from all concerned waterway users and experts [69,70].
90
RISK = Hazard x Exposure (an estimate on probability that certain toxicity will be 
realized). 
While hazard: Anything that can cause harm (e.g. chemicals, electricity, natural 
disasters). Severity may be measured by:
• No. of people affected
• Monetary loss
• Equipment downtime
• Area affected
• Nature of credible accident
• Risk ranking index according to level of risk the tables bellow show an example of risk 
matrix (Table 35) with assignments of risk level identifies by number index. 
  
   Consequence Criteria 
    
1  
Insignificant 
2  
Minor 
3  
Moderate 
4  
 Major 
5  
Catastrophic 
L
ik
el
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oo
d 
A - 
The consequence is almost 
certain to occur in most 
circumstances 
Medium (M) High (H) High (H) 
Very 
High 
(VH) 
Very High 
(VH) 
B -  
The consequence is likely to 
occur frequently 
Medium (M) 
Medium 
(M) 
High (H) 
High 
(H) 
Very High 
(VH) 
C -  
Possible and likely for the 
consequence to occur at some 
time 
Low (L) 
Medium 
(M) 
High (H) 
High 
(H) 
High (H) 
D -  
The consequence is unlikely to 
occur but could happen 
Low (L) Low (L) 
Medium 
(M) 
Medium 
(M) 
High (H) 
E -  
The consequence may occur 
but only in exceptional 
circumstances 
Low (L) Low (L) 
Medium 
(M) 
Medium 
(M) 
High (H) 
Risk management is the evaluation of alternative risk reduction measures and the 
implementation of those that appear cost effective where Zero discharge = zero risk, but 
the challenge is to bring the risk to acceptable level and at the same time, derive the max 
Benefit [64].
Components of system based safety risk assessment
System based safety assessment targets: Iidentification of potential hazard scenarios 
and major impact to ship Shipping and ship design which could lead to significant safety or 
operability consequences as well recent call for policies chance and procedural major effects 
Verification of current design, construction and operations ensure that risk from identified 
scenarios meet risk acceptability criteria.
If not, to recommend additional RBA process and available technology for control and 
protection that can reduce risk to suitable level.
RBA Steps:
Step 1: HAZID
The HAZID (step 1) should be conducted a in a technical meeting including brainstorming 
sessions, from various sectors within the LPG industry, i.e. ship owner/operator, shipyard, 
ship design office/maritime engineering consultancy, equipment manufacturer, classification 
society and research centre/university. Common identifiable hazards are:
Table 35: Risk level matrix.
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• Emission to air, water and soil 
• Shipboard cargo tank and cargo handling equipment
• Storage of tanks and Piping 
• Safety Equipments and Instruments
• Ruder failure in inland water
• Crew fall or slip on board
• Fault of navigation equipments in inland water
• Steering and propulsion failure
• Collision with ship including passing vessel hydro dynamic effects
• Terrorist attack or intentional incident
• Potential Shortage of crew
• Navigation and berthing procedure
The results from the HAZID should be recorded in a risk register stating total number of 
hazards, different operational categories. The top ranked hazards according to the outcome 
of the HAZID can be selected and given respective risk index based on qualitative judgment 
by the HAZID participants from diverse field of expert. It should emphasize on the study of 
existing situations and regulations including policies in place, present performance, flaws 
and survey on parties feeling on acceptability and procedures.
STEP 2: Hazard analysis
The risk analysis (step 2) comprises a thorough investigation of accident statistics for 
liquefy gas carriers as well as risk modeling utilizing event tree methodologies for the most 
important accident scenarios, based on the survey of accident statistics and the outcome of 
the HAZID leading to generic accident scenarios recommendation for further risk analysis. 
Figure 72 shows formal safety assessment steps.
Step 4: 
Cost 
benefit 
Step 3: 
Cost 
Control 
Step 1: Hazard 
identification 
Step 2: 
Risk 
analysis 
2 
Step 5: decision 
& 
recommendation 
Figure 72: Risk assessment and analysis steps.
The risk analysis essentially contains two parts, i.e. a frequency assessment and a 
consequence assessment. The frequency assessment, involve estimation of frequency of 
generic incidents using reasonable accident statistics derived from the selected accident 
scenarios which should also be compared with similar studies for liquefy gas carriers as 
well as other ship. The consequence assessment should be performed using event tree 
methodologies. Risk models can be developed for each accident scenario and event trees 
constructed according to these risk models utilizing accident statistics, damage statistics, 
fleet statistics, simple calculations modeling and expert opinion elicitation [71].
The frequency and consequence assessments provide the risk associated with the 
different generic accident scenarios which can be summarized in order to estimate the 
individual and societal risks pertaining to liquefy gas carrier operations and design. Based 
on available accident statistics and results from the HAZID, eight generic accident scenario 
umbrellas that required deep analysis are:
• Collision
• Fire or explosion
• Grounding
• Contacts
• Heavy weather/loss of intact stability
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• Failure/leakage of the cargo containment system
• Incidents while loading or unloading cargo LPG
• Emission ship power sources 
The first five generic accident scenarios are general in the sense that they involve all 
types of ships; wile 6 and 7 accident scenarios are specific to gas carriers and 8 concerned 
new environmental issue driving compliance and technology for all ships. Selected accident 
scenarios to investigate frequency assessment could provide a sufficiently accurate estimate 
of initiating frequencies for the eight selected accident scenarios. Figure 73 shows risk 
model for explosion case.
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Figure 73: Risk model for explosion scenario.
Identification of accident scenario that is significant to risk contribution should consider 
use of:
• Holistic risk assessment of major treat using RBA and OBS oodel including 
application of stochastic.
Probabilistic and deterministic methods to increase reliability and reduce uncertainties 
as much as possible this including using tool comprising foreseeable scenarios and scenario 
event, such tolls are:
Accident modeling model
• Estimation of risk, accident frequency and consequences 
Step 3: Risk control
Risk control measures are used to group risk into a limited number of well thought out 
practical regulatory options. Consideration should focus on:
• Specification of risk control measures for identified scenarios 
• Grouping of the measures into possible risk control options using 
• General approach: which provides risk control by controlling the likelihood of 
initiation of accidents, and may be effective in preventing several different accident 
sequences and
• Distributed approach: which provides control of escalation of accidents, together with 
the possibility of influencing the later stages of escalation of other, perhaps unrelated, 
accidents. And this followed by assessment of the control options as a function of 
their effectiveness against risk reduction.
Step 4: Cost Benefir Assessment (CBA)
Risk-Cost Benefit analysis to deduce mitigation and options selection Proposed need for 
new regulations based on mitigation and options.
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CBA quantification of cost effectiveness that provide basis for decision making about 
RCO identified, this include the net or gross and discounting values.
Cost of equipment, redesign and construction, documentation, training, inspection 
maintenance and drills, auditing, regulation, reduced commercial used and operational 
limitation ( speed , loads )
Benefit could include, reduced probability of fatality, injuries, serenity and negative 
effects as well as on health, severity of pollution and economic losses
Step 5: Decision making
This step involves:
• Discussion of hazard and associated risks 
• Review of RCO that keep ALARP
• Comparison and rank RCO based on associated cost and benefit 
Specification of recommendation for decision makers output could be use for beyond 
compliance preparedness and rulemaking tools for regulatory bodies towards measures 
and contribution for sustainability of the system intactness, our planet and the right of 
future generation. In order to select between alternative technical or regulatory solutions 
to specific problems the first three RBA steps (HAZID, risk assessment, RCOs) can fit into 
the development of high-level goals (Level 1) and functional requirements (Level 2) of OBS. 
Equally, the last three steps (RCOs, CBA, and Recommendations) could feed into Level IV 
and V of OBS
Uncertainty: Uncertainty will always be part of our activities because of limitation of 
knowledge of unseen in real world settings, issues associated with uncertainty are normally.
• Influences on recovery process
• Test of new advancements
• Influence on policy
• Address system changes over time
• services & resources
Estimating uncertainty including further validation, policy issues and rating could be 
obtained through the relation: 
R(P1c) = R(E1) x W(E1,P1) + R(E2) x W(E2,P1) + R(E4) x W(E4,P1)
Where R = rating, E = environmental factor, P = Policy factor
Uncertainty is necessary because of highly variable nature of elements and properties 
involved with the situation require simulate of extreme condition and model using 
combination mathematical modeling and stochastic techniques while considering all factors 
in holistic manner that cover:
• Risk areas and assessment: taking all practical using historical data’s and statistics 
that include all factors. Public health (people > other species)
• Mitigation of risk assessment and risk areas: This involves making permanent changes 
to minimize effect of a disaster Immediacy: (Immediate threat>delayed threats)
• Panel of expert: Reach out to those who are capable to extend hand and do the right 
thing at the risk area Uncertainty (More certain-> less certain)
• Community participation: Educate all concern about the going and lastly place firm 
implementation and monitoring procedure. For adaptability (Treatable-> untreatable)
• Emergency response: provide monitoring and information facilities and make sure 
necessary information is appropriately transmitted and received by all.
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Risk acceptability criteria: The diagram below gives overall risk reduction areas 
identification and preliminary recommendation, In order to assess the risk as estimated by 
the risk analysis, appropriate risk acceptance criteria for crew and society for LPG tankers 
should be established prior to and independent of the actual risk analysis. The overall risk 
associated with LPG carriers should be concentrated in the reduction desired areas ALARP, 
where cost effective risk reduction measures should be sought in all areas. Three areas 
or generic accident scenarios where which together are responsible for about 90% of the 
total risk are: Collision, grounding and contact, and they are related in that they describe 
situation where by the LPG vessel can be damaged because of an impact from an external 
source support inland water like vessel or floating object, the sea floor or submerged objects, 
the quay or shore or bad weather. Figure 74 and 75 show prescription risk acceptability 
analysis graphs.
 Figure 74: ALARP diagram-Source.
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Figure 75: Matrix plot analysis of system ALARP.
By studying the risk models associated with these scenarios, four sub-models in particular 
stands out where further risk reduction could be effective. These are the accident frequency 
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model, the cargo leakage frequency model, the survivability model and the evacuation 
model. Particularly, related to collision, grounding and contact, it is recommended that 
further efforts in step 3 of this FSA focus on measures relating to:
Navigational Safety Improvements 
• Maneuverability: Improved maneuverability Extended use of tugs might reduce the 
frequency of contact and grounding events near the terminals.
• Collision avoidance: i.e. warning boats in busy waters to clear the way for the LPG 
carrier.
• Cargo protection: Measures to prevent spillage through enhancing the cargo 
containment system’s ability to maintain its integrity
• Damage stability: Reducing the probability of sinking though enhancement of survival 
capabilities in damaged condition
Evacuation arrangements and associated consequence through improvements relating 
to evacuation procedures, escape route layout or life saving appliances. Figure 76 shows the 
CBA balancing process curve for sustainable design.
Risk control options step 3 can be identified and prioritized at technical workshops, 
such meting could consider identification and selection of risk control options for further 
evaluation and cost benefit assessment. This part of the FSA also contained a high-level 
review of existing measures to prevent accidental release of gas.
Minimum sum of cost
Minimum sum of cost
costt
Cost of polution control
High damage cost with
no control
No economic gain from
polusion control
Cost of damage from
polution
Diferent between cost of polution
control and environmetal damage
Figure 76: Cost Benefit Analysis.
Cost/
BenefitAccepatblequotient
Risk
=               (1)
The economic benefit and risk reduction ascribed to each risk control options should be 
based on the event trees developed during the risk analysis and on considerations on which 
accident scenarios would be affected. Figure 76 shows cost benefit analysis representative 
graph. Estimates on expected downtime and repair costs in case of accidents should be 
based on statistics from shipyards.
Beyond compliance ship design
Existing design tools cannot, at least with any degree of reliability, be used to design a 
vessel to operate will ensure environmental reliability for LPG ships and operation in shallow 
or restricted waters. This is because of the extreme on-linearity of hull and propulsion 
characteristics under these conditions. In general, naval architects and marine engineers 
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are educated and equipped with knowledge, skills, design processes that permit continuous 
checking balancing of constraints and design tradeoffs of vessel capabilities as the design 
progresses.
The intended result of the process is the best design given the basic requirements of 
speed, payload, and endurance. Focus is not placed on top down model of generic design 
based on risk where all areas of concerned are assessed at different stages of design spiral as 
well as risk of environmental consequence for risk involved in operability in restricted water. 
Operational wise, recent time has seen real attempt to fully integrate human operational 
practices with vessel design. 
 
Figure 77: Ship Design Spiral.
Evolving simulation technology, however give hope for assessment of extreme engineering 
to mitigate extreme condition as well as envisaged uncertainty. Incorporating risk 
assessment and goal based design for environmental protection and accident prevention as 
an important part of ship design spiral (shown in Figure 77) for LPG ship a necessary step 
to enabling proper tradeoffs in vessel design for reliability and other demands of time. The 
result is that design decisions that can compromise environment and collision are decided 
in favor of other factors. Only consideration of the full range of ship and terminal design 
and human factors relationships that affects LPG ships will produce an efficient and safe 
environmental friendly marine transportation system of LPG. Now that the new issue of 
environment is around, then we have to squeeze in more stuff in the spiral.
In shipping and associated industries, ship protection and marine pollution are 
respectively interlinked in term of safety and environment, conventionally; ship safety is 
being deal with as its occurrence result to environmental problem. Likewise, for many years, 
less attention has been given to ship life cycle, material properties, and frequency matching 
with the environment has resulted to corrosion. Also ship scraping, and what happen to 
the environment after ship scraping, yes a lot of recycling, but little or no attention is given 
to the residual material that find their ways to pollute the clean beautiful sea. Other areas 
of concern are channel ship design criteria ships, controllability in dredged channels and 
maneuverability as a consideration in the Design Process. All in all, preventive and control 
incorporating sensible measures in ship design can only be optimized method and give us 
confidence on our environment. Focal areas that are will need revolutionary changes in ship 
design for LPG Ships are:
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• Material selection to withstand structural, weight, economical lifecycle anti-corrosion 
and fouling
• Ascertain the IGC requirements for LPG carriers and special design considerations 
• Consideration of critical load cases for each structure component as well as Corrosion 
• Design considerations and general requirements Internal cargo pressures according 
to the IGC Code 
• Vertical supports, anti-rolling keys, anti-floating keys and anti-pitching keys 
• Standard design load cases for yielding and buckling Standard design load cases for 
fatigue. Acceptance criteria Fatigue strength assessment 
• Thermal stress analysis around supports 
• Incorporating ship simulation at early stage of ship design 
• Validation of applied loadings and the responses to structural scantly towards 
withstanding structural function, reliability, integrity, weight, economical lifecycle 
using Structural FE Analysis
• Incorporation manoeuvring ship simulation at early stage of design iteration
Beyond compliance cargo tank design: Pressure vessel is storage tank designed to 
operate at pressures above 15 p.s.i.g. Common materials held and maintained by pressure 
vessels include air, water, nitrogen, refrigerants, ammonia, propane, and reactor fuels. Due 
to their pressurizing capabilities, they are often used to store chemicals and elements that 
can change states. For this reason gas property is important in their design, the walls of 
pressure vessels are thicker than normal tanks providing greater protection when in use 
with hazardous or explosive chemicals. Important parameters to consider when specifying 
pressure vessels include the capacity, the maximum pressure and the temperature range. 
The capacity is the volume of the pressure vessel: The maximum pressure is the pressure 
range that the vessel can withstand.
The temperature ranges indicates the temperature of the material that the container can 
withstand Built in temperature control system. This helps to keep volatile chemicals in inert 
states. At times it may also change the state of the chemicals to make transportation easier.
Pressure vessel with temperature controls have gauges to allow for reading of internal 
pressures and temperatures. These gauges are available with a variety of end connections, 
levels of accuracy, materials of construction, and pressure ranges. There are mainly two 
types of pressure vessels:
Spherical pressure vessel: These pressure vessels are thin walled vessels. This forms 
the most typical application of plane stress. Plane of stress is a class of common engineering 
problems involving stress in a thin plate. It can also be called as simplified 2D problems. 
Cylindrical pressure vessel: This vessel with a fixed radius and thickness subjected to 
an internal gage pressure, the vessel has an axialsymmetry. Analyses of LPG tanks design 
required of advantage of finite element modeling with fluent and other CFD software using 
static, dynamic, thermal and nonlinear analysis. To prove the structural integrity of the 
tank designs for structural and seismic loading as well as assesses leakage and burn-out 
scenarios.
Tank analyses should include: 
• Leakage and double walled piping modeling 
• Prestress/post-tensioning and Burn-out modeling
• Relief valve heat flux modeling Static analysis 
• Wind loading and modal and seismic analysis 
• Temperature modeling prediction of stresses loading as well as other environmental 
safety 
• Stress and thermal analysis of marine loading arm.
Beyond compliance HAZOP and FMEA: Operability must follow Hazards associated 
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with LPG ships. HAZOP and FMEA risk assessment following FSA procedure recommended. 
Beside this the following operational requirement are expected to exercise all the time for all 
operation activities
Gas equipment: Equipments associated with gas works that require regular look 
after are: Gas dryer, heat exchanger, storage and container, gas reactors, gas compressor 
type, gas liquefier, dust filter, air separation column, filling manifold distillation column. 
Expansion engines suction filter, after cooler, moisture absorber air compressor.
Use of Personal Protective Equipment (PPE): Owing to its rapid vaporisation and 
consequent lowering of temperature, LPG, particularly liquid can cause severe frost burns if 
brought into contact with the skin. P.P.E appropriate for use with LPG must always be worn 
when the refuelling operation is taking place.
• Neoprene gloves, preferably gauntlets (or similar, impervious to LPG liquid). 
• Safety gear- footwear, Goggles or face shield. Long sleeved cotton overalls. 
Housekeeping: Housekeeping is one of the most important items influencing the safety 
of the Color Gas Installation. 
• No smoking no naked lights or other sources of ignition, including the use of mobile 
phones, pagers, or radio transmitters, are permitted in the vicinity of the installation.
• Do not ignore the hazard signs or remove them. (or put your emergency sign here). 
• The area must be kept free from long grass, weeds, rubbish, and other readily ignitable 
or hazardous materials. 
• All emergency exits and gangways to be kept clear at all times. 
Gas storage: Gas storage facility is a vital factor in off-setting seasonal fluctuations 
in demand and safeguarding gas supplies at all times. Gas storage plays a vital role in 
maintaining the reliability of supply needed to meet the demands of consumers. LPG gases 
are explosive and are stores carefully and properly with extra attention and effort to avoid 
any kind of injury. The following are important hazard risk measured to follow for gas 
storage:
• Transportable gas containers should be stored in well defined areas and should be 
segregated according to the hazard presented by the contents. 
• Contents of cylinders should be easily identifiable.
• Persons involved should receive training regarding handling of cylinder, potential 
risks, hazards from cylinder and contents.
• Gases can be stored in pressure vessels, cylinders, trailer, vaporizer and tanks. These 
are stored away from flammable materials and electrical outlets. 
Account should be taken of external dangers such as adjacent work operations under 
different managerial control or the possibility of mechanical damage due to traffic knocks. 
The gases should not be subjected to any sort of physical damage or corrosion. Emergency 
procedures should be established.
In the present times, many new next generation systems are being developed in order 
to cater for the growing need for operational flexibility required by various gases and gas-
fired power generation customers all across the globe. The exploration, production, and 
transportation of gases takes time, and most of the times the gas that reaches its destination 
is not always needed right away, so it is injected into gas storage facilities. These gas storage 
facilities should have the following characteristics:
• Low Maintenance and easy to operate
• Trouble Free Operation
• Sturdy Design and long operative life
• Low Working Pressure and Low Operating Cost
• Easy availability of spare parts and Low power consumption
First aid: Treatment must be carried out immediately by placing the casualty gently 
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under slowly running cool water, keeping it there for at least 10minutes or until the pain 
ceases or cover the affected parts with light, dampened or wet material. Encourage the 
affected person to exercise any fingers, toes or legs that are affected to increase circulation. 
In severe cases, tissue damage will take place before medical aid can be obtained. Seek 
professional medical treatment as required. 
Inhalation: LPG vapor is mildly narcotic, inhalation of high concentrations will produce 
anesthesia. Prolonged inhalation of high concentrations will cause asphyxiation. The 
emergency treatment for inhalation is to move the casualty to fresh air, keeping them 
warm and at rest. In chronic cases, where there is a loss of consciousness give oxygen or if 
breathing ceases give artificial respiration. Professional medical treatment should be sought 
as required.
Eyes: Immediately flush eyes with plenty of water for at least 15minutes. Hold eyelids 
apart while flushing to rinse the entire surface of eye and lids with water. Seek medical 
attention immediately.
Skin: A strong refrigerant effect is produced when liquid LPG comes into contact with the 
skin. This is created by the rapid evaporation of the liquid and it can cause severe frostbite, 
depending on the level of exposure.
Emergency preparedness
In the event of fire: The fact that LPG is used as a safe and valuable heating source in 
millions of homes show that there are chances to controlling and preventing a fire involving 
LPG. To minimize the possibility of outbreak of fire, it is of key importance to provide good 
plant design and layout, ensure sound engineering and good operating practice, and provide 
proper instruction and training of personnel in routine operations and actions to be taken 
in an emergency. Actions required are:
• Shut all valves on tank or cylinders and emergency control valve outside the building 
by turning clockwise. 
• Call the Fire Service and refer to presence of LPG tank. 
• Keep tank cool by water spray, if possible. 
Gas leakage: Damaged vessels and cracks can result in leakage or rupture failures. 
Potential health and safety hazards of leaking vessels include poisonings, suffocations, 
fires, and explosion hazards. Rupture failures can be much more catastrophic and can 
cause considerable damage to life and property. The safe design, installation, operation, and 
maintenance of pressure vessels in accordance with the appropriate codes and standards 
are essential to worker safety and health. Actions required are:
• Shut the emergency control valve outside your building 
• Extinguish all sources of ignition. 
• Shut all cylinder valves or the gas isolation valve on top of the tank 
• Do not operate electrical switches. 
• Open all doors and windows. Ventilate at low level as LPG is heavier than air.
Above all Appliances should be serviced according to the manufacturer’s recommendations 
by a competent person
Environmental technology and beyond compliance performance prospect
Development real time simulation helps in the mitigation most of the accident and 
cover issues of uncertainty. Development in automation technology help in installation of 
emergency shut down mechanism advent of advance communication technology further 
give hope for improvise protection prevention and control Prospect of container unitized LPG 
ships in inland water.
Novel design of inland water craft to provide solution to issue of bigger ship inability to 
maneuver in inland water.
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In line with Global warming, since air emission is linked to machineries emerging new 
technology for efficient and low air pollution power source for ships including LPG Ships 
are:
• Alternative energy 
• Alternative fuel and dual fuel engines
• Infusion of water mist with fuel and subsequent gas scrubbing units for slow speed 
engines
• Additional firing chamber
• Potential for gas turbine complex cycle
• Potential for turbocharger diesel engine 
• Compound cycle with gasified fuel, external compressor, combustion with pure 
oxygen
• Exhaust after treatment for medium speed engines
Conclusion
In today, environmentally conscious world there is already so mush pressure on stake 
holder designer operator’s trainer and builders in shipping industry, especially ship carrying 
flammable gases like LPG/CNG to avoid accident and incident and the consequence of 
which could lead to catastrophic long term environmental disaster. Potential for more laws 
prevent and put necessary control in place is evident. However, the use of available and 
new technology in an innovative age of information technological and knowledge that has 
built through research activities related to speed, safety, reliability, miniaturization, cost, 
mobility and networking in most industries. Integrative utilization of which could facilitate 
optimization our system at design, operation and other factors of life cycle accountability 
process in order to come up with sustainable system. The answer to this lies on beyond 
compliance policy using IMO FSA and GBS tool in hybrid as required to meet future law 
requirement and to aid effective development of rules that satisfy all concern. Functional 
requirements for liquid gas carrier design and operations in restricted water can be 
adequately developed from design, operation, human elements and construction point of 
view using adequate technical background as well as ergonomic design principles.
6. Risk and Reliability Based Multi- Hybrid Alternative Energy for 
Marine System: The Case of Solar, Hydrogen and Convention Power 
Steam Energy for Sustainable Port Powering
Abstract
Sources of alternative energy are natural. There has been a lot of research about the 
use of free fall energy from the sun to the use of reverse electrolysis to produce fuel cell. 
For one reason or the other these sources of energy are not economical to produce. Most of 
the problems lie on efficiency and storage capability. Early human civilization use nature 
facilities of soil, inland waterways, waterpower which are renewable for various human 
needs. Modern technology eventually replaces renewable nature with non renewable 
sources which requires more energy and produces more waste. Energy, Economic and 
Efficiency (EEE) have been the main driving force to technological advancement in shipping. 
Environmental problem linkage to source of energy poses need and challenge for new energy 
source. The paper discuss risk based iternative and integrative sustainability balancing 
work required between the 4 Es in order to enhance and incorporate use of right hybrid 
combination of alternative energy source (solar and hydrogen) with existing energy source 
(steam diesel or steam) to meet marine system energy demands (port powering). The paper 
will communicate environmental challenges facing the maritime industry. Effort in the 
use of available world of human technocrat to integrate sources of alternative energy with 
existing system through holistic proactive risk based analysis and assessment requirement 
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of associated environmental degradation, mitigation of greenhouse pollution. The paper 
will also discuss alternative selection acceptable for hybrid of conventional power with 
compactable renewable source solar/hydrogen for reliable port powering. And hope that the 
Decision Support System (DSS) for hybrid alternative energy communicated in this paper 
to improve on on-going quest of the time to balance environmental treat that is currently 
facing the planet and contribution to recent effort to preserve the earth for the privilege of 
the children of tomorrow.
Keywords: Alternative energy; energy; hybrid; port; power; sustainability; 
Introduction
Scale, transportation, language, art, matter and energy remain keys to human 
civilization. The reality of integration of science and system lies in holistically investigation 
of efficiency of hybridizing alternative energy source with conventional energy source. This 
can be achieved with scalable control switching system that can assure reliability, safety 
and environmental protection. Option for such sustainable system is required to be based 
on risk, cost, efficiency benefit assessment and probabilistic application. Green house gas 
(GHG) pollution is linked to energy source. Large amount of pollution affecting air quality 
is prone by reckless industrial development. GHG release has exhausted oxygen, quality of 
minerals that support human life on earth, reduction in the ozone layer that is protecting 
the planetary system form excess sunlight. This is due to lack of cogent risk assessment and 
reliability analysis of systems before building. Moreso, because conventional assessment 
focus more on economics while environment and its associated cycle is not much considered 
[72, 73]. Human activities are altering the atmosphere, and the planet is warming. It is 
now clear that the costs of inaction are far greater than the costs of action. Aversion of 
catastrophic impacts can be achieved by moving rapidly to transform the global energy 
system. Sustainability requirement that can be solved through energy conservation (cf. IPCC) 
are energy and associated efficiency, development, environment, poverty. Stakeholder from 
government’s consumers, industry transportation, buildings, product designs (equipment 
networks and infrastructures) must participate in the decision work for sustainable system. 
Recently the marine industry is getting the following compliance pressure regarding 
environmental issues related to emission to air under IMO MARPOL Annex 6. A world 
without port means a lot to economy transfer of goods, availability of ships and many things. 
Large volume of hinterland transportation activities import tells a lot about intolerant to air 
quality in port area. Adopting new energy system will make a lot of difference large number 
of people residing and working in the port. Most port facilities are powered by diesel plant. 
Integrating hybrid of hydrogen and solar into the existing system will be a good way for the 
port community to adapt to new emerging clean energy concept. Hybrid use of alternative 
source of energy remains the next in line for the port and ship power. Public acceptability 
of hybrid energy will continue to grow especially if awareness is drawn to risk cost benefit 
analysis result from energy source comparison and visual reality simulation of the system 
for effectiveness to curb climate change contributing factor, price of oil, reducing treat of 
depletion of global oil reserve. Combined extraction of heat from entire system seems very 
promising to deliver the requirement for future energy for ports. This paper discuss available 
marine environmental issues, source of energy today, evolution of alternative energy due 
to the needs of the time and the barrier of storage requirement, system matching of hybrid 
design feasibility, regulations consideration and environmental stewardship. The paper 
also discusses holistic assessment requirement, stochastic evaluation, using system based 
doctrine, recycling and integrated approach to produce energy. With hope to contribute 
to the ongoing strives towards reducing green house gases, ozone gas depletion agents 
and depletion of oxygen for safety of the planet in order to sustain it for the right of future 
generation.
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Energy, environment and sustainable development: Since the discovery of fire and 
the harnessing of animal power, mankind has captured and used energy in various forms for 
different purposes. This include the use of animal for transportation, use of fire, fuelled by 
wood, biomass, waste for cooking, heating, the melting of metals, wind mills, water wheels and 
animals to produce mechanical work. Extensive reliance on energy started during industrial 
revolution. For years there has been increased understanding of the environmental effects 
of burning fossil fuels has led to stringent international agreements, policies and legislation 
regarding the control of the harmful emissions related to their use. Despite this knowledge, 
global energy consumption continues to increase due to rapid population growth and 
increased global industrialization.In order to meet the emission target, various measures 
must be taken, greater awareness of energy efficiency among domestic and industrial users 
throughout the world will be required and domestic, commercial and industrial buildings, 
industrial processes and vehicles will need to be designed to keep energy use at a minimum. 
Figure 78 shows that the use of fossil fuels (coal, oil and gas) accounted continue to increase 
[72,74]. 
Figure 78: GHG Emissions Reductions through 2050, by Consuming Sector.
Various measures must be taken to reduce emission targets.The current reliance on 
fossil fuels for electricity generation, heating and transport must be greatly reduced and 
alternative generation methods and fuels for heating and transport must be developed and 
used. Sustainable design can be described as system work that which enhances ecological, 
social and economic well being, both now and in the future. The global requirement for 
sustainable energy provision is become increasingly important over the next fifty years 
as the environmental effects of fossil fuel use become apparent. As new and renewable 
energy supply technologies become more cost effective and attractive, a greater level of 
both small scale and large scale deployment of these technologies will become evident. 
Currently there is increasing global energy use of potential alternative energy supply system 
options, complex integration and switching for design requirement for sustainable, reliable 
and efficient system. The issues surrounding integration of renewable energy supplies need 
to be considered carefully. Proactive risk based Decision support system is important to 
help the technical design of sustainable energy systems, in order to encourage planning for 
future development for the supply of electricity, heat, hot water and fuel for transportation. 
Renewable energy systems have intermittence source, this make assurance reliability of the 
supply and subsequent storage and back-up generation a necessity. Generic algorithms of 
the behavior of plant types and methods for producing derived fuels to be modeled, available 
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process and manufacturer’s data must be taken into consideration. Today, simulation 
tool for analysis that allow informed decisions to be made about the technical feasibility 
of integrated renewable energy systems are available. Tool that permit use of supply mix 
and control strategies, plant type and sizing, suitable fuel production, and fuel and energy 
storage sizing, for any given area and range of supply should be adopted.
Energy consumption, demand and supply: Energy is considered essential for economic 
development, Malaysia has taken aggressive step in recent year to face challenges of the 
world of tomorrow, and this includes research activities strategic partnership. one example 
is partnership with the Japanese Government for construction on sustainable energy power 
station in the Port Klang power station, Pasir Gudang power station, Terengganu Hydro-
electric power station and Batang Ai Hydro-electric power station which are main supply to 
major Malysian port. The above enumerated power stations are constructed with energy-
efficient and resource-efficient technologies. Where power station are upgraded the power 
station by demolishing the existing aging, inefficient and high emission conventional natural 
gas/oil-fired plant (360MW) and installing new 750MW high efficiency and environment 
friendly combined cycle gas fired power plant built at amount of JPY 102.9 billion. The 
combined-cycle generation plant is estimated to reduce the power station’s environmental 
impact, raise generation efficiency and make the system more stable. The total capacity 
of power generation of 1,500MW is equal to 14% of total capacity of TNB in peninsula 
of 10,835MW and indeed this power station is one of the best thermal power stations 
with highest generation efficiency in Malaysia of more than 55%. The rehabilitation, the 
emissions of Nitride oxide (NOx) is reduced by 60%, Sulfur dioxide (SO2) per unit is reduced 
by almost 100% and Carbon dioxide (CO2) emission is reduced by 30%. Port operation 
energy demands are for transportation, hot water and heat. This third generation plan 
can easily be integrated with alternative energy [72,75]. Table 36 shows Malaysia energy 
environment outlook.
Energy-Related Carbon Dioxide Emissions (2006E) 163.5 million Metric tons, of which Oil (44%), Natural Gas (41%), Coal (15%)
Per-Capita, Energy-Related Carbon Dioxide Emissions 
((Metric Tons of Carbon Dioxide) (2006E) 6.7 Metric tons
Carbon Dioxide Intensity (2006E)
0.6 Metric tons per thousand $2000-PPP**
96.0 billion kilowatt hours
Table 36: Malaysia environmental review.
The energy use in all sectors has increased in recent years, most especially the energy 
use for transport has almost doubled it continues to grow and becoming problem. This 
trend is being experienced in industrialized and developing world. Energy demand for port 
work is supply from grids which are well established in most developed world. The method 
and sitting of generating conventional energy and renewable energy determine system 
configuration. Hierarchy systems that can be deduced from these two variables are:
• Limited capacity energy
• Limited energy plant
• Intermittent energy plant
Emerging renewable energy system: The design of integrated sustainable energy 
supply technology systems that are reliable and efficient for transport, heat, hot water and 
electricity demands can be facilitated by harnessing weather related sources of energy (e.g. 
wind, sunlight, waves, and rainfall). In order to provide a reliable electricity supply, reduce 
energy wastage and enable the energy requirements for heat and transport to be met, the 
outputs of these intermittent sources may be supplemented by various means [75,76]. The 
intermittent nature of most easily exploited sources of alternative energy remains the major 
problem for the supply the electricity network. This has implications for the management 
of this transitional period as the balance between supply and demand must be maintained 
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as efficiently and reliably as possible while the system moves towards the ultimate goal of 
a 100% renewable energy supply over the next fifty to one hundred years.It important to 
take the of amount intermittent electricity sources that can be integrated into a larger scale 
electricity supply network into consideration.Excess supply could be supplied by plant run 
on fuels derived from biomass and waste.The renewable hybrid age require utilities, local 
authorities and other decision makers to be able to optimization that beat constraints, 
potentials and other energy requirements from port powering.The sizing and type of storage 
system required depends on the relationship between the supply and demand profiles.For 
excess amount electricity produced this could be used to make hydrogen via the electrolysis 
of water.This hydrogen could then be stored, used in heaters or converted back into 
electricity via a fuel cell later as required. Using excess electricity, this hydrogen could be 
produced centrally and piped to for port or produced at vehicle filling stations for haulage 
or at individual facilities in the port [77,78]. Alternatively, excess electricity could be used 
directly to fuel electric haulage trucks, recharging at times of low electricity demand or 
use for HVAC system or water heating for immediate use or to be stored as hot water or in 
storage heaters [79]. 
Energy supply and demand matching: Fossil fuel use for transportation and port 
activities has increased dramatically over the past decade, and shows little signs of abating. 
This has caused concern about related environmental and health effects. There is need for 
to develop alternatively fuel system that produces little or no pollution. The main fuels that 
can be used in a variety of land, sea and air vehicles are biogas in natural gas and fuel cell 
vehicles, biodiesel in diesel vehicles, ethanol and methanol in adapted petrol and fuel cell. 
Biogas can be converted to run on natural gas and in some fuel cell. It must be cleaned first 
to create a high heating value gas (around 95% methane, a minimum of heavy gases, and 
no water or other particles). Fuel cell powered engine can run on pure hydrogen, producing 
clean water as the only emission. Biodiesel can be used directly in a diesel engine with little 
or no modifications, and burns much more cleanly and thoroughly than diesel, giving a 
substantial reduction in unburned hydrocarbons, carbon monoxide and particulate matter. 
The main barriers to the implementation of alternative fuels is the requirement for a choice 
of fuel at a national level, the necessity to create a suitable refueling infrastructure, the 
length of time it will take to replace or convert existing vehicles, and the need for a strong 
public incentive to change [25,30,31]. Choice of conventional energy source could be: 
Internal Combustion and Diesel Engines: Steam Turbines [78,80]. 
• Stirling Engines
• Gas Turbines
Choice of alternative energy 
Fuel Cells: The principle of the fuel cell was discovered over 150 years ago. NASA has 
improved the system in their emission free operation for spacecraft. Recent years has also 
seen improvement in vehicles, stationary and portable applications. As a result of this 
increased interest, stationary power plants from 200W to 2 MW are now commercially 
available, with efficiencies ranging from 30 to 50% and heat to electricity ratios from 0.5:1 
to 2:1. Fuel cell re load follower energy, the efficiency of a fuel cell typically increases at 
lower loadings. Fuel cell system also has fast response. This make them well suited to load 
following and transport applications. Fuel cell is advanced alternative energy technology 
with electrochemical conversion of fuel directly into electricity without intermediate stage, 
the combustion of fuel; hence by-pass the restriction of second law of thermodynamic the 
basic fuel supply in the fuel cell systems is hydrogen and carbon dioxide. The simplified fuel 
cell is exact opposite of electrolysis. The four basic element of the system are hydrogen fuel, 
the oxidant, the electrodes and the electrolyte chemicals. The fuel is supplied in the form of 
hydrogen and carbon dioxide which represent electrode and oxidant cathode, the electrolyte 
material that conduct the electric current can be acid or alkaline solid or liquid. Cycle of 
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operation begin with hydrogen carbon dioxide to the anode, where hydrogen ion are formed, 
releasing a flow of electron to the cathode through the electrolyte medium. The cathodes 
take oxygen from the air and transform it into ion state in combination with anode electron. 
The oxygen carrying ion migrates back to the anode, completing the process of energy 
conversion by producing a flow of direct current electricity and water as a by-product.
2H2->4e- +4H+                              (1)
4h+ +4e- +O2->2H20                            (2)
2H2+02 -> 2H20 +Heat                   (3)
The fact that it is made from water has promise for its unlimited supply the fact that 
water is the by-product also guarantee vast reduction of pollution on earth, solving problem 
of green house gas release and global warming. Fuel cell system involve combination of 
groups of small chemical reactions and physical actions that are combined in a number 
of ways and a in a number of different sections of the generator. This energy source uses 
the principles of thermodynamics, physical chemistry, and physics. The net result is a 
non-polluting, environmentally sound energy source using air or even water cooling with a 
minimum temperature rise of 20C above ambient and no emissions. The chemicals, metals 
and metal alloys involved are non-regulated. The chemical reactions are encased within the 
process unit where they are recovered, regenerated and recycled. This process produces no 
discharge or emission [75,76]. Fuel cells are classified by the type of electrolyte they use, 
and this dictates the type of fuel and operating temperature that are required. The most 
commonly used fuel cell for small scale due to its low operating temperature and compact 
and light weight form, is the Proton Exchange Membrane Fuel Cell (PEMFC). Phosphoric 
Acid and Molten Carbonate fuel cells (PAFC and MCFC) are also available for larger scale 
applications, and require higher operating temperatures (roughly 200°C and 650°C), which 
means they must be kept at this temperature if fast start-up is required. All of these fuel 
cells may be run on pure hydrogen, natural gas or biogas. Certain PAFCs may also use 
methanol or ethanol as a fuel. If pure hydrogen is used, the only emission from a fuel cell is 
pure, clean water. If other fuels are used, some emissions are given off, though the amounts 
are lower due to the better efficiencies achievable with fuel cells. Table 37 shows the types 
of fuel cell and their characteristics [76]. 
Types Electrolyte Operating temperature
Alkaline Potassium hydroxide 50-200
Polymer Polymer membrane 50-100
Direct methanol Polymer membrane 50-200
Phosphoric acid Phosphoric acid 160-210
Molten carbonate Lithium and potassium carbonate 600-800
Solid oxide Ceramic compose of calcium 500-1000
Table 37: Type of electrolyte fuel cell.
Comparing the efficiency of fuel cell to other source of alternative energy source, fuel 
cell is the most promising and economical source that guarantee future replacement of 
fossil fuel. However efficiency maximization of fuel cell power plant remains important issue 
that needs consideration for its commercialization. As a result the following are important 
consideration for efficient fuel cell power plant. Efficiency calculation can be done through 
the following formula: 
C
nF
GE g=                       (4)
G= H*T *Si                     (5)
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Where: Ec = EMF, G = Gibbs function nF = Number of Faraday transfer in the reaction, 
H = Enthalpy, T = Absolute temperature, S = Entropy change, I = Ideal efficiency. 
Advantages of fuel cell include size, weigh, flexibility, efficiency, safety, topography, 
cleanliness. Mostly use as catalyst in PAFC, and however recovery of platinum from worn 
out cell can reduce the cost and market of the use of P ACF economical. It has cost advantage 
over conventional fossil fuel energy and alternative energy. Disadvantages of fuel cell are 
adaptation, training, and cost of disposal. Fuel cell has found application in transportation, 
commercial facility, residential faculty, space craft and battery.
Solar energy system: Photovoltaic (PV) solar system use silicon photovoltaic cell to 
convert sunlight to electricity using evolving unique characteristic of silicon semiconductor 
material and accommodating market price of silicon is god advantage for PV fuel cell.Silicon 
is grown in large single crystal, wafer like silicon strip are cut with diamond coated with 
material like boron to create electrical layer, through doping the elementary energy particle 
of sunlight photon strike the silicon cell. They are converted to electron in the P-N junction, 
where the p accepts the electron and the n reject the electron thus setting into motion direct 
current and subsequent inversion to AC current as needed. Electrical conductor embedded 
in the surface layer in turn diverts the current into electrical wire [81].
Collector module needs to face south for case of photovoltaic, this depends on modular 
or central unit’s modular.
• Module storage unit need maintenance 
• The system need power inverter if the load requires AC current 
• Highlight of relevant procedural differences from regular projects of this type will be 
needed
• Discuss requirements benefits and issues of using new procedures, and incorporating 
that into the total cost
• Procedure to build on will be described, hybrid system and integration system will be 
described and analyzed from the results and 
• System successful complied with all regulations
• Efficiency penalty caused by extra power control equipment
Sola collector can be plate or dish type. Stefan` law relates the radiated power to 
temperature and types of surface: 
4=
P T
T
εσ                     (6)
Where P/A is the power in watts radiated per square meter, ε  is surface emissivity, σ  
is Stefan Boltzmann constant= 5.67x10e8 W/ 2m . 4K
The maximum intensity point of the spectrum of emitted radiation is given by:
( )max
2898A
T k
λ =                      (7)
Hybrid system: With a focus on developing applications for clean, renewable, non-
fossil fuel, energy systems. Our final emphasis is on maritime related activities; however, as 
marine engineers we are devoted to promoting all types of alternative & sustainable energy 
technologies. Various types of engine, turbine and fuel cell may be run on a variety of fuels 
for combined heat and power production. Hybrid system can provide control over power 
needs, green and sustainable energy that delivers a price that is acceptable and competitive. 
The power plants can be located where it is needed less high power lines are required, not 
only reducing costs but assisting health by reducing magnetic fields that people are so 
worried about, Global warming is addressed by direct action by providing power that does 
not release any emissions or discharges of any kind. The technology associated with the 
design, manufacture and operation of marine equipment is changing rapidly. The traditional 
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manner in which regulatory requirements for marine electrical power supply systems 
have developed, based largely on incidents and failures is no longer acceptable. Current 
international requirements for marine electrical power supply equipment and machinery 
such as engines, turbines and batteries have evolved over decades and their applicability 
to new technologies and operating regimes is now being questioned by organizations 
responsible for the regulation of safety and reliability of ships. Figure 79 and 80 shows 
hybrid configuration for conventional power, solar and hydrogen and Figure 81 shows 
physical model of hybrid of solar, wind and hydrogen being experimenting in UMT campus.
Figure 79: Hybrid configuration
Figure 80: Hybrid configuration
Various technologies have been employed towards the use of alternative free energy of 
the sun since the first discovery in the 18th century. Improvement and development has 
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been made towards making it available for use like existing reigning source of energy. Major 
equipment and hardware for the hybrid configuration are:
• Semi-conductor solar with high efficient storage capability will be designed 
• Hybrid back up power will be design based with integrative capability to other 
alternative power source like wind and hydrogen 
• Controller design for power synchronization will be designed and prototyped 
• Inverter and other power conversion units will be selected based on power needs
• Solar collector or receiver with high efficiency collection capacity will be designed 
• Software development and simulation 
• Steam will be used as energy transfer medium
 
Figure 81: Physical model of hybrid system under experimentation in UMT.
The power plants can be built in small units combined, which allow greater control over 
the output and maintains full operational output 100% of the time. The plant produces 
fewer emissions, the plant can be located close to the areas where the power is required 
cutting down on the need for expensive high power lines. Excess energy produced can 
be connected to the grid under power purchase arrangement. The system can be built in 
independent power configuration and user will be free from supply cut out. 
One of the unique features of hybrid system is the sustainable, clean energy system that 
uses a hydrogen storage system as opposed to traditional battery. Its design construction 
and functionality are inspired by the theme of regeneration and the philosophy of reuse. 
High efficiency solar panels works with an electrolyser to generate the hydrogen for fuel cell. 
The hybrid system can provide means to by-pass and overcome limitation posed by past 
work in generating replaceable natural energy of the sun and other renewable energy source 
that can be designed in hybrid system. Reliable deployment of hybrid system developments 
of mathematical model follow by prototyping, experimentation and simulation of the system 
are key to the design and its implementation. The main advantages of hybrid configurations 
are: Redundancy and modularity, high reliability of hybrid circuitry embedded control 
system, improve emergency energy switching and transfer, low operating cost through 
integrated design, low environmental impacts due to nature of the energy source [81-83].
Reliability and decision support framework: Various studies have been carried out 
to find the best hybrid supply for given areas. Results from specific studies cannot be 
easily applied to other situations due to area specific resources and energy use profiles 
and environmental differences. Energy supply system, with a large percentage of renewable 
resources varies with the size and type of area, climate, location, typical demand profiles 
and available renewable resource. A decision support framework is required in order to 
aid the design of future renewable energy supply systems, effectively manage transitional 
periods, and encourages and advance state of the art deployment as systems become more 
economically desirable. The DSS could involve the technical feasibility of possible renewable 
energy supply systems, economic and political issues. Reliability based DSS can facilitate 
possible supply scenarios to be quickly and easily tried, to see how well the demands for 
electricity, heat and transport for any given area can be matched with the outputs of a 
wide variety of possible generation methods. DSS can provide energy provision for port and 
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help guide the transition towards higher percentage sustainable energy provision in larger 
areas. The hybrid configuration of how the total energy needs of an area may be met in 
a sustainable manner, the problems and benefits associated with these, and the ways in 
which they may be used together to form reliable and efficient energy supply systems. The 
applicability and relevance of the decision support framework can be shown through the 
use of a can simulate case study of the complex nature of sustainable energy supply system 
design.
Regulatory requirement and assessment: The Unifies International Association of 
Classification Society (IACS) unified requirements are applicable to marine power plant and 
electrical installations. A listing of the applicable requirements to marine power plants is 
shown in appendix of this paper. They IACS requirement provide prescriptive statements 
that provide a definition or identify what has to be done and in some cases how to do it. They 
relate to safety and reliability of marine power plant and support systems and arrangements. 
The current requirements have been developed based on reactive approach which leads 
to system failure. Reactive approach is not suitable for introduction of new technology of 
modern power generation systems. This call for alternative philosophy to the assessment of 
new power generation technologies together with associated equipment and systems from 
safety and reliability considerations, such system required analysis of system capability 
and regulatory capability [84,85]. System based approaches for regulatory assessment is 
detailed under goal based design as shown in figure. 
IMO has embraced the use of goal based standards for ship construction and this process 
can be equally well applied to machinery power plants. Figure 82 illustrates the goal based 
regulatory framework for new ship construction that could be readily adapted for marine 
power plant application. Tiers of the goal base frame work are shown in Figure 83.
 
Goal based verification of compliance 
criteria 
Tier 
1&2 
IMO instrument/classification rules, industrial standards, class guides, and 
technical procedure 
Tier 3 
Tier 4 
Approval process 
Goal Analysis 
Secondary standard for company or individual ship 
Code of practice, safety and quality system shipbuilding, operation maintenance 
and manning 
Design process 
High level goal assessment/Safety and environment protection objective: 
i) Standard requirement ii) Functional requirement 
Tier 5 
Figure 82: Components of level goal standard assessment.
Risk based design: The approach to risk assessment begins with risk analysis, a 
systematic process for answering the three questions posed at the beginning of this chapter: 
What can go wrong? How likely is it? What are the impacts? The analysis that describes and 
quantifies every scenario, the risk estimation of the triplets can be transformed into risk 
curve or risk matrix of frequency versus consequences.
Quantitative risk assessments: Analysis tools that now gaining general acceptance in 
the marine industry is Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA). The adoption of analysis 
tools requires a structure and the use of agreed standards. The use of analysis tools must 
also recognise lessons learnt from past incidents and experience and it is vital that the 
background to existing requirements stemming from SOLAS or IACS are understood. 
Consistent with the current assessment philosophy, there needs to be two tenets to the 
process safety and dependability. A safety analysis for a hybrid power generation system 
and its installation on board a ship could use a hazard assessment process such as outlined 
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in Figure 83. The hazard assessment should review all stages of a systems life cycle from 
design to disposal. 
Figure 83: Components of risk and reliability analysis.
Figure 82 and 83 sows the components of risk assessment and analysis. The analysis 
leads to risk curve or risk profile. The risk curve is developed from the complete set of risk 
triplets. The triplets are presented in a list of scenarios rearranged in order of increasing 
consequences, that is, C1≤C2≤C3≤ ≤CN, with the corresponding probabilities as shown in 
Table 38. A fourth column is included showing the cumulative probability, Pi (uppercase 
P) as shown. When the points <Ci, Pi> are plotted, the result is the stair case function. 
The staircase function can be considered as discrete approximation of a nearly continuous 
reality. If a smooth curve is drawn through the staircase, that curve can be regarded as 
representing the actual risk, and it is the risk curve or risk profile that tells much about the 
reliability of the system. Combination of qualitative and quantitative analyses is advised to 
for risk estimates of complex and dynamic system. 
Scenario Probability Consequence Cumulative Probability
S1 P1 C1 P1=P1+P2
S2 P2 C2 P2=P3+P2
Si Pi Ci Pi=Pi+3+Pi
Sn+1 Pn+1 Cn+1 Pn-1=Pn+Pn+1
Sn Pn Cn Pn=Pn
Table 38: Components of risk and reliability analysis.
The design concept needs to address the marine environment in terms of those 
imposed on the power plant and those that are internally controlled. It is also necessary 
to address the effects of fire, flooding, equipment failure and the capability of personnel 
required to operate the system. In carrying out a hazard assessment it is vital that there are 
clearly defined objectives in terms of what is to be demonstrated. The assessment should 
address the consequence of a hazard and possible effect on the system, its subsystems, 
personnel and the environment. An assessment for reliability and availability of a hybrid 
power generation system and its installation in a ship could use a FMEA tool. An effective 
FMEA needs a structured approach with clearly defined objectives and IACS is currently 
developing standards that can uniformly be applied to marine systems and equipment 
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where an analysis is required. The work currently being undertaken by IACS will identify 
those systems and machinery that require analysis. For a hazard and failure mode analysis 
it is necessary to use recognised standards and there are a number of generic standards 
that can be applied and adapted for analysis of a hybrid system Figure 84: 
• IEC 61882, Hazard and Operability Studies (HAZOP) studies.
• IEC 60812, Analysis techniques for system reliability, application guide, Procedure 
for Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA).
• IEC 61508, Functional safety of electrical/electronic/programmable electronic 
safety-related systems.
                                    a)                b) 
Figure 84: a) Stair case risk b) Risk priority matrix.
L = low risk, M = moderate risk, H = high risk; VH = very high risk.
The assessment analysis processes for safety and reliability need to identify defined 
objectives under system functionality and capability matching. These two issues are 
concerned with system performance rather than compliance with a prescriptive requirement 
in a standard. The importance of performance and integration of systems that are related to 
safety and reliability is now recognised and the assessment tools now available offer such 
means. Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) is recognised by the IMO as being an important 
part of a process for developing requirements for marine regulations. IMO has approved 
Guidelines for Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) for use in the IMO rule-making process 
(MSC/Circ.1023/MEPC/ Circ.392). Further reliability and optimization can be done by 
using stochastic and simulation tools [14,15]. 
The development of requirements for fuel cells in the marine environment power plant 
application could usefully recognize the benefits of adopting a goal based approach. In order 
to determine the power supply capacity and system architectural arrangements required 
and to give specific requirements for services that affect the propulsion and safety of the 
vessel the various services are grouped under a number of headings.
Conclusion
Energy, environment, economic and efficiency and safety are the main technology driver 
today. Issue of energy and environment has been address. Problem associated with choice 
of energy system in the face of current environmental challenges has been discussed. The 
paper also discussed Standards and issues that are applicable to marine power generation 
systems. Alternative methods of assessment that can be applied to technology for which 
the current standards do not fit a recognized design and operating scenario and matter 
of lessons learnt from experience and from failures need to be understood before using 
alternative methods. Thus solar energy has been existing for a long time, different parties 
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have done various research programs on to solar energy and hydrogen energy in different 
ways, a lot have been achieved in alternative energy technology. The state of the planet, 
surrounded with issue of energy pollutant shows current need for development of reliable 
production of alternative energy, since, previous work has shown lack of reliability on 
stand a lone system. Incorporating risk based DSS scheme for hybrid system that integrate 
conventional system with new system could bring a break through to counter problem 
associated with production of alternative energy. Previous regulatory work for system design 
has been prescriptive by nature. Performance based standards that make use of alternative 
methods of assessment for safety and reliability of component design, manufacture and 
testing is recommended for hybrid alternative energy system installation.
7. Risk and Reliability Analysis Study of Offshore Aquaculture Ocean 
Plantation System
Abstract
Complex system design is increasingly being based on risk and reliability analysis. 
Aquaculture is the fastest growing sector for seafood production and other bio-base 
technological processes. Considerable interest exists in developing open ocean aquaculture 
in response to a shortage of aquaculture product, suitable system, sheltered inshore 
locations and possible husbandry advantages of oceanic system. Concept of very large 
floating structure is adapted in aquaculture farming in ocean to produce more aquaculture 
product like seaweed. The risk analysis study of offshore aquaculture ocean plantation 
system is very important to determine the system functionality and capability that meet 
sustainable and reliability requirement. This paper describe process required to qualitatively 
assess system risk and quantify mooring failure probability, maximum force and required 
number of mooring as well as associated cost with the system.
Introduction
Since the early 1970s the technology, for very large floating structures has developed 
continually, while changing societal needs have resulted in many different applications of 
the technology for floating structure. Very large floating structure for offshore aquaculture 
of seaweed could be adapted offshore aquaculture ocean plantation system for oceanic 
farming of fish, prawn, squid and many more. 
Seaweed encompass macroscopic, multicellular, polyphyletic, benthic marine algae that 
includes some members of the red, brown and green algae. Different type of seaweeds are 
available, they are classified by use for example as food, medicine, fertilizer, industrial, 
biomass and others. In addition, some tuft-forming blue green algae (Cyanobacteria) 
are sometimes considered as seaweeds. The usual type of seaweed that is used in ocean 
plantation is Cottonii seaweed or also known as Kappaphycus (Eucheuma spp.). 
The design of very large floating structure for offshore aquaculture ocean plantation 
system required a reliable and risk free system with robust mathematical and simulation, 
risk and reliability of the hydroelastic structure, mooring system, structure, and material. 
Hence, the study of risk and reliability for the mooring system of offshore aquaculture ocean 
plantation system is required to make sure the system can function well, be monitored and 
accessed safety and efficiency. Typical mooring structure for offshore aquaculture include 
piers, docks, floats and buoys and their associated pilings, ramps, lifts and railways. 
Generally, mooring structure is required to follow local and international requirements 
for offshore standards, materials, installation timing and surveys. The mooring structures 
should be able to withstand in critical saltwater and freshwater habitats when the standards, 
overwater structures shall be constructed to the minimum size necessary to meet the needs 
of ocean resources exploration use.
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Mooring system for VLFS need risk and reliability analysis of the associated criticality. 
Risk analysis of offshore aquaculture ocean plantation system focus on analyzing mooring 
structure with hope to help determine safe, reliability and efficiency of the system. 
Qualitative assessment and quantitative risk assessment analysis methods are explored 
towards reliable decision support for VLFS. Qualitative assessment analysis employed 
qualitative tools like checklist, and HAZOP (Hazard and Operability Study) that define the 
system while quantitative risk analysis, the methods employed include Failure Modes and 
Effects Analysis (FMEA), Fault Tree Analysis (FTA), Risk Control Option based on HAZID 
(Hazard Identification) process. The risk of disaster cannot be eliminated but risk can be 
reduced by employing better safety detection technique and establishing safety criteria prior 
to an accident occurrence.
This paper describe development of simplified but holistic methodology that determine 
risk based decision support for reliable design and development of VLFS system, the risk 
analysis focus on mooring structure failure and reliability through employment of risk tools 
like FMEA, FTA, RCO and HAZID. 
Background
The seaweed extract, (Carrageenan) is an important hydrocolloids product for food 
additive ingredient and it is highly demanded in the world market. Seaweed is also used for 
biomass energy production as well as pharmaceutical and medicinal product. The demand 
for seaweed has created huge market for this raw material, especially, the Cottonii seaweed 
also known as Kappaphycus (Euchema spp.). For exemple, under the Malaysian Government 
NKEA, there is need to produce 1 million tonnes seaweed every year. Unfortunately, currently 
there is no proper system or plat form to deliver this demand.
The mooring system failure analysis is very important part in the development offshore 
aquaculture ocean plantation systems; risk analysis is required to determine the system 
function duty and performance. Besides that, there will be increasing demand for concept 
of floating technology worldwide, so the concept of offshore aquaculture ocean plantation 
system can be applied for the technology platform required. There is currently no systematic 
and formal proactive methodology for offshore aquaculture floating structure design. Offshore 
floating structure is required to be reliable in order to withstand harsh environment. A risk 
and reliability studies of offshore aquaculture system for mooring structure will contribute 
to sustainable development of the seaweed farming industry as well as improvement of 
technology platform for other aquaculture farming in open seas.
The study involves conduct and determination the reliability analysis that can reduce 
the probability of accident risk occurrence and impact in offshore aquaculture system 
for ocean plantation. Especially mooring structure system integrity and reduction of 
consequence of failure. The studies access the risk, system functionality and capability of 
offshore aquaculture seaweed plantation for mooring structure. The study also estimate 
the risk in design of mooring structure for deployment of very large floating structure for 
oceanic aquaculture seaweed plantation and ddecision recommendation will be offered for 
level integrity of oceanic aquaculture seaweed plantation for mooring structure. 
Significant/rationale of risk based design VLFS: The study VLFS, fall under complex 
and new system, unlike system like ship, offshore structure, that have of the shelf guideline, 
new method is required for design and development of reliable VLFS for aquaculture 
seaweed farming. The risk and reliability analysis is one best approach to use for offshore 
aquaculture ocean plantation system of mooring system and VLF structure that withstands 
the aspects that has been tested in the system design and development. The risk approch 
investigate more detailed the risk, specification and requirement that the system needs to 
make sure that it is reliability for deployment of capability. The significant of this using risk 
method for VLFS are:
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• To avoid system failure according recommendation from quantifying and dedution of 
improvement measures 
• Identify inadequate mooring strength due to poor material quality of fatigue in order 
to determine required mitigation.
• Identified excessive environmental forces for example under estimated or freak 
environmental condition and determine solution for system additional uncertainty.
• Predicted incorrectly mooring tension based on the reviews and analysis of the system.
• Perfomed risk and reliability leads to recommend the best safety level integrity of 
oceanic aquaculture seaweed plantation for mooring structure to alert the risk and 
improve reliability of this system.
Case study area: The risk analysis condsiders east coast, Malaysia. The area identified 
and applied in Terengganu is the water body of water that is know for harsh weather, thus 
inheritably buffer area that provide and right way for sea traffic and water depth is prevalent 
location consideration of for seaweed farming. Other location ideal for seaweed cultivation 
are areas with absence of larger feeder river systems in its vicinity and reasonable deep 
waters that will ensure stability in its salinity and some degree of shelter protected by 
the chain of island off coast of the area. Such location required to fulfils the prime factors 
for seaweed culture which are suitable water condition and good exchange of seawater. 
Both these two factors can be found in the State of Terengganu especially in the coastal 
area off Setiu. Besides these two factors, the relatively developed infrastructure and logistic 
network in Terengganu are also some of the important supporting factors for this system 
development. 
Data requirement: The study data are collected from specific source and method. The 
right source of data should be chosen to make sure the data are true and valid for this 
study analysis. The data are also obtained from model test, Meteorology Department, JPS 
(Jabatan Pengaliran dan Saliran), Offshore Company and Aquaculture Company.
VLFS: Very Large Floating Structures (VLFSs) or Very Large Floating Platforms (VLPs) 
can be constructed to create floating airports, bridges, breakwaters, piers and docks, 
storage facilities (for oil and natural gas), wind and solar power plants, for military purposes, 
to create industrial space, emergency bases, entertainment facilities such as casinos, 
recreation parks, mobile offshore structures and even for habitation. VLFS for habitation 
could become reality sooner than one may expect. Currently, different concepts have been 
proposed for building floating cities or huge living complexes. The system is constituted by 
vertical tethers. This characteristic makes the structure very rigid in the vertical direction 
and very flexible in the horizontal plane. Both these features results particularly attractive. 
The vertical rigidity helps tie in wells for production, while, the horizontal compliance makes 
the platform intensive primary effect of waves [86].
Pontoon type VLFS are mat-like VLFSs because of their small draft in relation to the 
length dimensions. Very large pontoon type floating structure is often called Mega Floats. As 
a rule, Mega Floats is floating having at least one length dimension greater than 60 meters. 
Horizontally large floating structures can be from 500 to 5000 meters in length and 100 to 
1000 meters in width, while their thickness can be of the order of about 2-10 meters. 
Analysis and design of very large floating structures: Clauss state that in year 1992, 
the analysis and design of floating structures need to account for some special characteristics. 
That statement is valid when comparing to land based structures. In a floating structure, 
the static vertical self weight and pay loads are carried by buoyancy. If a floating structure 
has got a compliant mooring system, consisting for instance of catenaries chain mooring 
lines, the horizontal wave forces are balanced by inertia forces. That shows that if the 
horizontal size of the structure is larger than the wavelength, the resultant horizontal forces 
will be reduced due to the fact that wave forces on different structural parts will have 
different phase which is direction and size.
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The forces in the mooring system will then be small relative to the total wave forces. 
The main purpose of the mooring system is then to prevent drift-off due to steady current 
and wind forces as well as possible steady and slow drift wave forces which are usually 
more than an order of magnitude less than the first order wave forces. Sizing of the floating 
structure and its mooring system depends on its function and also on the environmental 
conditions in terms of waves, current and wind [87]. The design may be dominated either by 
peak loading due to permanent and variable loads or by fatigue strength due to cyclic wave 
loading. Moreover, it is important to consider possible accidental events and ensure that the 
overall safety is not threatened by a possible progressive failure induced by such damage. 
Clauss explain that, unlike land-based constructions with their associated foundations 
poured in place, very large floating structures are usually constructed at shore based building 
sites remote from the deep water installation area and without extensive preparation of the 
foundation. Each module must be capable of floating so that they can be floated to the site 
and assembled in the sea. Owing to the corrosive sea environment, floating structures have 
to be provided with a good corrosion protection system and also possible degradation due 
to corrosion or crack growth (fatigue) requires a proper system for inspection, monitoring, 
maintenance and repair during use. 
Design considerations for mooring structure: The mooring system must be well 
designed to ensure that the very large floating structure is kept in position so that the 
facilities installed on the floating structure can be reliably operated and to prevent the 
structure from drifting away under critical sea conditions and storms [88]. There are a 
number of mooring systems such as the dolphin-guide, frame system, mooring by cable and 
chain, tension leg method and pier/quay wall method.
The design procedure for a mooring system may take the following steps. First select the 
mooring method, the shock absorbing material, the quantity and layout of devices to meet 
the environmental conditions and the operating conditions and requirements. The layout of 
the mooring dolphins for example is such that the horizontal displacement of the floating 
structure is adequately controlled and the mooring forces are appropriately distributed. 
In role of reliability analysis, the behavior of the floating structure under various loading 
conditions is examined. The layout and quantity of the devices are adjusted so that the 
displacement of floating structure and the mooring forces do not exceed the allowable 
values. Finally, the floating structure is designed by applying the design load based on the 
calculated mooring forces. The materials for the mooring system shall be selected according 
to the purpose, environment, durability and economy. 
According to C.W.Lee, the deformation of the mooring line for floating structures can 
happen due to current act. The shapes of the structures change to a considerable degree 
by the water flow and the large tension working on the mooring line of the upper side. The 
degree of deformation of the structures and the tension of the mooring line depend on the 
size of flow speed and materials. The tension of the mooring line on the upper side of the 
tide and waves changes regularly and become higher by a maximum of 250% than when 
only tides works on it.
The seaweed industry
Seaweed farming: Harvesting seaweed from wild population is an ancient practices 
dating back to the fourth and sixth centuries in Japan and China, respectively, but it 
was not until the mid-twentieth century that methods for major seaweed cultivation were 
developed. Since that time, seaweed farming or marine agronomy has grown rapidly due to 
demand that has outpaced the productivity of natural populations. Today almost 90% of 
seaweed for human use comes from cultivation, rather than wild harvests (Zemke-White & 
Ohno).
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Seaweed has traditionally been grown in nearshore coastal waters, with some smaller 
operations on land. Offshore systems which is the focus of this study are an emerging 
seaweed culture technology. The key components of the Chinese seaweed farming industry 
(Chen) and type of Cottonii seaweed or also known as Kappaphycus (Eucheuma spp.). 
Seaweed growth of life cycle: Seaweed life cycles are complex in many species, with 
annual and perennial species and sexual and asexual reproductive modes, resulting in 
isomorphic or heteromorphic life history forms, commonly referred to as alternation of 
generations. Understanding the complex and diverse life cycles of different seaweeds is of 
practical significance in controlling growth and reproduction for optimal plant husbandry. 
An example in which our increased understanding of life cycle had clear economic impact 
was the identification of the conchocelis, originally considered a separate organism, as 
a one of the diploid stages of Porphyra spp. This recovery revolutionized the culture of 
commercially cultivated seaweed in Japan, China, and Korea. The conchocelis become the 
seed stock source for artificial propagation of this seaweed.
The seaweed industry: The global production of all aquaculture products in 2004 was 
59.4 million metric ton with a total value of $70.3 billion. Of this almost a quarter by weight 
but only a tenth by value ($6.8 billion) was aquatic plants, 99.8% of which were farmed in 
Asia and the Pacific Region. Seaweed farms worldwide are estimated to produce 13.9 million 
metric ton wet weight per year.
Seaweed farming has become an economically important natural resource for Malaysia 
since 1978, when it was first introduced to Semporna, east coast of Sabah on a commercial 
scale. It has develop the aquaculture activities in Sabah as a second largest contributor 
from marine aquaculture which produce 60% from total value of exported fisheries product 
at MR$114 million (1994-1997) [89]. It has wide application potentials similar to other 
commodities such as palm oil and cocoa. This has been approved during the Ninth Malaysia 
Plan (2006-2010) and the Third National Policy (1998-2010) with seaweed being mentioned 
specifically as one of the most important aquaculture product of food farming commodities 
for the country. Although the sector of seaweed industry has developed enormously over the 
past few years (111,298 tonnes wet weight in 2008), seaweed production and national target 
on 2010 of 250,000 tonnes (wet weight) is however yet to be achieved [90].
In the Tenth Malaysia Plan, the government estimates to produce 1 million tonnes of 
seaweed by 2015. Consequence from this target, there are many efforts to bring the industry 
of seaweed farming to the Peninsular Malaysia specifically in the east coast area which 
offers high potential to be developed as commercial area for seaweed farming. In contrast, 
east coast of peninsular Malaysia is the area that is exposed directly to the strong sea 
currents and periodic monsoon season which is prevalent off the east coast. Furthermore, 
with the nature elements of the deep and open water environment, seaweed farming is hard 
to be applied in this area. However, Marine System Engineering can deliver system that 
could solve this problem.
Risk analysis: Risk analysis are best used for assessing and evaluating uncertainties 
associated with an event, risk is defined as the potential for loss as a result of a system 
failure and can be measured as a pair of factors, one being the probability of occurrences 
of an event, also called a failure scenario, and the other being the potential outcome or 
consequence associated with the event’s occurrence [91].
A risk assessment is the process used to determine the risk based on the likelihood and 
impact of an event. Failure history through experience (qualitative) and data (quantitative) 
may be used to perform a risk assessment.
Risk analysis is concerned with using available data to determine risk posed by safety 
hazards and usually consists of steps such as scope definition, hazard identification and 
risk determination. The phase in which the decision process is in undated with metrics 
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and judgments is called the risk evaluation. The purpose of analysis is to determine the 
contributory causes and circumstances of the accident as a basis for making recommendation, 
if any, with the aim of preventing similar accidents occurring again.
There are many sources of risk to marine systems including human error, external events, 
equipment failure and installation error [91]. Risk is defined as the product of likelihood of 
occurrence and consequences of an accident. Risk analysis or assessment helps to answer 
basically three questions as shown in Figure 85.
QUESTIONS 
What can go 
wrong?
What are the 
chances that it 
will go wrong?
What are the 
expected 
consequences if it 
does go wrong?
Figure 85: Questions Answered by Risk Assessment or Analysis.
Qualitative analysis relies on statistical methods and data bases that identify the 
probability and consequence. This objective approach examines the system in greater 
detail for risk. Quantitative risk analysis generally provides a more uniform understanding 
among different individuals but requires quality data for accurate results. Qualitative risk 
analysis uses expert opinion to evaluate the probability and consequence. This subjective 
approach may be sufficient to access the risk of a marine system. The qualitative method 
for risk assessment or analysis is designed for the purpose of enhancing one’s awareness 
of potential problems and can assist one in analyzing the risks. A combination of both 
qualitative and quantitative risk analysis can be used depending on the situation. There 
are many methods and technique that have been developed to perform various types of 
analysis, in areas such as reliability and safety. In order to perform risk assessment and 
analysis method, this can be determined by quantitative and qualitative risk analysis tools 
presented in Table 39 below:
Quantitative Methods
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)
Identifies the components (equipment) failure modes and the impact on the surrounding components and the system.
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
Identify combinations of equipment failure and human errors that can result in an accident.
Event Tree Analysis (ETA)
Identify various consequences of events, both failures and successes that can lead to an accident.
Qualitative Methods
ALARP
Possible to demonstrate that the cost involved in reducing the risk further would be grossly disproportionate to the benefit 
gained.
Checklist
Ensures that organizations are complying with standard practice.
Safety/Review Audit
Identify equipment conditions or operating procedures that could lead to a casualty or result in property damage or environment 
impacts.
What-If
Identify hazards, hazardous situations, or specific accident events that could lead to undesirable consequences.
Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP)
Identify system deviations and their causes that can lead to undesirable consequences and determine recommended actions to 
reduce the frequency and/or consequences of the deviations.
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Preliminary Hazard Analysis (PrHA)
Identify and prioritize hazards leading to undesirable consequences early in the life of a system.
Determine recommended actions to reduce the frequency and/or consequences of prioritized hazards.
Table 39: Quantitative and qualitative risk analysis.
FMEA: Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is a powerful tool used by the system 
safety and reliability engineers/analysts to identify critical parts functions and components 
whose failure will lead to undesirable outcome such as production loss, injury or even an 
accidents. The tool was first proposed by NASA in year 1963 for their obvious reliability 
requirements. Since then, it has been extensively used as a powerful technique for safety and 
reliability analysis of products and process in wide range of industries that are particularly 
aerospace, nuclear, automotive and medical.
Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is a method to analyze potential reliability 
problems in the development cycle of the project, making it easier to take actions to overcome 
such issues, enhancing the reliability through design. FMEA is used to determine actions 
to mitigate the analyzed potential failure modes and their effect on the operations. Expected 
failure modes, being the central step in the analysis, needs to be carried on extensively, in 
order to prepare a list of the maximum potential failure modes.FMEA is also a procedure for 
evaluating the various aspects of a system in order to identify all catastrophic and critical 
failure possibilities so that they can be eliminated or minimized through design correction 
at the earliest possible time (MIL-STD-1629A, 1980).
FTA: Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) is a tool for analyzing, visually displaying and evaluating 
failure paths in a system, thereby providing mechanism for effective system level risk 
evaluation. Many people and corporation are already familiar with this tool and use it on 
a regular basis for safety and reliability evaluations, FTA has become an important tool in 
system design and development and history related to the basic should be recorded and 
appropriate people duty recognized. FTA is based on Reliability theory, Boolean algebra and 
probability theory.
Reliability analysis: Reliability analysis methods have been proposed in several studies 
as the primary tool to handle various categories of risks Billinton, Janjic and Popovic. 
Traditionally, the research and the development of reliability analysis methods have focused 
on generation and transmission. However, several studies have shown that most of the 
customer outrages depend on failures at the distribution level (Billinton and Allan; Billinton 
and Sankarakrishnan; Bertling). Furthermore, there is an international tendency towards 
adopt new performance based tariff regulation methods Billinton & Mielczarski.
Hence, reliability of a system can be defined as the system’s ability to fulfil its design 
functions for a specified time. This ability is commonly measured using probabilities. 
Reliability is, represent the probability that the complementary event that will occur will 
leads to failure. Based on this definition, reliability is one of the components of risk. Safety 
can be defined as the judgment of a risk’s acceptability for the system safety, making it a 
component of risk management [91].
Risk analysis in maritime industry: International Maritime Organization state that, 
Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) is a structured and systematic methodology, aimed at 
enhancing maritime safety, including protection of life, health, the marine environment and 
property by using risk analysis and cost benefit assessment. FSA can be used as a tool to 
help in the evaluation of new regulations for maritime safety and protection of the marine 
environment or in making a comparison between existing and possibly improved regulations, 
with a view to achieving a balance between the various technical and operational issues, 
including the human element, and benefit between maritime safety or protection of the 
marine environment and costs.
FSA consists of five steps which are, firstly is identification of hazards that means a 
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list of all relevant accident scenarios with potential causes and outcomes, secondly is 
assessment of risks means that the evaluation of risk factors, thirdly is risk control options 
that is devising regulatory measures to control and reduce the identified risks, fourthly is 
cost benefit assessment which determining cost effectiveness of each risk control option 
and lastly recommendations for decision making conclusion from the information about the 
hazards, their associated risks and the cost effectiveness of alternative risk control options.
The ALARP principle: ALARP (As Low as Reasonably Practicable) is a used in the 
analysis of safety critical and high-integrity systems. The ALARP principle define residual 
risk that shall be as low as reasonably practicable, it has been used for decision support 
for Nuclear Safety Justification, is derived from legal requirements in the UK’s Health & 
Safety at Work Act 1974 and is explicitly defined in the Ionising Radiation Regulations, 
1999. The ALARP principle is part of a safety culture philosophy and means that a risk is 
low enough that attempting to make it lower would actually be more costly than cost lkely 
to come from the risk itself. This is called a tolerable risk. The ALARP principle arises from 
the fact that it would be possible to spend infinite time, effort and money attempting to 
reduce a risk to zero. It should not be understood as simply a quantities measure of benefit 
against detriment. It is more a best common practice of judgement of the balance of a risk 
and societal benefits. 
The meaning and value of the ALARP tolerability risk presented in Figure 86 the triangle 
represents increasing levels of risk for a particular hazardous activity, as we move from the 
bottom of the triangle towards the top.
Figure 86: Levels of Risk and As Low As Is Reasonably Practicable (ALARP).
Offshore industry risk analysis: Traditionally, offshore Quantitative Risk Analyses 
(QRAs) have had a rather crude analysis of barrier performance, emphasizing technical 
aspects related to consequence reducing systems.However, recently the Petroleum Safety 
Authority Norway (PSA) has been focusing on safety barriers and their performance both 
in regulations concerning health, safety and environment (PSA) and in their supervisory 
activities.
The development of offshore Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) has been lead by 
the mutual influence and interaction between the regulatory authorities for the UK and 
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Norwegian waters as well as the oil companies operating in the work sea. Also, other 
countries have participated in this development but to some extent this has often been 
based on the British and Norwegian initiatives according to DNV Consulting Support, GI 
291, Det Norske Veitas AS, 1322 Hovik, Norway.
In more recent times, efforts to protect citizens and natural resources, has make 
governments to be more involved, requiring corporations to employ risk-reducing measures, 
secure certain types of insurance and even, in some cases, demonstrate that they can 
operate with an acceptable level of risk. During the 1980’s and 1990’s more and more 
governmental agencies have required industry to apply risk assessment techniques. For 
instance, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency requires new facilities to describe worst 
case and expected environmental release scenarios as part of the permitting process. Also, 
the United Kingdom requires submittal of Safety Cases which are intended to demonstrate 
the level of risk associated with each offshore oil and gas production facility (ABS Guidance 
Notes on Risk Assessment, 2000)
Offshore rule for offshore structure: The variety of offshore structures concerning the 
function, size, geometrical configuration and material selection as well as the variability 
of the environmental factors complicate the development of a unique design procedure 
(Research Centre Asia Classification Society, 2003). Therefore, the separate investigation of 
the interaction between the actual structure and the environment is necessary.
For mooring system offshore rules use reference documents NI 493 Classfication of Mooring 
System for Permanent Offshore Units. The design and specification of mooring structure for 
offshore aquaculture ocean plantation system must be based on all requirements had listed 
and mention in NI 493 document.
Safety and risk of offshore aquaculture: The EC-JRC International Workshop on 
Promotion of Technical Harmonization on Risk-Based Decision Making (Stresa/Ispra, May 
2000) investigated the use of risk-based decision making across different industries and 
countries. Under the UK safety case regulations (UK Health and Safety Executive, 1992) each 
operator in the UK Sector is required to prepare a Safety Case for each of its installations, 
fixed or mobile, to demonstrate that:
• The management system adequately covers all statutory requirements.
• There are proper arrangements for independent audit of the system.
• The risks of major accidents have been identified and assessed.
• Measures to reduce risks to people to the lowest level reasonably practicable have 
been taken.
• Proper systems for emergency arrangements on evacuation, escape and rescue are 
in place.
Before an installation is allowed to operate, the Safety Case must be formally accepted by 
the Health and Safety Executive (HSE). Like any aquaculture industry, offshore aquaculture 
will benefit from thoughtful site selection. Offshore enterprises should be sited in areas 
that meet optimal biological criteria for species grow-out and minimize user conflicts with 
other established groups. Careful site selection may also ensure the development of offshore 
aquaculture zones or parks to expedite industry development.
Failure of mooring system: It is clearly identified that mooring systems on Floating 
Production Systems are category 1 safety critical systems (Noble Denton Europe Limited). 
Multiple mooring line failure is required to put lives at risk both on the drifting unit and on 
surrounding installations. There is also a potential pollution risk. Research to date indicates 
that there is an imbalance between the critical nature of mooring systems and the attention 
which they receive.
The mooring system failure probability is considerably reduced with increases safety 
factor in particular for system with several parallel loads sharing element. For system with 
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low overall safety factor, the mooring system failure probability is expected to increase 
with increasing in number of lines, whereas for high safety factors, the system failure 
probability is expected to reduce with the increasing number of lines. While for the same 
load distribution and number of lines, a wire system is in general more reliable than a chain 
system with the same overall safety factor.
Material and methods: General idea of the risk and reliability analysis study of offshore 
aquaculture ocean plantation system focus on mooring structure of offshore aquaculture 
systemas well as investigation of the problem, goal and objectives, adavantage, disadvantage, 
limitation, desighnn for environment, data reliabiliuty. Analysis of historical information 
from various sources play mportant role in the outcome of system identification.Flow chart 
and tables and mathematical governing equation are used to present detail of the process 
and procedure. The outcome of risk leads to recommendation for system reliability of future 
work. This study process followed three tiers, preliminary system identification, qualitative 
risk assessment that involves HAZID process and quantitative risk. The process of the 
approach is more elaborated as followed.
Preliminary system assessment and involve the review of past work data collection and 
general requirement for mooring structure. Data of analyses of offshore aquaculture ocean 
plantation mooring system and structure are collected in order to define system, deduce 
system risk areas and reliability areas. 
(HAZID) Hazard Identification qualitative process involves clarification risk. For risk 
analysis had two processes which are qualitative analysis and quantitative analysis. 
Qualitative assessment use HAZOP and checklist, Fault Modes and Effect Analysis (FMEA), 
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA).
Quantitative analysis involves Analytical process that employed hybrid of deterministic, 
statistical, reliability and probabilistic method to redefine system behavior in the past, 
present and future. These use of law physics, help to strength the analysis and support the 
study of the risk and reliability of this system.
In result of each of the tier can lead to risk matrix, ALARP graph Risk Control Option 
(RCO) and cost Effectiveness Analysis.
Since the design of VLFS for seaweed farming is required new methodology based on 
risk, guideline systems for solving a problem with specific components such as phases, 
tasks, methods, technique and tools that are incoroporated are (Irny, S.I. and Rose, A.A, 
2005). It can define as follows:
• The analysis of the principles of method, rules and postulates employed by a discipline.
• The systematic study of methods that are, can be or have been applied within a 
discipline.
• The study of description of methods.
The methodology for this study is shown below in Figure 87.
 
Figure 87: Flow Chart for Research Methodology.
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Safety and Environmental Risk Model (SERM): SERM methology adapted from 
O.O.Sulaiman [92] intend to address risk over the entire life of the complex system. SERM 
address qualitative aspect as well quantitatively accidents frequency and consequences 
VLFS, as shown in Figure 87.
Data: The raw collection data is obtained from specific places and method. The right 
sources should be chosen to make sure the data is reliable and valid for the study analysis. 
Some of the data will be obtained from model test, Meteorology Department, JPS (Jabatan 
Pengaliran dan Saliran), Offshore Company, Aquaculture Company and last but not least 
Seaweed Block System SBS Project in Setiu, Terengganu and Sabah.
Data analysis: The raw collection data is obtained from specific places and method. The 
right sources should be chosen to make sure the data is reliable and valid for the study 
analysis. Some of the data will be obtained from model test, Meteorology Department, JPS 
(Jabatan Pengaliran dan Saliran), Offshore Company, Aquaculture Company and last but 
not least Seaweed Block System SBS Project in Setiu, Terengganu and Sabah.
• Qualitative risk assessment and analysis method
• System Defination
• Qualitative Assessment
• Tools emlloyed for qualitative assessment are describe below:
• Checklist 
This is qualitative approach to insure the organization is complying with standard 
practice. The checklist can be used as a preparation for system design, deployment, 
maintenance and monitoring to avoid unnecessary problems and delays. The checklist 
included in the International Safety Management (ISM) procedures as documentation about 
checks for maintenance can be adopted for this study. The list can be filled in manually or 
printout electronically.
Checklist analysis is a systematic evaluation against pre-established criteria in the form 
of one or more checklists. It is applicable for high-level or detailed-level analysis and is used 
primarily to provide structure for interviews, documentation reviews and field inspections 
of the system being analyzed. The technique generates qualitative lists of conformance and 
non-conformance determinations with recommendations for correcting non-conformances.
Checklist analysis is frequently used as a supplement to or integral part of another method 
especially what-if analysis to address specific requirements. The quality of evaluation is 
determined primarily by the experience of people creating the checklists and the training 
of the checklist users. The checklist analysis used most often to guide inspection of critical 
systems. It is also used as a supplement to or integrates part of another method, especially 
what-if analysis to address specific requirements. 
Procedures for Checklist Analysis,
• Define the activity or system of interest
• Define the problems of interest for the analysis
• Subdivide the activity or system for analysis
• Create relevant checklists
• Respond to the checklist questions
• Further subdivide the elements of the activity or system (if necessary or otherwise 
useful)
• Use the results in decision making
Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP): A hazard and Operability (HAZOP) study is 
a qualitative risk analysis technique that is used to identify weaknesses and hazards in a 
processing facility or system; it is normally used in the planning phase (design). The HAZOP 
technique was originally developed for chemical processing facilities, but it can also be used 
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for other facilities and systems. For example, it is widely used in Norway in the oil and gas 
industry.
A HAZOP study is a systematic analysis of how deviation from the design specifications 
in a system can arise and an analysis of the risk potential of these deviations.Based on 
a set of guidewords, scenarios that may result in a hazard or an operational problem are 
identified. The following guidewords are commonly used: no/not, more of/less of as well as, 
part of reverse and other than. The guidewords are related to process conditions, activities, 
materials, time and place. The question would be Figure 88:
• What must happen to ensure the occurrence of the deviation no throughput (cause)?
• Is such an event possible (relevance/probability)?
• What are the consequences of no throughput (consequence)?
As a support in the work of formulating meaningful questions based on the guidewords, 
special forms have been developed. The principle that is used in a HAZOP study can be 
illustrated in the following way:
Guidewords 
Deviation Consequences Causes 
Figure 88: HAZOP study is a systematic analysis.
In HAZOP study, critical aspects of the design can be identified, which requires further 
analysis. Detailed, quantitative reliability and risk analyses will often be generated after that. 
A HAZOP study of a planned plant or system will, in the same way as an FMEA, normally 
be most useful if the analysis is undertaken after the System Operation and Monitoring 
have been worked out. It is at this point in time that sufficient information about the way 
the plant is to be operated is available. A HAZOP study is a time and resource demanding 
method. Nevertheless, the method has been widely used in connection with the review of the 
design of process system for a safer, more effective and reliable system. 
Quantitative risk assessment and analysis method
Hazard identification: Hazard identification (HAZID) and risk assessment involves a 
critical sequence of information gathering and the application of a decision-making process. 
These assist in discovering what could possibly cause a major accident (hazard identification), 
how likely it is that a major accident would occur and the potential consequences (risk 
assessment) and what options there are for preventing and mitigating a major accident 
(control measures). These activities should also assist in improving operations and 
productivity and reduce the occurrence of incidents and near misses. The flowchart below 
summarises all the steps needed in a HAZID process. 
Major accidents by their nature are rare events, which may be beyond the experience 
of many employers. These accidents tend to be low frequency, high consequence events as 
illustrated in Figure 1 below. However, the circumstances or conditions that could lead to a 
major accident may already be present, and the risks of such incidents should be proactively 
identified and managed. Figure 89 shows the HAZID flowchart for typical rare events.
In assessing safety systems, towards deduction of option to mitigate the effects of 
external hazards, the assessor should have due regard to Reliability, redundancy, diversity 
and segregation.External hazards may particularly give rise to common mode or common 
cause failures. 
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Failure Modes and Effect Analysis (FMEA): A Failure Modes and Effects Analysis 
(FMEA) is a procedure in product development and operations management for analysis of 
potential failure modes within a system for classification risk i2by the severity and likelihood 
of the failures. A successful FMEA activity helps a team to identify potential failure modes 
based on past experience with similar products or processes, enabling the team to design 
those failures out of the system with the minimum of effort and resource expenditure, 
thereby reducing development time and costs. It is widely used in manufacturing industries 
in various phases of the product life cycle and is now increasingly finding use in the service 
industry. Failure modes are any errors or defects in a process, design or item, especially 
those that affect the intended function of the product and or process and can be potential 
or actual. Effects analysis refers to studying the consequences of those failures. The Figure 
89 and 90 below shows FMEA process toward determining the Risk Priority Number (RPN).
 
Figure 89: HAZID rare events process and HAZID events process.
 
Figure 90: Risk1 Priority Number.
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The RPN (Risk Priority Number) is the product of Severity, Occurrence and Detection 
(RPN = S x O x D) and is often used to determine the relative risk of a FMEA line item. In 
the past, RPN has been used to determine when to take action.RPN should not be used this 
way. RPN is a technique for analyzing the risk associated with potential problems identified 
during a Failure Mode and Effects Analysis. RPN=Severity Rating x Occurrences Rating x 
Detection Rating, is the formula used in FMEA. FMEA procedures are:
Define the system and its performance requirements:
• State all assumptions and ground rules that will be used in the analysis.
• Develop block diagrams of the system and identify possible failure modes for example 
breaking, cracking, snap weather and others.
• Identify cause of each failure mode.
• Determine impact of every possible failure mode on the operation of affected items, 
items of subsequent assemblies, and the total system.
• List the possible symptoms of all failures and the means used to detect the failure.
• Assign a severity ranking to each failure mode.
• Assign an occurrence ranking to each failure mode for example estimate of the 
probability of the failure based on actual event occurence.
• For each potential failure mode, perform a criticality analysis.
• Evaluate and recommend any corrective actions and improvements to the design.
Fault Tree Analysis (FTA): Fault tree analysis (FTA) is a top down, deductive failure 
analysis in which an undesired state of a system is analyzed using Boolean logic to combine 
a series of lower-level events. This analysis method is mainly used in the field of safety 
engineering and Reliability engineering to determine the probability of a safety or accident 
or a particular system level (functional) failure.
In Aerospace the more general term system. Failure Condition is used for the undesired 
state v Top event of the fault tree. These conditions are classified by the severity of their 
effects. The most severe conditions require the most extensive fault tree analysis. These 
system Failure Conditions and their classification are often previously determined in the 
functional Hazard analysis. FTA can be used to:
Understand the logic leading to the top event/undesired state.
Show compliance with the (input) system safety/reliability requirements.
Prioritize the contributors leading to the top event-Creating the Critical Equipment/
Parts/Events lists for different importance measures.
Monitor and control the safety performance of the complex system (e.g. is it still safe to 
fly an Aircraft if fuel valve x is not working? For how long is it allowed to fly with this valve 
stuck closed?).
Minimize and optimize resources. Assist in designing a system. The FTA can be used as 
a design tool that helps to create (output/lower level) requirements.
Function as a diagnostic tool to identify and correct causes of the top event. It can help 
with the creation of diagnostic manuals/processes.
Many different approaches can be used to model a FTA but the most common and 
popular way can be summarized in a few steps. Remember that a fault tree is used to 
analyze a single fault event and that one and only one event can be analyzed during a single 
fault tree. Even though the fault may vary dramatically, a FTA follows the same procedure 
for an event, be it a delay of 0.25 msec for the generation of electrical power, or the random, 
unintended launch of an (Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles) ICBM. FTA analysis involves 
five steps:
Define the undesired event to study: Definition of the undesired event can be very hard 
to catch, although some of the events are very easy and obvious to observe. An engineer 
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with a wide knowledge of the design of the system or a system analyst with an engineering 
background is the best person who can help define and number the undesired events. 
Undesired events are used then to make the FTA, one event for one FTA, no two events will 
be used to make one FTA.
Obtain an understanding of the system: Once the undesired event is selected, all causes 
with probabilities of affecting the undesired event of 0 or more are studied and analyzed. 
Getting exact numbers for the probabilities leading to the event is usually impossible for the 
reason that it may be very costly and time consuming to do so.Computer software is used 
to study probabilities; this may lead to less costly system analysis.
Systems analysts can help with understanding the overall system. System designers 
have full knowledge of the system and this knowledge is very important for not missing any 
cause affecting the undesired event. For the selected event all causes are then numbered 
and sequenced in the order of occurrence and then are used for the next step which is 
drawing or constructing the fault tree.
Construct the fault tree: After selecting the undesired event and having analyzed 
the system to know all the causing effects (and if possible their probabilities) we can now 
construct the fault tree. Fault tree is based on AND and OR gates which define the major 
characteristics of the fault tree.
Evaluate the fault tree: After the fault tree has been assembled for a specific undesired 
event, it is evaluated and analyzed for any possible improvement. This step is as an 
introduction for the final step which will be to control the hazards identified. In short, in 
this step it is not required to identify all possible hazards affecting the system in a direct or 
indirect way the system.
Control of the hazards identified: This step is very specific and differs largely from one 
system to another but the main point will always be that after identifying the hazards all 
possible methods are pursued to decrease the probability of occurrence Figure 91.
Fault trees are developed using gate and events symbols. A gate may have only one input 
and one or more outputs. Dhillon and Kapur have defined the following common gate and 
event symbols for use in FTA.
 
Figure 91: Control of the hazards identified.
• OR Gate: used when output event occurs when one or more input events occur.
• AND Gate: used when output event occurs when all input events occur.
• Priority AND Gate: like AND gate but input events occur in a specified order.
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• Exclusive OR Gate: used when output occurs when one and only one of the input 
events occur.
• Delay Gate: used when output event occurs after a specified time delay.
• Inhibit Gate: used when output event occurs based on a conditional event occurring.
• M-out-of-N Gate: used when output event occurs based on an m out of n input events 
occurring.
• Resultant Event: used to represent an event resulting from some combination of 
preceding fault events.
• Basic Fault Event: used to represent failure of component or subsystem.
• Incomplete Event: used to represent a fault event whose cause has not yet been 
determined.
• Conditional Event: used to represent the condition associated with an Inhibit gate.
• Trigger or Switch Event: used to examine special cases by forcing events to occur or 
by forcing them not to occur.
Equation for FTA:
ab = ba     (cumulative law)
a + b = b + a     (cumulative law)
(a + b) + c = a + (b + c) = a + b + c  (associative law)
(ab) c = a (bc) = abc    (associative law)
a (b + c) = ab + ac    (distributive law)
Quantitative risk analysis for very large floating structure for offshore aquaculture 
structure
Failure probability: A mooring device is failed when the mooring reaction force W, due 
to oscillation of the floating structure, exceeds the yield strength R. The floating structure 
drifts when all its mooring devices are failed.Failure of a mooring device indicates presence 
of an event satisfying the following condition:
TtRXtWtZ kkk ≤≤>−= 00);()(               (1)
Where X is natural condition parameters, T duration of the natural condition parameters 
and Rk the random variable for the final yield strength of mooring device k, X and Rk are 
independent of each other.
The probability of a multi-point mooring system being failed by strong wind and waves 
in specified service life is given by the following equations: 
f i k
m
K k K k
k 1
P (T) dx dr
Pr ob Z (t) 0,0 t T X x ,R r
=
=
 
> ≥ ≥ = = 
 
∫∫

                          (2)
Where Prob [A|B=C] is the probability of under the condition of B=C and fx(x) and fR(r) 
are probability density functions of natural condition parameters and final yield strength of 
mooring device, respectively. Using the extreme-value distribution of the annual maximum 
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values as the distribution of natural condition parameters, we define the annual reliability 
as follows:
( ) 1 ( )fR T P T= −                                                                                         (3)
The total reliability for years of service life is approximated by the following equation:
( ) ( )1 ( ) NN fR T P T= −                                         (4)
Estimation of failure probability
The governing equation for oscillation of the floating structure is defined as follows:
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where : displacement vector of horizontal plane response of the floating structure; 
Mij: inertia matrix of the floating structure; Mij(∞) added mass matrix at the infinite 
frequency; Fv: viscous damping coefficient vector; Lij: Memory influence function; FM: 
Mooring reaction force vector; FWind: Wind load vector, F1 and F2: first and second wave 
force vectors respectively.
Estimation wave force: Wave force vector is generally expressed as the sum of linear 
wave force proportional to wave height and the slowly varying drift force proportional to the 
square of the wave height.See the equation below.
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Where h1 (T)h2(T1,T2) are the vectors of impulse response function of wave force. ζ (t) is the 
time series of surface elevation of incident waves.
Estimation of risk of current load: Floating structure and the pressure drag for the 
lateral walls. Average wind velocity distribution on the horizontal plane is assumed uniform.
The velocity profile in the perpendicular direction expressed using the logarithmic rule.For 
the fluctuating wind velocity, the mainstream direction (average wind velocity direction) is 
the sole element of consideration. The power spectrum of fluctuating current load is given 
in the following equation that considers spatial correlation:
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The spatial correlation is defined as follows:
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Where ρa: air density, U: average wind velocity, dA: area element of the floating structure 
surface, Cd: drag coefficient, S (f): power spectrum of fluctuating wind, x: coordinate in the 
main stream direction of plane element, y: coordinate at right angles to the mainstream 
direction of plane element, k1: spatial correlation coefficient at right angles to the mainstream 
and k2: spatial correlation coefficient in the direction of mainstream.
Estimation natural environmental condition: Assuming yield strength R is a 
deterministic value and wave height and others are a function of wind velocity, in equation 
as given below. This enables us to calculate annual initial failure probability from the 
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distribution of the conditional failure probability and the distribution of the probability of 
annual maximum current velocity.
f 10 10 10B
P P T U f (U )dU
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Where P [T| is conditional initial failure probability during duration time T and f (U10) 
probability density function for annual maximum wind velocity. The lowest value B for 
integration varies with which extreme value distribution the conditional failure probability 
is approximated by the equation. 
Assessment of functional and serviceability: Modern safety criteria for marine structures 
are expressed by limit states as indicate in the Table 40 below and are briefly outlined in the 
following. This will be applied to stages of risk and reliability assessment and analyzing the 
system required.
Limit State Description Remarks
Ultimate (ULS)
Overall structure stability.
Ultimate strength of structure.
Ultimate strength of mooring system.
(Not relevant for VLFS)
Component design check
Fatigue Failure of joint-normal welded joins in hull and mooring system.
Component design check depending 
on residual system strength after 
fatigue failure.
Accidental collapse 
(ALS)
Ultimate capacity of damaged structure (due to fabrication 
defects or accident loads) or operational error. System design check
Serviceability (SLS)
Structure fails its serviceability if the criteria of the (SLS) are 
not met during the specified service life and with the required 
reliability
Disruption of normal use due to 
excessive deflection, deformation, 
motion or vibration.
Table 40: Safety Criteria (e.g. ISO,) [87].
Expected result from quantitative analysis: The expected results of this study analysis 
are declared from based on the methodologies applied to the study analysis. In Figure 92 
it is expected to obtain the probability of exceedance of the mooring reaction relative to 
average current velocity.
Figure 92: Graph of quantitative analysis.
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The Figure 93 shows example of the extreme value distribution of annual maximum 
current velocities graph based on natural environmental condition that shows below.
Figure 93: The extreme value distribution of annual maximum current velocities graph.
In Figure 94 expected require conditional failure probabilities and mean current reliability 
could be obtained. 
 
Figure 94: The conditional failure probabilities and mean current reliability.
Figure 95 shows expected result for variation of failure probability to a number of 
mooring on the system.
131
Figure 95: The variation of failure probability to a number of mooring on the system.
The expected results will help to make discussion and decision to make sure the study 
analysis achieve the objectives required. Other relevant plot of the result will be produced.
8. Qualitative Method for Antifouling Long Life Paint for Marine 
Facilities or System
Abstract
Fouling is a major problem to shipping industry.Hull fouling reduces the fuel efficiency 
and speed of affected ships, increase in frequency of ship dry dockings, reduces propeller 
efficiency and accelerated corrosion rate. Antifouling paints are used to coat the underwater 
area of ships to prevent organisms such as algae and molluscs attaching themselves to the 
hull of the ship. As a result, antifouling paints which are alternatives to TBT systems such 
as Controlled Depletion Systems (CDPs), Tin-Free Self-Polishing Copolymers (tin-free SPCs) 
and foul release systems were developed in marine industry. However, most of these paints 
cannot last for long because misapplication. Paint is not a finished product until it has been 
applied and dried on an appropriate substrate at the designed performance film thickness. 
High performance paint systems are especially sensitive to misapplication and knowledge 
of the paint characteristics. Also recommended film thickness is vital to obtain optimum 
results to improve paints performance and reduce maintenance cost. Therefore, proper 
application is critical to the performance of the paint system. This paper presents the result 
of study made on the problems of fouling on ship hull structures and deduced a qualitative 
model for ship paints application in order to prolong the life span of antifouling paint.
Keywords: Antifouling; Application; Hull Fouling; Paint; Qualitative
Introduction
Performance of ships depends on their speed and power generated. Like wise, economic 
and efficiency of ship operation is achieved at optimum speed, power and according to 
frequency of dry docking of ship. Hull fouling poses a lot of hindrances to design power and 
efficiency of ship. Fouling refer to the accumulation of unwanted material on solid surfaces 
in an aquatic environment. The fouling material can consist of either living organisms 
(biofouling) or a non-living substance (inorganic or organic). 
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Marine fouling is a perennial problem for vessels, ports and anything kept in the sea for a 
period of time. The sea is teeming with the tiny larvae of marine organisms that swim around 
until they find somewhere to settle and grow. Smooth surfaces are particularly attractive to 
many of these creatures, and are quickly encrusted. This slow down ships in seaways, block 
pipes and speed up corrosion. This study focuses on the problems of ship hull fouling which 
hull fouling reduces fuel efficiency and speed of affected ships, consequently increases their 
operating costs due to the increase in frequency of ship dry docking.It also reduces propeller 
efficiency [93,94] and accelerates corrosion [95].
In order to lessen hull fouling, antifouling paints are used to coat the bottoms of ships to 
prevent organisms such as algae and molluscs attaching themselves to the hull,that result to 
the slowing down of the ship and thus increasing fuel consumption. The new IMO convention 
defines antifouling systems as a coating, paint, surface treatment, surface or device that is 
used on a ship to control or prevent attachment of unwanted organism. Biocidal anti-fouling 
paints have been applied to the bottoms of ships for decades. The paints slowly leach into the 
water, killing anything attached to the ship hull but leachates have been found to accumulate 
in harbors and the sea.
Among all the different solutions proposed throughout the history of navigation, Tributyltin 
(TBT) paints have been one of the most effective deterrents to hull fouling organisms, but studies 
have linked TBT accumulations to deformations in oysters and sex changes in whelks. As a 
result, restrictions on the usage of TBT in vessels were imposed. The International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) adopted the Antifouling Systems (AFS) Convention in 2001. The Convention 
called for a global ban on the application of TBT-based antifouling paints by 1st January 2003 
and the prohibition of the presence of such paints on the surface of vessels by 1st January 
2008. National bans on the use of the TBT paint will result in an increased hull fouling, unless 
environmentally friendly replacement paints are accepted by the shipping industry.
The paint industry has been urged to develop environmental friendly TBT-free products able 
to replace the TBT-based paint that yield the same economic benefits and cause less harmful 
effects on the environment. There are Controlled Depletion Systems (CDPs) and tin-free self-
polishing copolymers (tin-free SPCs).CDPs are upgrade of traditional soluble matrix technology 
by means of modern reinforcing resins.The reaction mechanisms are assumed to be equivalent 
to those of conventional rosin-based AF paints. The tin-free SPCs are designed for the same 
reaction mechanisms with sea water as Tributyltin Self-Polishing (TBT-SPC) paints.
There is another type of antifouling paint that may replace the TBT-based antifouling paints 
which is foul release systems. Foul release systems are non-toxic and made of silicone elastomers 
of low surface energy. This low surface energy inhibits the ability of fouling organisms to attach 
strongly to the surface. Paint is not a finished product until it has been applied and dried on an 
appropriate substrate at the designed performance film thickness. When the paint is applied to 
the exterior layer to a ship hull, it is subject to a variety of parameters that can degrade the paint 
and reduce its useful life-span. These parameters need to be taken into consideration during 
ship paints application. Thus, ship paints application procedures are very important in order 
to enhance the performance or quality of antifouling paints. The parameters which need to be 
considered during application of the paints to the ship hull include surface preparation, paint 
application, paint materials, curing time, environmental conditions, locations, personal quality, 
inspections and others.
The performance of any paint coating depends on the correct and thorough preparation of 
the surface prior to coating. The most expensive and technologically advanced coating system 
will fail if the surface preparation is incorrect or incomplete. Additionally, methods of applying 
the paints are by brush, roller, conventional (air) spray, conventional (pressure pot) spray and 
airless spray. Although the application methods are very important, the application technique 
or skills of personnel also play a vital role. When applying marine paints the most important 
factors to consider are the condition of the substrate, the surface temperature, and the 
atmospheric conditions at the time of painting. Appropriate ship paint materials can effectively 
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prevent attachment or accumulation of fouling on the ship hull bottom.Furthermore, inspection 
by the coating inspector is necessary to make sure the coating is properly applied. 
This study seeks to examine the related issues of Antifouling (AF) paints, ship paints 
application and aims to deduce fouling prevention systems and enhance the performance 
of antifouling paints. This includes the study of biology of the fouling process, historical 
development of AF paints and also the proper way for ship paints application. The historical 
description leads to a discussion of Tributyltin (TBT)-based systems, tin-free biocide-based and 
non-toxic alternatives replacements. Proper paint application is critical to the performance of 
the paint system. This study will use historical data of antifouling paints to determine the 
parameters for ship paints application. Finally, a qualitative model for ship paint application to 
enhance the performance of antifouling paints is deduced.
Methodology
The model design is for the ship paint application procedure. This is produced through 
interview carried out with the ship yard personal in MMHE and M-Set. Data are collected from 
Painting and Blasting Department, reviewed about ship painting process and interview with the 
Classification Society and Paint Maker in order to get the further information. This is to make 
sure the procedure is compliance with the standard and IMO requirement. Data is analysed by 
considering the whole ship painting process and how the ship painting procedure is carried out 
according to the standard. And the analysis leads to deduce a qualitative model for ship paint 
application procedure.
Results and Discussion
The model is produced with the intention of giving a guideline for all level of personnel on the 
standard of workmanship in the ship repair division, especially, the blasting and painting parts 
in order to satisfy ship owners and classification societies. This model indicates the elements 
accuracy to be kept in the process of blasting and painting repairs or modifications and the 
finished quality obtained.
The model is developed from several references, historical data and case study related to 
antifouling paints. The model can serves as a guideline of the standard of workmanship for 
painting process that mitigates fouling of ships hull. The quality of the end product relies on the 
whole ship paint application process. Thus, we must always keep in mind that Quality is built 
in the process, not in the inspection.
Existing flow chart for ship paint application Figure 96: 
Step 1: Vessel comes into dock. 
Step 2: Hull Cleaning 
Step 3: Salt Test 
(30p.p.m) 
Step 4: Shipowner marks out corroded area for blasting 
and discussion with shipyard personnel and executive. 
Step 5: Hull Blasting 
Step 6: Blast profile 
inspection 
Step 7: Paint Coating Application 
No 
No 
Figure 96: Flow chart for ship paint application.
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From the existing ship paint application above, I found the gaps to improve the existing 
procedure. The improved ship paint application flow chart is showed in Figure. This flow 
chart can make the paint application becomes more efficient.
Improved flow chart for ship paint application Figure 97:
Step 1: Vessel comes into dock. 
Step 3: Hull Cleaning 
Step 4: Salt Test 
(30p.p.m) 
Step 5: Shipowner marks out corroded area for blasting 
and discussion with shipyard personnel and executive. 
Step 6: Hull Blasting 
Step 7: Blast profile 
inspection 
Step 8: Paint Coating Application 
No 
No 
Step 2: Underwater hull cleaning assessment 
Figure 97: Improve Flow chart for ship paint application.
From the improved ship paint application flow chart above, I have added one step from 
the previous flow chart in order to optimize the existing procedure. This improved flow chart 
can make the paint application become more comprehensive, concise and efficiency.
Vessel comes into dock: Since it is a class requirement, for each vessel needs to come 
into dock to undergo the bottom survey inspection of its underwater area every two and 
half years.Vessel will be put in the dry dock upon arrival in the shipyard. The vessel will be 
moored into the dock and when it had successfully sat on the keel blocks, the water in the 
dock will be pumped dry.
Underwater hull pre-cleaning assessment: The step for the inspection process is 
to conduct an underwater assessment of the fouling growth that has occurred since the 
last inspection and evaluate the coating condition. This will be completed before any hull 
cleaning is performed. Normally, ship hull can be divided into 6 quadrants as showed in 
Figure 98. The six quadrants are: I-starboard forward, II-starboard aft, III-port aft, IV-port 
forward, V-starboard waterline and VI-port waterline.
 
Figure 98: Hull quadrants [96].
Fouling assessment: Fouling growth on each boat hull will be evaluated on a 0-5 scale. 
0 represents the optimal condition and 5 the worst condition. Table 41 determines the 
numeric ratings and provides a description of what type of fouling growth is associated with 
each rating. The paint maker’s inspector will record the fouling rating for each quadrant and 
provide any additional observations or comments, such as noting the type of fouling present 
on the hull surface.
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*0 is best condition, 5 is worst condition, ** Coral is the local term used for limestone 
tubes of worms that grow on the coating’s surface.
Rating Fouling Growth
0 No silting, biofilm or fouling growth present.
1 Light silting or biofilm. Little to no discoloration; Paint surface still clearly visible beneath.
2 Heavy biofilm; Light to moderate silting as indicated by discoloration (a solid, discernible, physical layer); Painted surface may be slightly obscured.
3 Low to medium levels of fouling present; Dark algae impregnation; Hard growth may be present (tubeworms, barnacles, bryozoans, etc.); Painted surface definitely obscured.
4
Medium to high levels of fouling present; Hard growth present, such as tubeworms, barnacles, bryozoans, etc.; 
Macrofoulers may include mature forms that may be densely grouped; Paint surface no longer visible beneath 
fouling in areas.
5
High levels of fouling present; Lengthy, soft algae and hard, tube worms and possibly barnacles impregnating 
the coatings; Macrofoulers may be densely grouped; Coral** growth can be seen to extend out from the hull; 
Paint surface no longer visible beneath fouling.
Table 41: Fouling rating scale.
Coating condition assessment: Coating condition for the entire hull need to be evaluated 
based on Table 42 which identifies the rating scale of coating condition. The colour of undercoat 
also need to be recorded when the coating was applied to the ship hull. Ratings of 1-3 represent 
antifouling painted surface appearance associated with normal physical wear due to underwater 
cleaning action or hydrodynamic effects. Ratings 4 and 5 indicate either excessive cleaning 
actions or blistering due to internal failure of the paint system. 
Rating Coating Description
1 Antifouling paint intact, new or slick finish. May have a mottled pattern of light and dark portions of the original paint colour.
2 Shine is gone or surface lightly etched. No physical failures.
3
Physical failure on up to 20% of hull. Coating may be missing from slightly curved or flat areas to expose 
underlying coating.Coating has visible swirl marks within the outermost layer, not extending into any 
underlying layers of paint.
4
Physical failure of coating on 20-50% of bottom. Coating missing from slightly curved or flat areas to expose 
underlying coating.Coating missing from intact blisters or blisters which have ruptured to expose underlying 
coating layer(s). Visible swirl marks expose dunderlying coating layer.
5 Physical failure of coating on over 50% of bottom. Coating missing from intact blisters or blisters which have ruptured to expose the underlying coating layer(s).Visible swirl marks exposed underlying coating layer.
Table 42: Coating condition rating scale.
Surface preparation: Good surface preparation is one of the most important process of 
the entire coating procedures, as great percentage of coating failures are usually associated 
with poor surface preparation. All paint systems will fail prematurely if the surface 
preparation is not done according to standard procedures requirement. If contaminants 
such as loose rusts, oil, grease, dirt, salts, chemicals, dusts, etc are not removed completely 
from the surface intended for coating, the paint adhesiveness as well as cohesiveness and its 
quality would be affected. Osmotic blistering would also occur resulting in premature failure 
of the coating in service. There is no paint system that would give optimum performance 
result over a poorly prepared steel surface. 
Hull cleaning: There are various methods available for cleaning and preparing steel 
surfaces prior to painting. The choice and methods of surface preparation would depend 
on the location where the intended area of the vessel is required and the availability of 
equipment to be used. Hull cleaning includes hard scrap and fresh water washing. Hard 
scraping shall be carried out to remove slimes, weeds, shells, barnacles, etc. Besides that, 
approved detergents shall be used to remove any oil or grease present on the hull.
Hull cleaning standard by fresh water: Surface preparation by using fresh water can be 
divided into 4 levels. Table 43 is the levels or categories for fresh water surface preparation:
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Fresh Water Washing/Pressure Cleaning Quality
Low Pressure Water Washing
Pressure: Less than 68 bar (1000 psi) It can remove surface salts, dust and loose surface debris.
High Pressure Water Washing
Pressure:Between 68-680 bar (1000-
10000psi)
For 68-204 bar (1000-3000 psi)
It can remove salts, dirt, loose coatings and leached layer of antifouling coatings.
For 204-680 bar (3000-10000psi)
It can perform selective removal of coatings and intact coatings.
Fresh Water Washing/Pressure Cleaning Quality
High Pressure Hydro-Blasting (Water-
Jetting)
Pressure: Between 680-1700 bar (10000-
25000 psi)
It can remove all existing old paint or heavy rust. It scales to WJ 3 (Water jetting 
standards NACE 5/ SSPC-SP 12) to a uniform matt finish with at least two 
thirds of the surface being free of all visible residues (except mill scale) and the 
remaining one-third containing only randomly dispersed stains of previously 
existing rust, coatings and foreign matter.
Ultra High Pressure Hydro-Blasting (Water 
Jetting)
Pressure: Above 1700 bar (25000 psi), but 
normally 2000-2800 bar (30000-40000psi)
It can remove all existing old paint or heavy rust. It scales to WJ 2 hydro jetting 
standard of uniform matt finish with at least 95% of the surface area being free 
of all previously existing visible residues and the 5% containing only randomly 
dispersed stains of rust, coating and foreign matter.
Table 43: Categories for fresh water surface preparation.
Salt test: The purpose of carrying out the salt test is to prevent coating failure due to 
effects of salt elements on the surface before coating. In order to prevent the defect, salt test 
is carried out to measure the level of salt and to make sure that salt content is at minimum 
level. Normally, salt test is carried out by using Bresle kit sampler. Figure 99 showed the 
flow chart of salt test measurement by Bresle kit sample.
 
Remove protective backing and foam centre from Bresle Patch and apply to 
the hull surface, press firmly around the perimeter of the patch to ensure a 
complete seal. 
 
Syringe with 3 ml of deionised water is inserted into the patch through 
spongy foam perimeter and inject 1.5 ml of deionised water into patch and 
do not remove syringe, reposition needle and evacuate any air in the patch. 
Once air has been removed, inject remaining 1.5 ml of water and removed 
the syringe from the patch. Surface of patch is then rubbed gently for 10 to 
15 seconds to allow water to dissolve surface contaminants. 
 
Syringe is then inserted into the patch and extract the solution from patch. 
Salt content will be measured by salt-meter. Acceptable salt reading should 
not exceed 30 p.p.m.  
 
Figure 99: Hull quadrants [96].
Condition of ship hull (side shell area) prior to grit blasting: Next, the Owner’s 
representative will mark out the corroded area for blasting based on rust grade and shall 
discuss it with the Yard’s Painting executive. There are four types of rust condition using 
Swedish Standard which listed in Table 4. When all parties had agreed on the total blast 
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area and the blasting grade, a Proposed Side Shell Blasting and Painting Area shall be 
signed and endorsed Figure 100.
 
 
Steel surface largely covered with adhering mill scale with little, if 
any rust. 
Rust Grade A 
 
Steel surface has begun to rust and from which mill scale has 
begun to flake. 
Rust Grade B 
 
Steel surface on which the mill scale has rusted away or from 
which it can be scraped, but with slight pitting visible under 
normal vision. 
Rust Grade C 
 
Steel surface on which the mill scale has rusted away and on 
which pitting is visible under normal vision. 
Rust Grade D 
 
Figure 100: Hull quadrants [96].
Shipyard shall draw up a work schedule based on the agreed areas and instruct the 
blasting contractor to proceed with the blasting works. The blasting time of inspection is 
usually divided into two sessions, once before noon and another late in the evening. This is 
to allow sufficient time for the blasters to produce a larger blast area so that when the paint 
is mixed and applied; there will not be much wastage for the coverage.
Grit blasting: Grit blasting is the commonly used method for preparing a surface for 
the application of paint. When properly carried out, grit blasting can remove old paint, rust, 
salts, fouling, etc., and provides a good mechanical key (blast profile) for the new coating. 
Copper grit is one of the blast media widely used for blasting in shipyard and is obtained 
as cooper slag waste from melting the copper metal at a very high temperature. It is a by-
product and is often referred to as hard coarse-grained silicieous sandstone. This is the base 
for grit and can be found or prepared in different sizes for different types of blasting known 
as grit blasting. It usually comes is sizes ranging from 830cc (meshes) and 1030cc but most 
shipyard prefers the former over the latter because of its coarseness and larger size in order 
to achieve a higher blast profile on the steel substrate. Besides that, it is important that the 
correct blast profile is achieved before the substrate is coated. Paint manufacturers should 
specify the blast profile for each coating, in terms of the pattern required for that paint. 
The instrument to measure the blast profile is called Blast Profile gauge and the reading is 
in micron. In general, thicker coatings will require a profile with a greater peak to trough 
measurement than a thin coating. 
Blast cleaning standard: The most commonly referred standards are Steel Structure 
Painting Council (SSPC), National Association of Corrosion Engineers (NACE) and Swedish 
138
Standards or International Standards Organization (ISO). Each standard is divided into four 
standards of cleanliness, broadly described as; brush off, commercial, near white metal and 
white metal. Whilst each standard may be differ slightly in requirements and terminology.
The Table 44 indicates the grades for steel surfaces using blast cleaning. 
Brush Off Commercial Near-White Metal White Metal
SSPC SP 7 SP 6 SP 10 SP 5
NACE No. 4 No. 3 No. 2 No. 1
SWEDISH Sa. 1 Sa. 2 Sa. 2½ Sa. 3
Table 44: Preparation grades for steel surfaces using blast cleaning.
Blast profile: The correct blast profile is very important prior to painting. If the blast 
profile is produced too high, an inadequate coating coverage will result over any high and 
sharp peaks and this could lead to premature coating breakdown. However, grit blasting can 
also result in an insufficient surface profile and may simply redistribute contamination over 
the steel surface trapping contaminants under the surface. The blast profile measurement 
method by the testex profile tape is as below Figure 101:
 
Tear out one piece of the testex profile tape, remove the protective cover and 
paste it onto the blast profile of the steel substrate. 
Using a hard knob, pressed it hard on the testex tape against the blast profile of 
the steel substrate to obtain a rough pattern. 
Remove the testex tape and measure blast profile using the manual profile gauge. 
The blast profile of the blasted surface is measured in microns. 
For using abrasive grit of mesh size 830 cc, the blast profile is usually around 
120 microns. 
For using abrasive grit of mesh size 1030 cc, the blast profile is usually within 70 
microns. 
Figure 101: Flow chart of blast profile measurement by testex profile tape.
Paint application: The paint application is to provide a film which gives protection 
or decoration of ship hull being painted. The success of any application and subsequent 
performance depends on some variables such as surface preparation, film thickness of the 
paint system, methods of application and conditions during application.
Film thickness measurement: The Wet Film Thickness (WFT) of the coating is measured 
and can be converted to a Dry Film Thickness (DFT) following the paint maker’s guidelines 
for that product. The wet film thickness measurement can be determined by how much 
coating should be applied to reach the specified DFT. The dry film or wet film ratio is based 
on percentage of solids by volume of the coating being used. The basic formula to measure 
the WFT is:
(%)
100)(
dVolumeSoli
mDFTWFT ×= µ
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Ship side coating thickness range: Different ship side area has different Dry Film 
Thickness (DFT). Table 45 shows ship side coating thickness range.
Locations/Areas Surface Preparation DFT range, µm
Topside
1. High pressure fresh water wash (3000-
5000 psi)
2. Grit blast Sa 2.0 or Sa 2.5
200-400 (epoxy)
Boot Top
150-300 (epoxy)
75-100 (tie coat)
150-200 (antifouling)
Vertical Side
200-300 (epoxy)
75-100 (tie coat)
250-300 (antifouling)
Flat Bottom
175-300 (epoxy)
75-100 (tie coat)
100-200 (antifouling)
Propeller 375-400
Rudder 500
Table 45: Ship side coating thickness range.
Method of paint application: Airless spray is now almost a universal method for 
ship side paint application. This is by far the most important and efficient method for 
the application of heavy-duty marine coatings, which allows the rapid application of large 
volumes of paint as well as the application of high build coatings without thinning. Airless spray 
method can reduce the overspray and bounce back problems. Moreover, it follows that ships 
paints must be formulated and manufactured to be suitable for application by airless spraying.
Airless spray is a technique of spray application which does not rely on the mixing of paint 
with air to provide atomization.Atomization is achieved by forcing the paint through a special 
and precise constructed nozzle or tip by hydraulic pressure. The choice of tip determines the 
film thickness applied per pass of the spray gun and should be selected in accordance with the 
coating manufacturer’s guidelines. The speed of each pass and volume solids of the paint will 
influence film thickness. Airless spray equipment normally operates at fluid line pressure up to 
5000 psi (352 kg/cm2) and care should be taken periodically. 
Modern products are most commonly applied by airless spray.One airless spray gun is 
capable of spraying between 50 and 80 litres of paint per hour, i.e. covering 150-400 m2/hr at 
the required film thickness. Moreover, airless spray application produces less overspray than 
conventional air-assisted spraying but there is some risk of painters inhaling spray droplets. 
Antifouling compositions offer special problems because of the poisons they contain, this applies 
both to the older copper poison types and more particularly to the organometallic poisons. 
Thus, suitable protective equipment must be used.
Commonly, painting must be inspected regularly to ensure that specifications regarding 
surface preparation, wet and dry film thickness, drying times, mixing of two-pack materials, 
overcoating intervals, quality of workmanship and others are met.
Condition during application: There are some factors which must be considered during 
paints application. The major factors are condition of substrate, temperature, relative humidity, 
weather conditions and condensation. The proper ambient temperature for steel hull painting 
process should be 3°C above dew point. Most paints can tolerate high humidity but condensation 
must not form on the surface being painted. During the painting process for the ship hull, the 
relative humidity must below 85%. Furthermore, paint should not be applied during fog, mist or 
raining. Generally, under these conditions, it is difficult to maintain the steel temperature above 
the dew point. Besides that, condensation is forbidden during hull painting process.
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Antifouling paints for the ship hull area: Generally, there are two basic mechanisms employed 
in coatings to prevent fouling settlement which are toxic antifouling and foul release coating.Toxic 
antifouling means that prevention of fouling by a surface coating requires the maintenance, in 
the water in contact with the coating, of a concentration of toxin that is lethal to all of the target 
organisms. Meanwhile foul release coating has a surface with very low surface energy which reduces 
the efficiency of the attachment process dramatically, i.e. a non-stick surface is presented to the 
organism.
Typical ship paints properties: Ship paints properties are very important for us to understand 
because this is important on choosing the correct and proper types of ship paints. The Table 46 
shows the properties of the ship hull painting systems most commonly used in the marine industry.
Coating compatibility: Coating compatibility is important when the maintenance or repair 
work is carried out, to ensure that the repair coat will adhere to the original paint, otherwise failures 
will occur between the individual layers (inter-coat adhesion failure). Incompatibility between coating 
types, such as epoxy anticorrosive coatings with some types of antifouling paints, can be overcomed 
by the use of a tie coat, which has good adhesion to both paint types and is therefore applied onto 
the anti-corrosive layer before the antifouling layer is applied. Thus, paint compatibility is a factor 
which must be takes as consideration. 
Performance of antifouling paints determined by hull roughness: Ship’s underwater hull 
is painted to protect the substrate and also prevent undue roughness. The most significant cause 
of hull roughness is fouling. Normally, paint fouling control technology can be characterized into 4 
types: Controlled Depletion Polymer (CDP), TBT Free Self Polishing Copolymer (SPC), Hybrid TBT 
Free Self Polishing Technology and Foul Release Technology. Each type of paint fouling control 
technology has different Average Hull Roughness (AHR) value. Table 47 shows the AHR value for 
these 4 types of AF paints. The paint fouling control which has smallest AHR value has lower 
percentage increase in power needed or fuel used. Thus, foul release technology can save more 
power and fuel used.
Paint Type Drying  Mechanism
Properties Area of Use
Mechanical Cosmetic Overcoatability Under water
Above  
Water
Acrylic Physical Moderate Very Good Good antifouling ⁄
Alkyd Oxidative Moderate Good Good - ⁄
Bituminous Physical Poor N⁄A Very Good ⁄ -
Chlorinated Rubber Physical Moderate Moderate Very Good ⁄ ⁄
Epoxy Chemical Cure Very Good Poor Poor ⁄ ⁄
Epoxy-Ester Oxidative Moderate Moderate Good - ⁄
Epoxy-Tar Chemical Cure Good N⁄A Moderate ⁄ -
Polyurethane Chemical Cure Very Good Very Good Moderate - ⁄
Polyurethane-Tar Chemical Cure Good N⁄A Moderate ⁄ -
Vinyl Physical Good Good Very Good - ⁄
Vinyl-Tar Physical Moderate N⁄A Very Good ⁄ -
Zinc Silicate Moisture Cure Very Good N⁄A
Very Poor-Self to 
Self Good-with 
epoxies
- ⁄
Table 46: Typical ship paints properties.
Types of paint fouling control technology Average Hull Roughness (AHR)
Controlled Depletion Polymer (CDP) 40 microns/year
TBT Free Self Polishing Copolymer (SPC) 20 microns/year
Hybrid TBT Free Self Polishing Technology 30 microns/year
Foul Release Technology 5 microns/year
Table 47: Average Hull Roughness (AHR) value for antifouling paints.
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Antifouling systems regulations and convention: Generally, antifouling system has 
their regulation to control the harmful antifouling systems on ships. This is very important 
for us to understand in order to enable the ship become compliant. In this research, I 
include Antifouling System (AFS) requirement and the Convention and Best Management 
Practices on marine pollution by removal of antifouling coatings from ships. From the 
AFS requirement, there is a prohibition on the application or re-application of organotin 
compounds which acts as biocides in antifouling systems. When existing vessels replaced 
the antifouling after 1 January 2003, they complied with this requirement or provided 
sealer to avoid a non-compliant antifouling to avoid leaching. All vessels after 1 January 
2008 shall either not bear such compounds on their hulls or external parts or surfaces; or 
apply coating that forms a barrier (sealers) to such compounds such as leaching from the 
underlying non-compliant antifouling systems.
Furthermore, Convention and Best Management Practices is to prevent marine pollution 
by the removal of ship antifouling coatings. Thus, management for AFS waste collection 
is very important throughout the process. The adoption of management practices for the 
application and removal of antifouling systems can reduce of biocides into the natural 
environment. The aspects include choice of antifouling system and collection, treatment 
and disposal of spent coatings which have an impact on the release of biocides into the 
environment. If not managed properly, it may result in high concentrations of biocides in the 
marine sediments in areas close to where application and removal activities are conducted.
Quality assurance: Each model has their own standards in order to make sure the 
standard is controlled and complied with the rules and requirements. To ensure the model 
is controlled efficiently, quality assurance plays an important role. The purpose of a quality 
assurance system is to prevent problems from occurring, detect them when they do, identify 
the cause, remedy the cause and prevent recurrence. Quality Assurance mechanism in this 
model is to ensure that accuracy and precision throughout a procedure. The parties involved 
in this procedure include Yard’s Painting executive, Shipowner’s representative, suppliers, 
Paint Manufacturer and Surveyors. The responsibility of Yard’s Painting executive is to use 
checklists and inspection records to ensure the standards are followed. Besides that, they 
will conduct audit by QA department on a monthly basis.If t sign of any incompliance is 
found, yard person such as Project Manager will issue Quality Assurance Note (QAN) or Non 
Conformance Report (NCR) towards suppliers. QAN is only for light or small incompliant but 
NCR is for heavy incompliant. 
Furthermore, Paint Manufacturer’s inspector must have a widely experience and good 
judgement in order to make sure the paint job was completed as specified. They need to 
take concern on many aspects throughout the painting process. Adhesion test or dolly 
test which is commonly known among the paint inspectors, would have to be carried out 
when the external hull of the ship is being grit blasted and applied fresh coatings. This is to 
ensure the paint adhesion onto the substrate hull can withstand a pull-out pressure of not 
less than 300 psi. The higher the pressure of the pull-out test, the stronger the adhesion of 
the paint onto the steel substrate is. All parties must take concern on their responsibilities 
to ensure the quality obtained is in compliance. Every daily log, tests and inspections work 
must be recorded for future evaluations of the painting. There are no any by-pass steps that 
can be skipped. Throughout the process above, the quality of the paint is assured.
Conclusion
Fouling is unwanted accumulation material on solid surface. There is either living organism 
(biofouling) or non living substance. Antifouling paints are used to prevent the biofouling. 
There are two types of antifouling paints which are toxic and non-toxic alternatives to TBT 
systems. Nowadays, there is a trend to use the foul release technology which is also known 
as non-toxic alternatives to TBT systems such as silicon-type foul release AF paint. This 
product is expensive and requires longer working period to accomplish but the long term 
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benefits can be seen from the smooth and faster speed of the vessel reaching its destination 
and it’s cost effective saving which is believed to be about 40%. According to LNG Carrier 
Owners Manual, foul release coatings are proving themselves to be the ideal solution for 
LNG hull and propeller fouling control. Not only can they keep hulls and propellers smooth 
and free of macro-fouling for extended service period of up to 60 months but in addition, 
since they do not use biocides to control fouling, they can be an integral part of an LNG 
environmental management plan.
Further more, ship paint application is the most important part to control the performance 
or quality of antifouling paints. High performance paint systems are especially sensitive 
to misapplication and knowledge of the application characteristics and recommended 
film thickness is vital to obtain optimum results. For optimum service life, the surface 
must be completely free of all contaminants that might impair performance and should be 
treated as such to assure good and permanent adhesion of the paint system. The quality 
of surface preparation has a direct relation with the lifetime of a system. Nowadays, the 
paint application method commonly used airless spray. The degree of skill of the personnel 
can affect the performance of paints. Besides that, paints materials, coating compatibility 
and environmental conditions also need to be concidered. Different paints materials have 
different properties, thus have different effects on the paints performance. 
Throughout the whole ship painting process, it is necessary to inspect the work as it 
progresses if there is to be any reasonable assurance that a paint job was completed as 
specified. There are many failure cases due to poor workmanship occurred after the work 
has been completed and has been paid for. Beside that, quality assurance is part of quality 
management focusing on increasing the ability to fulfill requirements of the process. As a 
conclusion, the model results are complied with the standard requirements.
Recommendation
There are many aspects in this research which could be investigated in the future. Some 
suggestion and recommendations on future study are as follow:
• The practical way to measure hull fouling is to use a professional diver to not only 
measure but to survey or inspect the general condition of the hull as a whole and 
record with video camera or CCTV. This is because hull fouling varies along the hull.
• There are many ship paints application methods discussed in this paper Therefore, it 
is suggested that investigation for each methods in much more details.
• The performance of AF paints can be determined by many factors. Thus, it is suggested 
that investigation for performance or quality of AF paints to be done in much more 
detail.
9. Safe Mooring and Berthing Protection System Analysis for Marine 
Facilities
Abstract
Waterway and port development work involves laborious activities and sub sequential 
use of large amount of energy. Efficient berthing and mooring is a function of safety 
and environmental conservation. Most inland waterways; lack facility for berthing.
Heavy seaborne traffic in port leads to the requirement of port terminal development or 
improvement. Marine terminal involved problem related to traffic and high cost. Availability 
of modular navigation facility (fender and anchor) for safe berthing and mooring, prevent 
accident occurrence, compensate of uncertainty and subsystem risk consideration factors. It 
also facilitate use of modular facility that reduce labour require, energy usage, hence carbon 
footage has gain approval of efficient product development in recent year. The use of such 
mobile equipments equally gives advantage to port to reduce port traffic, safety preservation 
of environment reduction in maintenance and berth allocation and reduction in accident 
related to loss of mooring function or hit on navigation structure. The study involved design 
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of a safe mooring system and selection of safe loading and unloading facilities to ensure the 
smooth safe navigation activity in waterway and reduction in the work delay. The berthing 
facility is moveable, floating structure that acts as a protection for ships safe berthing and 
mooring in waterway. The analysis involve design that determine the safe berthing velocity, 
the berthing energy, environmental load (wind and current) and material which are the 
important parameters for fender selection and to ensure that it is safe to carry out its 
function for safe mooring, loading and unloading activities. The use of light weight material, 
less energy can be employ for berthing and mooring for waterway operation, and provision 
of safety for the system can be discount for environmental conservation. The result of this 
study hoped to improve safety and efficiency mooring and berthing in waterway and port 
operation and handling of the ships entering and leaving the marine terminal and waterway.
Introduction
Worldwide seaborne traffic at inland waterways and ports is continually growing. This 
bring along high demand for ships from shipbuilding companies and also jetty constructions. 
Waterway and port operators need to enhance the facilities in the ports so that they can 
compete with the other competitors. Due to the restriction of the capital to build the facilities 
that need a lot of money for example jetty, berth required in order reducing the heavy 
seaborne traffic which is a burden to the port owner. A cost effective way alleviate such 
burden for port owner is to acquire floating pier which act as loading and unloading floating 
pier. Floating piers are much less costly compare to building a jetty or berth. Marine fenders 
and anchor are crucial to a ship berth. A proper fender design should effectively absorb or 
dissipate the kinetic energy carried by a docking ship and thus mitigate the impact force to 
a sustainable level [97]. Fender and anchor selection normally involves extensive trade-offs 
depending on the type, purpose, site, function and operation concept of a berthing facility. 
Standard fender design practice to date uses a nominal berthing energy specified in terms 
of the displacement, approach speed and attitude of docking ship. This paper describes the 
result of analysis of berthing and mooring system and selection of safe facility (fender and 
anchor) for waterway. The study determines the safe berthing velocity, berthing energy and 
environmental loading for ships at various displacements [98,99].
Methodology
Berthing facility structure and barge particulars
Platform which is originated as a barge is design because it is a moveable and floating 
structure which can be use anywhere and can be installed in anytime when needed. D-type 
fender and Tee bollard are selected to use as the protection equipments for the barge. Figure 
102, Table 48 shows process for berth. Figure 103 shows the process of for mooring system 
design.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Water Displacement of Ship (Md) 
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Eccentricity Coefficient (Ce) 
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Figure 102: Flow chart of determine the Berthing Energy (E).
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Environmental loads 
Standard/non standard mooring 
Figure 103: Mooring design process.
Particular Unit
LOA 67.3 m
Breadth 18.3 m
Moulded depth 3.7 m
Depth 2.68 m
Lightship 383 tons
Maximum Displacement 2380 tons
Maximum Draft 2.9 m
Capacity 2500 tons
Wetted Surface Area 1212.98 m2
Volume 2198.24 m3
Table 48: Barge particulars.
Berthing energy and berthing velocity: The berthing energy is used to determine the 
most suitable fender for the berthing facilities. The ships ranging from 1000-10000 tons in 
water displacement are choosing as models of ships that berth at the facilities. As the ship 
is stopped by the fender, the momentum of the entrained water continues to push against 
the ship and this effectively increases its overall mass. The mass of specified water is called 
Added Seawater Mass; the added sea-water influence coefficient is called Cm [100,101].
Water displacement of ship: The ships ranging from 1000-10000tons in water 
displacement for this analysis.
Added mass coefficient: Empirical formula for the added mass coefficient (Cm) is given as:
2
1
4
D LCm
Md
ρΠ
= +                                                                     (1)
Where, Cm = Added Mass Coefficient, D = Draft (m), L = Ship Length (m), P = Seawater 
Density (t/m3), Md = Wate Displacement of ship.
Berthing velocity: Empirical formula used for berthing speed (m/sec)
( )3
3
11
log
/ 1000
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v
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=                     (2)
Where, v = Berthing Speed (m/sec), MS = Loaded Water Displacement of the ship (tons)
Eccentricity coefficient: Empirical formula for the Eccentricity Coefficient (Ce)
( )2
1
1 /
Ce
I r
=
+                                 (3)
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Where: r = Gyration radius of ship against axial of enter of gravity on horizontal plane.I 
=Project of the distance between the center of gravity and berthing point on dock direction.
Berthing energy: The impacting energy calculation is subject to the ships berthing 
method which can be defined as following:
Ship-To-Ship Berthing energy empirical formula
( ) ( )
( )
1 1 2 1 2
1 1 2 1
0.5  
( )
Md Cm Md Cm
E V Ce
Md Cm Md Cm
 × × ×
= × × 
× + × 
                                         (4)
Where, E is Vessel effective berthing energy (ton.m), Md-Displacement Tonnage (ton), 
V-Berthing Velocity (m/s), Cm Added Mass Coefficient, Ce-Eccentricity Coefficient
The berthing velocity is obtained from actual measurements or relevant existing statistic 
information. When the actual measured speed velocity is not available, the BSI and PIANC 
etc. standard is adopted to determine the required velocity value [102,103]. The berthing 
energy is obtained from:
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Where, E-Vessel effective berthing energy (ton.m), Md-Displacement Tonnage (ton), 
V-Berthing Velocity (m/s), Cm Added Mass Coefficient, Ce-Eccentricity Coefficient. Berthing 
velocity is obtained 
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Where, v = Berthing Speed (m/sec), MS = Loaded Water Displacement of the ship (tons)
Environmental loads on berthing facilities: Moorings are classified as either fleet 
moorings or fixed moorings. A fleet mooring consists of structural elements, temporarily 
fixed in position, to which a vessel is moored. These structural elements include anchors, 
ground legs, a riser chain, a buoy and other mooring hardware. Lines and appurtenances 
provided by vessels are not a part of the fleet mooring. Loads on moored vessels are due 
to wind result primarily from drag. Eenvironmental loads which are winds, currents and 
waves produce loads on moored vessels are considered. Static wind and current loads 
are discussed in detail below. Static loads due to wind and current are separated into 
longitudinal load, lateral load, and yaw moment. Flow mechanisms which influence these 
loads include friction drag, form drag, circulation forces, and proximity effects. The mooring 
analysis is described in the flowing section [104,105]. 
Lateral wind load: Lateral wind load on barge is determined using the following:
21
2yw a w y DW w
F V A C sinρ θ=                                                                                   (9)
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Where: Fyw = lateral wind load, in pounds, Pa = mass density of air = 0.00237 slugs per 
cubic foot at 68°F, Vw = wind velocity, in feet per second, AY = lateral projected area of barge, 
in square feet, CDW = wind-force drag coefficient, θW = wind angle 
Longitudinal wind load: Longitudinal wind load on barge is determined using following:
21  
2xw a w x DW w
F V A C cosρ θ= −                                                                                          (10)
Where: Fxw = Longitudinal wind load, in pounds, Pa = Mass density of air = 0.00237 slugs 
per cubic foot at 68°F, Vw = Wind velocity, in feet per second, Ax = Longitudinal projected area 
of barge, in square feet, CDW = Wind-force drag coefficient
Wind Yaw Moment: Wind yaw moment is computed using the following:
 xyw yw wM F e=                                                                 (11)
Where: Mxyw = wind yaw moment, in foot-pounds, Fyw = lateral wind load, in pounds, ew = 
eccentricity of Fxw, in feet.
( )w
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L θ = − − °  
for 0 ≤ θW ≤ 180°,             (12)
( )w
3.125 e 0.0014 270
100 w
L θ = − − °  
for 180°< θW ≤ 360°            (13)
L= length of barge
Current loads developed on moored vessels result from form drag, friction drag, and 
propeller drag. Lateral forces are dominated by form drag. Form drag is dependent upon 
the ratio of vessel draft to water depth: as the water depth decreases, current flows around 
rather than underneath the vessel. Longitudinal forces due to current are caused by form 
drag, friction drag, and propeller drag. 
Lateral current load: Current loads developed on moored vessels result from form drag, 
friction drag, and propeller drag. Lateral forces are dominated by form drag. Form drag 
is dependent upon the ratio of vessel draft to water depth: as the water depth decreases, 
current flows around rather than underneath the vessel. Lateral current load is determined 
from the following equation:
21
2
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Where: Fyc = lateral current load, in pounds, Pw = mass density of water = 2 slugs per 
cubic foot for sea water, Vc = current velocity, in feet per second, LwL = vessel waterline length, 
in feet, T = vessel draft, in feet,Cyc = lateral current-force drag coefficient, θ = current angle
The lateral current-force drag coefficient is given by:
( (| ? ( ? |1 ? ? | ?) / 1))ky y y yC c C c oo C c C c oo e wd T
−= + − −              (15)
Where: Cyc = Lateral current-force drag coefficient,Cyc100 = Limiting value of lateral 
current-force drag coefficient for large values, of Wd/T, Cyc/1 = Limiting value of lateral, 
Current-force drag coefficient for Wd/T = 1, e = 2.718, k = Coefficient, wd = Water depth, in 
feet, T = Vessel draft, in feet
Longitudinal current load: Longitudinal forces due to current are caused by form 
drag, friction drag, and propeller drag [100,106]. Longitudinal current load procedures. 
Longitudinal current load is determined using the following equation:
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   xc x form x fricion x propF F F F= + +                  (16)
Where: Fxc=Total longitudinal current load, Fxform =Longitudinal current load due to form 
drag, Fx friction =Longitudinal current load due to skin friction drag, Fx prop=Longitudinal current 
load due to propeller drag, Form drag is given by the following equation:
2
 
1
2x form w c xcb c
F V BTC cosρ θ= −                (17)
Where: Fxform = Longitudinal current load due to form drag, Pw = Mass density of water = 2 
slugs per cubic foot for sea water, Vc = Average current speed, in feet per second, B = Vessel 
beam, in feet, T = Vessel draft, in feet, Cxcb = Longitudinal current form-drag coefficient = 
0.1, θ = Current angle.
Skin friction drag is given by the following equation:
2
 
1
2x fricion w c xca c
F V SC cosρ θ= −                 (18)
Where: Fx friction = Longitudinal current load due to skin friction, Pw = Mass density of water 
= 2 slugs per cubic feet for sea water, Vc = Average current speed, in feet per second, Wetted 
surface area, in square feet.
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T = Vessel draft, in feet, LwL = Waterline length of vessel, in feet, D = Displacement of ship, 
in long tons, Cxca = Longitudinal skin-friction coefficient 
( )2
0.075  
2nlogR −
                                                                                (20)
Rn = Reynolds number = V LwLc cos θc/γ, γ = Kinematic viscosity of water (1.4x10
-5 square 
feet per second), θc= Current angle
Current yaw moment: Current Yaw moment procedure for determining current yaw 
moment. Environmental loading data considered is given in Table 49. Current yaw moment 
is determined using the following equation:
 cxyc yc
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Where: Mxyc = Current yaw moment, in foot-pounds, Fyc = Lateral current load, in pounds, 
c
WL
e
L
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= Ratio of eccentricity of lateral current load measured along the longitudinal axis of 
the vessel from amidships to vessel waterline length, ec = Eccentricity of Fyc, LwL = Vessel 
waterline length, in feet. The value of c
WL
e
L
 
 
 
is given as a function of current angle, θc and 
vessel type.
Environmental Consideration
Wind Normal wind speed = 8m/secExtreme wind speed = 10.7m/sec
Waves Max wave height = 0.5m(for 10.7m/sec)
Current Slight change 1-1.2m/sec
Average water depth 6 m
Table 49: Environmental parameters.
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Winds, currents and waves produce dynamic loads on moored vessels due to waves 
follows. Static loads due to wind and current are separated into longitudinal load, lateral 
load and yaw moment. The following relations are used to determine the wind and waves 
loads [100,107].
21
2yw a w y DW w
F V A C sinρ θ=                               (22)
2 cos1
2yw a w y DW w
F V A Cρ θ=                                                                              (23)
Result and Discussion
Physical system parameters: General arrangement of for mobile berthing facilities is 
designed based on specification:
Vessel-Length of vessel (Length overall 76.2 m ( L), Beam (B) 21.3 m, Draft (D) 4.0 m), 
Waterway-(Depth 6 m, Width 3 B, UKC 40%)
Berthing energy: Berthing velocity for the ships displacement range of 1000 tons to 
10000 tons of water displacement is considered. The highest speed value of the berthing 
velocity occur when the 1000tons displacement ship berthing at the berthing facilities which 
is 0.6667m/sec, the higher the value of water displacement of the ship, the lower value of 
berthing velocity.0.653knot is considered best operating speed for vessel of 2000tons and 
0.5267 knot is considered optimal speed for vessel of 5000 tons (Figure 104). 
Considering ships of 1000 to 10000 tons displacement, the optimal berthing energy for 
the 2000 tons displacement ship berthing is 104.1ton.m and for 5000 is 94.2 Tons (Figure 
105). Figure 106 shows PIANC acceptability criteria, where a. Easy berthing (sheltered) 
b.dificult berthing (berthing) c. easy berthing (exposed, d. Good berthing (exposed), Difficult 
berthing (exposed).
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Figure 104: Graph water displacement versus berthing velocity.
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Figure 105: Graph water displacement versus berthing velocity.
 
Figure 106: PIANC Standard for berthing velocity.
The wind angle is taken from 30oc to 175oc with the average 30oc as interval. The 
maximum lateral wind load occurs when the wind is extreme at 90oc which has the value of 
3109.75pounds. The maximum longitudinal wind load occurs when the wind is extreme at 
175oc which has the value of 1500.52 pounds. Figure 107 can be considerably acceptable 
as the amount may have little impact in the vessel dynamic positioning. The current angle 
is taken from 30oc to 175oc with the average 30oc as interval. The maximum lateral current 
load occurs at the berthing maximum draft and current angle of 90oc which has the value of 
112.34pounds. The maximum longitudinal current load occurs at berthing minimum draft 
and current angle of 145oc which has the value of 12.21pounds (Figure 108).
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Figure 107: Wind angle versus wind load.
  
Figure 108: Current angle versus current load.
Mooring and berthing facilities selection: Design of mooring components
Total Lateral load on berthing facilities
= Total lateral wind load + total lateral current load
= 3109.75 pounds + 113.24 pounds = 3222.09 pounds
Total longitudinal load on berthing facilities
= Total longitudinal wind load + total longitudinal current load
= 1500.53 pounds + 12.53 pounds = 1513.06 pounds
The horizontal hawser load using the following equation:
2 2
xT yTH F F= +
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2 21513.06 ?3222.09 3559.66H pounds= + =
Where: H = horizontal hawser load, FxT = total longitudinal load, FyT = total lateral load
Chain selection: Approximate chain tension, T = 1.12 H (Horizontal Hawser Load) = 
3986.66 pounds
Maximum allowable working load, Tbreak 
Tdesign = 0.35 Tbreak 
3986.66 pounds = 0.35 Tbreak 
Tbreak = 11390.46 pounds
*1-inch chain with a breaking strength of 14,500 pounds
Anchor selection: Most fleet moorings use either a Stockless or a Stato anchor because 
there is considerable Navy experience with these anchor types, they are currently in large 
supply and they have been tested extensively. Furthermore, Stockless and Stato anchors can 
be used to satisfy the required capacity of the standard fleet moorings for most conditions. 
Parameter in determine the type of anchor chain is as followed [108,109].
Holding capacity = efficiency x weight
3559.52 = (4) (weight)
Weight = 3559.66/4 =889.92pounds /0.9 kips
1,000-pound (1-kip) Stockless anchor can be selecteed
Total Lateral load on berthing facilities is 3222.09 pounds, the total longitudinal load on 
berthing facilities is 1512.73 pounds and the horizontal hawser load, H is 3559.52 pounds. 
Fender selection: According to the British standard, the ultimate fender capacity is 2 X 
berthing Energy. The maximum berthing energy occurs when the berthing facilities are in 
the maximum load and the berthing ship is at 1000 tons displacement which has the value 
of 89 ton.m. The fender capacity must be at least 2 x 89 ton.m = 178 ton.m. 
Conclusion
This paper presents analysis of safe mooring and berthing as well as selection of safe 
berthing and protection navigation structure (anchor and fender) require for protection of 
the facilities. The berthing facilities can help to improve safety, contribute to subsystem 
analysis that reduces uncertainty risk in waterway. The heavy seaborne traffic and the 
cost of building an extra Jetty which may become a burden to ports operator can also be 
offset with information deduce from the study. Mobile berthing facilities can be installed 
anytime and anywhere to help the port operator to save money and time. The analysis can 
be improved as a working platform by simulation and prototyping for experiment that can 
be used for further investigation.
10. CFD Simulation for Cavitation Studies and Optimization of Propeller 
Blade
Abstract
Propeller cavitation is a major problem in ship operation and the costs of repair and 
maintenance is high for ship-owner.Proper design of propeller plays a very important 
role in life cycle and the performance of vessel. The use of simulation to observe various 
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parameters that affect cavitations can be helpful to optimize propeller performance. This 
project design and simulates cavitations flow of a Kaplan series, Fixed Pitch Propeller 
(FPP) of a 48 meters Multipurpose Deck Ship at 11 knots. Simulation test was carried out 
for laminar and turbulent flow using Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD) approach to 
observe cavitations occurrence at selected radius (300 rpm and 600 rpm). The parameters 
consider are pitch angle, angle of attack, viscosity of sea water, operating vapour pressure in 
the seawater, engine power, lift and drag vectors of each of the blade sections and resultant 
velocity of the fluid flow.Comparison of performance is made and it compares well with 
the theory. Thrust coefficient (KT), torque coefficient (KQ), thrust (T), advance coefficient (J) 
and cavitations number (σ), was calculated to deduce efficiency and validate the model. 
The study can be use to build prototype physical model that could be beneficial for future 
additional experimentation investigation.
Keywords: Simulation, cavitation, optimization, performance, propeller
Introduction
Marine propeller is a propulsion system which turns the power delivered by the engine 
into thrust to drive the vessel through water. Propeller cavitation is a general problem 
encountered by the ship owner, whereby it causes vibrations, noises, degradation of 
propeller performance, deceases engine efficiencies, effects the life cycle of the ship and also 
resulted in high cost of maintenance. 
The basic physics of cavitation occurs when the pressure of liquid is lower or equal to 
the vapour pressure, which depends on the temperature thus forming cavities or bubbles. 
The compression of pressure surrounding the cavities would break the cavities into smaller 
parts and this increases the temperature. Collapse of bubbles if contact with parts of the 
propeller blades will create high localized forces that subsequently erode the surface of the 
blades. 
Simulation on cavitating flow using CFD can be carried out to determine the performance 
of the propeller. A model is generated in Gambit and fluid flow physics are apply to predict 
the fluid dynamics and other physical phenomena related to propeller[110]. Stated that, 
CFD can provide potential flow analysis such as flow velocities and pressure at every point 
in the problem domain as well as the inclusion of viscous effects. 
Previous studies on propeller cavitation: [111] in their studies, generated hybrid grid 
of about 187 000 cells using Gambit and TGrid.The blade surface was firstly meshed with 
triangles including the root, tip and blade edges. The turbulent boundary layer was resolved 
with four layers of prismatic cells between blade and hub surfaces. In the cavitating propeller 
case, the boundary conditions were set to simulate the flow around a rotating propeller 
in open water. Inlet boundary, velocity components for uniform stream, blade and hub 
surfaces, and outer boundary were included.This ensured the rotational periodicity of the 
propeller on the exit boundary by setting the pressure corresponding to the given cavitation 
number and other variables was later extrapolated [112,113]. 
On the other hand [112] applied a mixture models with algebraic slip to simulate 
cavitating flow over a NACA 66 hydrofoil. This multiphase flow model which is incompressible 
fluids consists of liquid and vapour was used as primary and secondary phase respectively. 
Structured quadrilateral grids of 19 490 cells were meshed.Inflow and outflow boundary 
were indicated as velocity magnitude and direction and zero gauge pressure respectively. 
Contour of vapour volume fraction shown in Figure 109 indicates that cavity can be observed 
at the mid-chord region [114,115]. 
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Figure 109: Cavity at the mid-chord region.
This study is focused mainly on simulating a cavitating flow at the propeller blade 
section of Kaplan series order to optimize the propeller blade to increase its performance. 
Two-dimensional simulations of different radius were carried out at different revolution 
per minute (rpm) and the results were compared based on the pressure difference. The 
objective is to simulate and investigate the water flow at the propeller blade section and to 
recommend measure to reduce cavitation in order to increase its efficiencies [114,116].
Methodology
Model generation in gambit
The Propeller Blade models of 0.2R and 0.6R were generated and computational domains 
were created to assume water is flowing from far towards the Propeller Blade. Figure 109 and 
Table 50 show far field boundary conditions surrounding the Propeller Blade. Then, meshing 
was carried out between the boundaries and Propeller Blade to determine the accuracy of 
the model generation. Figure 110 and 111 show the meshing process [117,118,119].
 
Figure 110: Creation of far field boundaries to simulate the fluid behaviour in Fluent.
Curve Boundary condition
AED
AB
CD
BC
Far field 1
Far field 2
Far field 2
Far field 3
Table 50: Boundary conditions for simulating fluid behaviour.
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Figure 111: Meshing process of 0.2R Propeller Blade section.
 
Figure 112: Meshing result of 0.2R Propeller Blade section with boundaries creation.
Numerical method: The Propeller Blade of 0.2R and 0.6R were simulated in Fluent 
6.3.26. Pressure based numerical solver, laminar and turbulent physical model were selected 
as the functioning base for 300rpm and 600rpm. Then, the material properties for instance 
and the density of sea water and viscosity value were defined and calculated. Consequently, 
the operating condition was set to be 2296 Pa, which is the condition for vapour pressure 
at sea, water when the temperature is 20°C. On the other hand, the boundary conditions 
of far field 1 and far field 2 were specified as velocity inlet, where by the velocity magnitude 
and direction was calculated [120,121]. 
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As for far field 3, this boundary was specifies as pressure outlet, the gauge pressure was 
set to be 0 Pa. The existence of inflow and outflow boundaries enables the characteristics 
of fluid to be observed by entering and leaving the flow domain. The turbulent viscosity 
ratio was set to correspond to the default value for 600 rpm of both radiuses. Next, the 
solution procedure was set as simple algorithm, and under discretization, the pressure and 
momentum were set as Standard and First Order upwind respectively [122,123]. 
Results and Discussions
Three Propeller Blade section profiles at different radius, such as 0.2R, 0.6R and 1.0R 
were simulated. The CFD results were then, visualized and analyzed for comparison. 
Result of 0.2R propeller blade section: The CFD results, for instance, three residuals 
of CFD calculation lift and drag force, velocity vector plot, and contour plot were visualized 
and analyzed.
Iteration O.2R: Figure 112 shows 250 iteration results, whereby the continuity; 
x-velocity and y-velocity were calculated for flow equation. 
 
Figure 113:  Iteration results of three residuals.
Based on Figure 113, it can be seen that the residuals were moving upwards and not 
fulfilling the converging criteria, that is to be below 0.001. This shows that the solution was 
diverging instead of converging. As for the lift and drag vector force, Figure 113 and 114 
shows a divergence result which is not compatible with the convergence criteria.
 
Figure 114: Lift vector force iterated by CFD solver.
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Figure 115: Drag vector force iterated by CFD solver.
Contours of velocity vectors: Laminar flow of 0.2R Propeller Blade section at 300 rpm 
is observable in Figure 115 and 116. There is no pressure gradient observed surrounding 
the Propeller Blade section. This indicates that the possibility of cavitation to occur is very 
small. 
 
Figure 116: Contour of velocity vector of 0.2R at 300rpm and 600rpm.
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Figure 117: Low velocity vector of 0.6R at leading and trailing edge at 300 rpm and 600 rpm.
Contours of absolute pressure: Laminar flow of 0.2R Propeller Blade section at 300 
rpm is observable in Figure 117. There is no pressure gradient observed surrounding the 
Propeller Blade section. This indicates that the possibility of cavitation to occur is very 
small.
 
Figure 118: No pressure gradient which indicated no cavitation occurrence at 300rpm.
Turbulent flow at 600 rpm shows pressure difference in Figure 118. Lowest pressure is 
observed below the Propeller Blade section. This indicates that possibility of cavitation to occur 
is high. 
158
 
Figure 119: Lowest pressure is observed below 0.2R Propeller Blade section.
Result of 0.6R propeller blade section: For 0.6R Propeller Blade section, the CFD 
results, for instance, three residuals of CFD calculation, lift and drag force, velocity vector 
plot and contour plot were visualized and analyzed. 
Iteration of 0.6R
Figure 119 shows 250 iteration results, whereby the continuity; x-velocity and y-velocity 
were calculated for flow equation. It can be seen that the residuals were moving downwards 
equivalent to the convergence criteria, which is 0.001. This shows that the solution was 
converging. 
 
Figure 120: Iteration results for continuity, x-velocity and y-velocity.
Lift and drag vector force as shown in Figure 120 and 121 shows a convergence solution 
through the lift and drag convergence history.
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Figure 121: Monitoring the solution convergence through lift convergence history.
 
Figure 122: Monitoring solution convergence through drag convergence history.
On the other hand, laminar flow simulation of 0.6R at 300 rpm resulted in lower pressure 
observable at the trailing edge as shown in Figure 122.
 
Figure 123: Lower pressure at trailing edge of 0.6R.
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Besides, turbulent flow for 0.6R of 300 rpm is seen that cavitation occurred at the upper 
surface of the Propeller Blade section as shown in Figure 123.
 
Figure 124: Low pressure is spotted at the upper surface of the Propeller Blade section.
For the 600 rpm, huge area of lower pressure is observed at the upper surface of the 0.6R 
Propeller Blade section of the turbulent flow as shown in Figure 124.
 
Figure 125: Huge area of lower pressure is observed at the upper surface.
Based on the above contours, cavitations can happen if the Propeller Blade radius section 
increases, especially for 0.6R compare to 0.2R. This is because, the bigger the radius, 
much pressure would be concentrated at that location. Besides this, in the turbulent flow, 
cavitation is more likely to induce compare to laminar flow due to its fluid characteristics. 
Also, the higher the rpm, the lower the absolute pressure. 
Graph of absolute pressure versus curve length: The graph in Figure 125 shows that, 
the pressure decreases when it pass by the Propeller Blade which equivalent to the diagrams 
shown above and as it leave the Propeller Blade, the pressure slowly increases back to its 
actual pressure. 
Figure 126: Absolute pressure characteristic moving across a Propeller Blade.
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Figure 126 shows cavitation number, σ versus advance coefficient, based on the graph. 
When the propeller rotates at 300 rpm, the operating condition falls in the region for 
conventional propeller, which is suitable for most of the merchant vessels, whereas, at 
600 rpm, propeller operating condition falls in the poor region for high speed propeller 
operation. This indicates low efficiency for propeller since low advance coefficient implies 
high propeller power coefficient. This is probably due to inaccurate application of propeller 
rotational speed with engine load and gear box used.
Figure 127: Cavitation number, σ versus advance coefficient.
When the propeller rotates at 300 rpm, the advance coefficient and cavitation number 
reaches the region for conventional propeller operation. This means that at 300 rpm, the 
propeller rotates at a good condition suitable to the engine load and gear box required. On 
the other hand, when the propeller rotates at higher speed, it reaches at the poor region 
for high speed propeller operation which indicates damages, vibration and cavitation would 
occur. Based on the results of velocity and contour plots of 300 rpm and 600 rpm, the 
higher the rpm, the lower the absolute pressure, which is the condition for cavitation to 
occur. This is caused by high rotational rates of the propeller which creates high and low 
pressure region on the blades. Besides, when the radius increases along the propeller, 
cavitation might happen too. Airfoil section profile at 0.2R does not have cavitation due to 
less pressure concentration in that region compare to 0.6R airfoil section profile. At 0.6R 
airfoil section profile, more works are required to be done in that region.  
Conclusion
The paper presents the result of water flow at the blade section profile. Cavitation 
occurrence is observed to be at the upper surface of 0.6R compare to 0.2R of Propeller 
Blade section due to different pressure concentration. Besides, cavitation is predicted at 
low absolute pressure when the rpm is high and this correlate with theory hypothesis. 
Optimization of the propeller can be achieved by increasing the Blade Area Ratio (BAR) 
and compare it with the standard Kaplan BAR value that is, 0.85. The result deduce from 
this study can be added to existing databased for validation purposes especially for ship 
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navigating with the Malaysia water. This could provide information on environmental 
differential impact on propeller. It is recommended that further multiphase, experimental 
simulation should carry out to test rotational speed of propeller at different power produced 
by the engine load.
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